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Unbefriended And Unrepresented: Better Medical Decision Making For Incapacitated Patients Without Healthcare Surrogates

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UNBEFRIENDED AND UNREPRESENTED: BETTER MEDICAL DECISION MAKING FOR INCAPACITATED PATIENTS WITHOUT HEALTHCARE SURROGATES

Thaddeus Mason Pope*

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INTRODUCTION

How should we make medical decisions for incapacitated patients who have no available legally-authorized surrogate decision maker? Because these patients lack decision-making capacity, they cannot authorize treatment themselves. Because they lack a surrogate, nobody else can authorize treatment either. Clinicians and researchers have referred to these individuals as “adult orphans” or as “unbefriended,” “isolated,” or “unrepresented” patients.¹ Clinicians and researchers have also described them as “unimaginably helpless,”² “highly vulnerable,” and as the “most vulnerable,”³ because “no one cares deeply if they live or die.”⁴

The persistent challenges involved in obtaining consent for medical treatment on behalf of these individuals is an immense problem in ethics and patients’ rights. Some commentators describe caring for the unbefriended as “one of the most difficult problems in medical decision making.”⁵ Others call it the “single greatest category of problems” encountered in bioethics consultations.⁶

Appropriately, this problem is getting more attention. Major policy reports from both legal and medical associations have focused on decision making for the unbefriended.⁷ Perhaps most notably, the

1. See *infra* Part II.

2. Winsor C. Schmidt, *Guardianship for Vulnerable Adults in North Dakota: Recommendations Regarding Unmet Needs, Statutory Efficacy, and Cost Effectiveness*, 89 N.D. L. REV. 77, 83 (2013).

3. Timothy W. Farrell et al., *AGS Position Statement: Making Medical Treatment Decisions for Unbefriended Older Adults*, 65 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y. 14, 15 (2017).

4. Naomi Karp & Erica Wood, *Incapacitated and Alone: Healthcare Decision Making for Unbefriended Older People*, 31 HUMAN RIGHTS 20, 21 (2004) [hereinafter Karp & Wood, *Incapacitated and Alone*]. “He’s a human being, and a terrible thing is happening to him. So attention must be paid. He’s not to be allowed to fall into his grave like an old dog. Attention, attention must be finally paid to such a person.” ARTHUR MILLER, *DEATH OF A SALESMAN* 44 (Taisha Abraham ed. 2011) (1949).

5. THE HASTINGS CENTER, *GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING* 24 (David H. Smith & Robert M. Veatch eds., 1987) [hereinafter *GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION*].

6. Karp & Wood, *Incapacitated and Alone*, *supra* note 4, at 21.

7. See, e.g., Farrell et al., *supra* note 3; Karp & Wood, *Incapacitated and Alone*, *supra* note 4; N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, *WHEN OTHERS MUST CHOOSE: DECIDING FOR PATIENTS WITHOUT CAPACITY* 161–175 (1992); JESSICA E. BRILL ORTIZ, *ADVOCATING FOR THE UNBEFRIENDED ELDERLY: AN INFORMATIONAL BRIEF* 3 (2010); CTR. FOR ADVOC. FOR THE RIGHTS AND INTS. OF THE ELDERLY (CARIE), *MEETING THE NEEDS OF PERSONS WITH ALZHEIMER’S OR OTHER DEMENTIA WHEN NO INFORMAL SUPPORT IS AVAILABLE* 1 (2010); MED. DECISION-MAKING FOR UNKNOWN AND

elite mainstream media has repeatedly covered the problem of the unbefriended in the United States.⁸ Decision-making for the unbefriended has also been the primary topic of recent day-long or multi-day conferences,⁹ both themed, subject-specific conferences, and individual sessions at several national and regional professional association meetings.¹⁰

UNREPRESENTED PATIENTS: A REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE HARV. ETHICS LEADERSHIP GRP. BY THE CMTY. ETHICS COMM. 4 (2016).

8. See, e.g., Lois Henry, *Need A Worthwhile Project?: Consider This One*, BAKERSFIELD (Oct. 11, 2014), http://www.bakersfield.com/columnists/lois-henry-need-a-worthwhile-project-consider-this-one/article_e954639a-790b-5c32-9fd9-f1bb89c1391f.html; Phyllis Korkki, *Childless And Aging?: Time To Designate A Caregiver*, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2012), <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/business/retirementspecial/for-childless-older-people-legal-and-logistical-challenges.html>; Tim Lahey, *Voiceless At The End Of Life*, SCI. AM. (Aug. 2, 2013), <https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/voiceless-at-the-end-of-life/>; Paula Span, *Hiring An End-Of-Life Enforcer*, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2013, 12:33 PM), <https://newoldage.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/24/hiring-an-end-of-life-enforcer/>; Paula Span, *When There's No Family*, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2013, 12:10 PM), <https://newoldage.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/23/when-theres-no-family/>; Carina Storrs, *The 'Elder Orphans' Of The Baby Boom Generation*, CNN (May 18, 2015), <http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/18/health/elder-orphans/>.

9. See, e.g., NorthShore U. Health Sys., *Regional Meeting* (April 17, 2017); Hospice & Palliative Care Assn. of New York, *2017 Annual Interdisciplinary Seminar & Meeting* (Mar. 31, 2017); N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., *The Sixth Annual John Corser Ethics Conference: The Unbefriended* (May 21, 2015); U. of Ark. for Med. Sci., *Intensive Workshop on Healthcare Ethics: Making Decisions for Others* (May 7–8, 2015); David T. Ozar, Professor, Loyola U. Chicago, *The Unbefriended: A New Protected Class of Patients?*, Address at the 2015 Annual Am. Coll. of Legal Med. meeting (Feb. 28, 2015).

10. See, e.g., Maura George, *The "Unbefriended" Patient – When there is No One to Speak for the Patient*, Georgia Healthcare Ethics Consortium 2017 Annual Conference (Mar. 23, 2017); Jean T. Abbott, Jackie Glover, and Thaddeus M. Pope, *Caring for the "Unrepresented Patient": Strategies to Avoid Moral Distress and Substandard Care*, 12th International Conference on Clinical Ethics Consultation (panel presentation) (May 19–22, 2016); Eric Widera et al., *Unbefriended: Medical Decision Making for the Incapacitated and Alone*, American Academy of Hospice and Palliative Medicine Annual Assembly (March 11, 2016); David Harris and James Shaughnessy, *The Unbefriended Patient: Ethics and Other Considerations*, Tufts Medical Center Medical Grand Rounds (March 23, 2016); Allyson L. Robichaud, *Medical Decision-Making for Patients Without Proxies: The Effect of Personal Experience in the Deliberative Process*, Association for Practical and Professional Ethics 25th Annual International Conference (Feb. 19, 2016); Sharona Hoffman & David Orentlicher, *The Unbefriended Elderly: Making Medical Decisions for Patients without Surrogates* (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association of Law Schools, Section on Law, Medicine, and Health Care) (Jan. 3, 2015); Joan H. Hellyer, Kathy Meyerle, and Brent Moos, *Decision-Making for the Unbefriended Patient: A Model Approach* (paper presented at the 11th Annual International Conference on Clinical Ethics Consultation) (May 21, 2015); Leslie Kuhnel, *Representing the Voices of Unrepresented Persons* (paper presented at the 10th International Conference on Clinical Ethics Consultation) (April 25, 2014); Janice Fujiwara, Brian Emmert, and Maria T. Carney, *Elder Orphans: Hiding in Plain Sight* (paper presented at the American Geriatrics Society Annual Scientific Meeting) (May 14, 2015); Robert V. Doyle, *The Unbefriended Patient: An Ethical Framework for Decision-Making* (paper presented at the Australasian Association of Bioethics and Health Law Conference) (July 13, 2013); Geri Sprague-Damon and Carol S. Huffman, *Taking the Lead, Seizing Opportunity—LCSW as Health Care Proxy* (paper presented at the Society for Social Work Leadership in Healthcare 45th

Finally, the problem of the unbefriended has received increasing attention not only in the meeting halls of conferences, but also in the pages of academic literature.¹¹ New articles have been printed in law journals,¹² medical journals,¹³ nursing journals,¹⁴ long-term care journals,¹⁵ and bioethics journals.¹⁶ Even the popular media is covering the problem.¹⁷

Annual Meeting and Conference) (Nov. 3-6 2010); Thaddeus M. Pope, Martin L. Smith, and Douglas B. White, *The Unbefriended Must Not Be Unprotected: Organizational and Clinical Management of Patients Without Surrogates* (presentation at 17th Annual Meeting of the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities) (Oct. 22, 2015); Karon M. Coleman and Hana Osman, *Incapacitated and Alone: Social Workers as Proxies* (paper presented at the 23rd Annual University of Miami Miller School of Medicine Bioethics Program Conference, Florida Ethics: Debates, Decisions, Solutions) (April 17, 2015); Karen Armstrong, *Making Decisions for Patients without a Surrogate*, Illinois Hospital Association Ethics Training Series Webinar (Aug. 14, 2013); 39th Meeting of the New Hampshire-Vermont Hospital Ethics Committee Network: *If the Patient Can't Decide, then What?* (April 7, 2014); Joan H. Hellyer, *Decision Making for the Unbefriended Patient*, Center for Christian Bioethics Grand Rounds, Loma Linda University (Feb. 26, 2014); Mark Repenshek, *A Patient's Best Interests: How Can Ethical Decisions Be Made without Surrogates?* (paper presented at the 11th Annual Conference on Contemporary Catholic Healthcare Ethics, Clinical Care and Institutional Identity in the Catholic Tradition, Loyola University Chicago Stritch School of Medicine) (March 13-14, 2014); Susan F. Cohn and Margaret H. Reiff, *Care Management Challenges with the 'Unbefriended Elder'* (paper presented at the 18th Annual Jarvie Colloquium: Mindful Aging) (June 20, 2013); Kathryn Beauchamp et al., *Who Will Care about Me?* (paper presented at the Colorado Healthcare Ethics Forum: Quandary of the Unbefriended and Incapacitated) (April 26, 2012); Jessica Evert, *Decision Making for the Unrepresented Patient* (paper presented at the Sutter Health California Pacific Medical Center Annual Summer Workshop in Clinical Ethics, San Francisco) (June 8, 2013). Decision making for the unbefriended was even the subject of a recent Twitter Chat. BioethxChat, *Patients without Surrogates*, TWITTER (April 20, 2015).

11. See, e.g., Grace Farris, *The Library Card*, 385 LANCET 766 (2015) [http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736\(15\)60426-3/fulltext](http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(15)60426-3/fulltext); Megan-Jane Johnstone, *Caring about the Unbefriended Elderly*, 21(9) AUSTRALIAN NURSING & MIDWIFERY J. 20 (2014); Christine Kilgore, *The 'Unbefriended' Challenge PALTC*, 15(6) CARING FOR THE AGES 1 (June 2014) [http://www.caringfortheages.com/article/S1526-4114\(14\)00225-X/fulltext](http://www.caringfortheages.com/article/S1526-4114(14)00225-X/fulltext); Fred Rincon, *Emergency Management of Acute Ischemic Stroke in Incapacitated Patients Who Have No Surrogate Decision Makers*, 17(6) CONTINUUM LIFELONG LEARNING NEUROLOGY 1335 (2011); Martin L. Smith & Catherine L. Luck, *Desperately Seeking a Surrogate—For a Patient Lacking Decision-Making Capacity*, 4(2) NARRATIVE INQUIRIES IN BIOETHICS 161 (2014) <http://muse.jhu.edu/article/552051>; Rebecca L. Volpe & Deborah Steinman, *Peeking Inside the Black Box: One Institution's Experience Developing Policy for Unrepresented Patients*, 36(2) HAMLIN L. REV. 265 (2013).

12. See, e.g., Volpe & Steinman, *supra* note 11.

13. See, e.g., Farris, *supra* note 11; Rincon, *supra* note 11.

14. See, e.g., Johnstone, *supra* note 11.

15. See, e.g., Kilgore, *supra* note 11, at 12.

16. See, e.g., Smith & Luck, *supra* note 11.

17. See, e.g., Paul C. McLean, *The Loneliest Patients: When They Can't Make Decisions, Who Will?*, WBUR COMMONHEALTH (Oct. 19, 2016), <http://www.wbur.org/commonhealth/2016/10/19/unbefriendedpatientspaulmclean>; Encarnacion Pyle, *More 'Elder Orphans' without Family Nearby Needing Help*, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Nov. 13, 2016).

But while the problem has been increasingly recognized and acknowledged, it has not yet been adequately mitigated or resolved. In 1987, the Hastings Center released *Guidelines on the Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment and Care of the Dying*.¹⁸ The eminent bioethics think tank observed that “no decision making mechanism is widely available to find attentive surrogates for the many people without them. There is also as yet no consensus on the proper solution.”¹⁹

Nearly thirty years later, far too little has changed. There is still no consensus on the proper solution. Across the United States, few jurisdictions have developed laws or policies that adequately protect this most vulnerable population.²⁰ “Existing mechanisms to address the issue of decision-making for the unbefriended are scant and not uniform.”²¹ Most facilities are “muddling through on an ad hoc basis.”²²

In 2015, the Institute of Medicine made substantially the same pessimistic observations in its own comprehensive report on end-of-life care.²³ And in 2016, American Geriatrics Society updated its earlier 1996 position statement.²⁴ The AGS identified “significant state-to-state variability in legal approaches to unbefriended

18. GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION, *supra* note 5.

19. *Id.* at 25.

20. Am. Med. Dir. Ass’n, *White Paper on Surrogate Decision-Making and Advance Care Planning in Long-Term Care*, SOC’Y FOR POST-ACUTE & LONG-TERM CARE MED. (Mar. 1, 2003), <http://www.paltc.org/amda-white-papers-and-resolution-position-statements/white-paper-surrogate-decision-making-and> (“Only a few states specify a procedure . . . [for a] patient without a surrogate.”); Joseph Sacco, *Incapacitated, Alone, and Treated to Death*, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2008), <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/07/health/views/07case.html>.

21. MARY JOY QUINN, GUARDIANSHIPS OF ADULTS: ACHIEVING AUTONOMY, JUSTICE, AND SAFETY 112 (2005). I have collected examples of institutional policies on decision making for the unbefriended at <http://thaddeuspope.com/consent/unbefriended.html>.

22. Marshall B. Kapp, *The ‘Voluntary’ Status of Nursing Facility Admissions: Legal, Practical, and Public Policy Implications*, 24(1) CRIM. & CIVIL CONFINEMENT 1, 12 (April 1997) [hereinafter *The ‘Voluntary’ Status of Nursing Facility Admissions*]; Marshall B. Kapp, *Editorial—Surrogate Decision-Making for the Unbefriended: Social and Ethical Problem, Legal Solution?* 1(2) J. ETHICS, L. & AGING 83 (1995) [hereinafter *Surrogate Decision-Making*].

23. See COMM. ON APPROACHING DEATH, INST. OF MED., DYING IN AMERICA: IMPROVING QUALITY AND HONORING INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES NEAR THE END OF LIFE 24–25 (2015) [hereinafter *DYING IN AMERICA*].

24. Farrell, *supra* note 3.

patients.”²⁵ And it concluded that these variations “create confusion for health care providers,” resulting in “harms including treatment delays or prolongation of potentially burdensome treatments.”²⁶

The purpose of this Article is to help improve the quality of healthcare decision making for the unbefriended. I hope that this comprehensive and systematic explanation of both the problem and the available solutions will empower both public and clinical policymakers to develop more informed and more circumspect policies and procedures.

In Section I, I review traditional mechanisms to protect prospective autonomy. The law has devised several tools, such as advance directives and surrogates, that permit individuals to control their future medical treatment in the event that they lose decision-making capacity.²⁷ Unfortunately, none of these tools are available for the unbefriended.²⁸ In Section II, I more carefully define “unbefriended patient,” assess the size of the unbefriended population, and examine demographics and causal factors.

In Section III, I describe four risks and patient safety problems arising from being unbefriended in the U.S. healthcare system. Unbefriended patients are exposed to overtreatment, undertreatment, and placement in an inappropriate setting.²⁹ In addition to these physical risks, they are likely to receive healthcare discordant with their values and preferences.³⁰

The best way to avoid these risks is to avoid becoming unbefriended in the first place. So, in Sections IV and V, I examine key means of prevention. Section IV mechanisms can be employed by clinicians without legal change: (1) vigilant and ultra-careful capacity assessment, (2) more advance care planning, and (3) diligent

25. *Id.*

26. *Id.*

27. Thaddeus M. Pope, *Legal Fundamentals of Surrogate Decision Making*, 141(4) CHEST 1074, 1074 (2012) [hereinafter Pope, *Legal Fundamentals*].

28. *Id.* at 1077.

29. Volunteers of America—Minnesota, Unbefriended Elders: Matching Values with Decisions, Presentation at Minnesota Gerontological Society (April 30 2010), <http://www.mngero.org/downloads/UnbefriendedElders.pdf>.

30. *Id.*

searching for surrogates. Section V mechanisms require legislation to authorize longer or more flexible default surrogate lists. If more people are authorized to make healthcare decisions, it is less likely the patient will be unbefriended.

Unfortunately, prevention is not always successful.³¹ Some patients are “unavoidably” unbefriended.³² In Section VI, I describe the main officially available solution: guardianship. But guardianship is rarely the right solution. First, there is a broad consensus that guardianship should be only a last resort.³³ Second, the process is too slow and cumbersome to be responsive to the patient’s medical needs.³⁴

Consequently, both legislatures and individual health systems or facilities have developed other more accessible mechanisms on their own.³⁵ But these mechanisms vary in how they balance speed and fairness.³⁶ In Section VII, I examine mechanisms that lack adequate due process.³⁷ These include having the healthcare decision authorized: (1) by the attending physician herself, (2) by a second physician, or (3) by an “interdisciplinary team.”³⁸ Finally, in Section VIII, I describe solutions that are more accessible than guardianship, yet still afford adequate procedural due process.³⁹ These often include tiered approaches that correlate the amount of oversight to the gravity of the decision at hand.⁴⁰ These solutions typically require

31. See Farrell et al., *supra* note 3, at 15.

32. See *id.*

33. AM. BAR ASS’N, PRACTICAL TOOL FOR LAWYERS: STEPS IN SUPPORTED DECISION MAKING 6 (2016), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/law_aging/resources/guardianship_law_practice/practical_tool.html.

34. ALAN MEISEL, KATHY L. CERMINARA & THADDEUS M. POPE, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF END OF LIFE DECISIONMAKING 3-118 to 3-120 (3rd ed. & 2017 Supp.) [hereinafter THE RIGHT TO DIE].

35. See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON LAW AND AGING, STATE GUARDIANSHIP LEGISLATION: DIRECTIONS FOR REFORM 1 (2011), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/2011/2011_aging_gship_elss_2010.authcheckdam.pdf.

36. See *id.* at 1; Farrell et al., *supra* note 3.

37. See *infra* Part VII.

38. T.E. Miller, C.H. Coleman & A.M. Cugliari, *Treatment Decisions for Patients without Surrogates: Rethinking Policies for a Vulnerable Population*, 45(3) J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 369, 371 (1997).

39. See *infra* Part VIII.

40. Mathew Varughese et al., *Ethics and Clinical Practice Guided by the Family Health Care Decisions Act*, 16(1) NYSBA HEALTH L.J. 75, 80 (2011).

consent either from the ethics committee or from an external and independent committee.⁴¹

Ultimately, we must balance speed and fairness. On the one hand, we want a decision-making process that is accessible, quick, convenient, and cost-effective. On the other hand, we want a process that provides the important safeguards of expertise, neutrality, and careful deliberation. This Article offers a comprehensive organization and framing of various models that are specified in law or implemented at the institutional level. My intent is to that this examination will help public and institutional policymakers determine where to best strike the balance.

I. Traditional Mechanisms to Protect Prospective Autonomy

Patient autonomy is highly valued in the United States.⁴² Patients with decision-making capacity can make their own healthcare decisions.⁴³ Moreover, patients retain the right of self-determination even when they lose the capacity to make healthcare decisions for themselves.⁴⁴ Our society's individualistic norms place "such a strong emphasis on the voice of the patient" that medical decisions should "continue to be guided by that voice as much as possible."⁴⁵ For example, in the seminal *In re Quinlan* case, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that Karen did not lose her right to choose when she lost capacity.⁴⁶ That right could be exercised on her behalf by her family.⁴⁷

The law has devised three main tools to promote "prospective autonomy," the right to control one's future medical treatment in the event that one loses decision-making capacity.⁴⁸ The first mechanism

41. THE RIGHT TO DIE, *supra* note 34, at 3-101 to 3-102.

42. Pope, *Legal Fundamentals*, *supra* note 27, at 1074. A fourth mechanism is guardianship. *See infra* Section VI.

43. *See id.*

44. *Id.*

45. Bruce Jennings, *Ethical Dilemmas in Surrogate Decision Making*, in *LIVING WITH GRIEF: ETHICAL DILEMMAS AT THE END OF LIFE* 158 (K.J. Doka ed., Hospice Foundation of America 2005).

46. *See In re Quinlan*, 355 A.2d 647, 671-72 (N.J. 1976).

47. *See id.*

48. Pope, *Legal Fundamentals*, *supra* note 27, at 1074.

is the instructional advance directive or living will.⁴⁹ But most of us do not write such directives.⁵⁰ The second mechanism is the proxy directive or durable power of attorney for healthcare, designating another person, a surrogate, to direct the course of our medical treatment upon our incapacity.⁵¹ But most of us do not appoint surrogates either.⁵² Therefore, the third mechanism by which our prospective autonomy is protected and promoted is the most common: through the informal selection of surrogates based on statutory priority lists.⁵³

Essentially, the issue is one of consent. Clinicians need consent to administer treatment or diagnostic interventions.⁵⁴ Two situations are relatively straightforward. First, if the patient has capacity, then she can provide or refuse that consent herself.⁵⁵ Second, in emergency situations, even if the patient lacks capacity, her consent is implied.⁵⁶ So, there is no need for patient or surrogate consent in emergencies. But outside these two situations, clinicians need consent through some vehicle of prospective autonomy.⁵⁷ Our focus is on consent mechanisms for incapacitated patients in non-emergency situations.

A. Decision Making Capacity

Essential to an understanding of prospective autonomy is an understanding of decision-making capacity. If the patient has capacity, then there is no need for either advance directives or surrogates.⁵⁸ Adult patients—both those 18 years of age or older and emancipated minors—are presumed to have capacity until determined otherwise.⁵⁹

49. *Id.*

50. *Id.*

51. *Id.*

52. *Id.*

53. *Id.*

54. See Paul S. Appelbaum, *Assessment of Patients' Competence to Consent to Treatment*, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1834, 1834 (2007).

55. See Pope, *Legal Fundamentals*, *supra* note 27, at 1074.

56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 892D(a) (AM. LAW. INST. 1979).

57. See Appelbaum, *supra* note 54, at 1834.

58. Pope, *Legal Fundamentals*, *supra* note 27, at 1075.

59. *Id.*

This presumption is rebutted only after the attending physician, often with confirmation from a second physician, determines that the patient lacks one or more of the three essential attributes of capacity.⁶⁰ First, the patient must possess the ability to understand both her own condition and the treatment's significant benefits, burdens, risks, and reasonable alternatives.⁶¹ Second, the patient must be able to reason and deliberate about her treatment choices.⁶² Third, the patient must be able to make and communicate a decision.⁶³

Capacity is decision specific. This means that a patient lacking capacity to make a complex decision might still have capacity to make other decisions.⁶⁴ It also means that incapacity is not a status-based judgment.⁶⁵ Being elderly or diagnosed with dementia does not automatically make one incapacitated.⁶⁶

In 2017, the Idaho Legislature found that many individuals with developmental disabilities are erroneously presumed to lack capacity.⁶⁷

The term developmental disability covers a wide range of conditions, many of which do not impair the ability of the person to make competent medical decisions. However, this right has been often denied to such persons, with a demand that the person have a guardian. This is not only a denial of the fundamental rights of the person, it can lead to expensive and unneeded court proceedings.⁶⁸

60. *Id.*

61. *Id.*

62. *Id.*

63. *Id.*

64. Pope, *Legal Fundamentals*, *supra* note 27, at 1075.

65. *Id.*

66. *Id.*

67. S.B. 1090, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2017), codified at IDAHO CODE § 39-4503.

68. S.B. 1090, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2017) (Statement of Purpose), <https://legislature.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/sessioninfo/2017/legislation/S1090SOP.pdf>.

Accordingly, Idaho enacted a statute that provides even individuals who are “developmentally disabled” may have capacity and thus may consent to their own care.⁶⁹

B. Emergency Exception and Implied Consent

In emergency situations, healthcare decision making for the unbefriended is reasonably straightforward. The patient lacks capacity to consent and there is no reasonably available surrogate.⁷⁰ Clinicians cannot get “actual” consent for needed treatment. But this is not problematic. There is no need to obtain patient or surrogate consent, because consent to treatment is implied.⁷¹ The emergency makes it necessary, or apparently necessary, for providers to act *before* there is opportunity to obtain consent.⁷²

Emergency situations are typically defined as those in which, “according to competent medical judgment, the proposed surgical or medical treatment or procedures are reasonably necessary” and a “delay in treatment could reasonably be expected to jeopardize the life or health of the person affected or could reasonably result in disfigurement or impaired faculties.”⁷³

For example, a 2011 Missouri bill provided that healthcare may be provided to an unbefriended patient without consent if:

69. S.B. 1090, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2017), codified at IDAHO CODE § 39-4503.

70. *See id.*

71. *See, e.g.*, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-512 (2016); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2397(a)((2)–(3)) (West 2016); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1418.8(h) (West 2016); CAL. PROB. CODE § 3210(b) (West 2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18.6-104(3) (2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2510(a)(4) (2016); IDAHO CODE § 39-4504(i) (2016); IND. CODE § 16-36-3-3 (2016); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-7(2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 27- 431.063 (2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13(c)(1) (2016); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-q(2) (McKinney 2017); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-66-40(A) (2016) (“Health care may be provided without consent to a patient who is unable to consent if no person authorized . . . is available immediately, and in the reasonable medical judgment of the attending physician or other health care professional responsible for the care of the patient, the delay occasioned by attempting to locate an authorized person, or by continuing to attempt to locate an authorized person, presents a substantial risk of death, serious permanent disfigurement, or loss or impairment of the functioning of a bodily member or organ, or other serious threat to the health of the patient.”).

72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 892D(a) (AM. LAW. INST. 1979); *Stewart-Graves v. Vaughn*, 170 P.3d 1151, 1155 (Wash. 2007); *Miller v. HCA, Inc.*, 118 S.W.3d 758, 772 (Tex. 2003). The emergency exception might be characterized for addressing urgent healthcare decision making on behalf of the temporarily unbefriended.

73. *See, e.g.*, O.C.G.A. § 31-9-3(a) (2016). *See also* 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1) (2012).

[I]n the reasonable medical judgment of the attending physician or other healthcare professional responsible for the care of the patient, the delay occasioned by attempting to locate an authorized person or by continuing to attempt to locate an authorized person presents a substantial risk of death, serious permanent disfigurement, or loss or impairment of the functioning of a bodily member or organ, or other serious threat to the health of the patient.⁷⁴

The law in every other state is substantially similar.⁷⁵

In short, the law concerning treatment decisions in emergency situations is reasonably well settled. Therefore, the challenges confronting healthcare providers for the unbefriended primarily concern non-emergency treatment. The remaining decision-making mechanisms focus on how treatment decisions are made for incapacitated patients in non-emergency situations.⁷⁶

C. Advance Directives and POLST

Arguably, if patients left sufficiently clear and complete instructional advance directives (living wills), there would be no need for surrogates. Providers could simply consult the patient's own *ex ante* instructions for guidance.⁷⁷

But more than three decades of experience shows that it is difficult to effectively implement this form of "directed decision-making."⁷⁸ Most individuals do not complete advance directives.⁷⁹ Most of those that are completed are not available when needed.⁸⁰ And, even when completed and available, instructional advance directives are often

74. H.B. 392, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011).

75. *E.g.*, O.C.G.A. § 31-9-3(b) (2016) ("In addition to any instances in which a consent is excused or implied at law, a consent to surgical or medical treatment or procedures suggested, recommended, prescribed, or directed by a duly licensed physician will be implied where an emergency exists.").

76. On the other hand, some have argued for expanding the scope of the emergency exception to cover some of these other cases. J. Bernstein, *Presumed Consent: Licenses and Limits Inferred from the Case of Geriatric Hip Fractures*, 18(1) BMC MED. ADD PERIOD? ETHICS 17 (2017).

77. Pope, *Legal Fundamentals*, *supra* note 27, at 1075.

78. *Id.*

79. *Id.*

80. *Id.*

insufficiently clear and detailed to obviously apply to the patient's current situation.⁸¹ Accordingly, prospective autonomy is usually promoted not through instructional advance directives but through substitute decision-makers collectively known as "surrogates."⁸²

D. Agents and Durable Powers of Attorney for Healthcare

Every state has established a process that allows competent individuals to appoint an agent to decide about healthcare when they become unable to decide for themselves.⁸³ While terminology varies from state to state, this type of surrogate is normally referred to as a "proxy," an "agent," a "healthcare representative," or an "attorney-in-fact."⁸⁴

This appointment can be made through a legal form typically referred to as an advance directive or a durable power of attorney for healthcare (DPAHC).⁸⁵ While short and simple, these appointment forms require the strict observation of certain formalities.⁸⁶ For example, the individual must often sign the form in the presence of two witnesses who are neither related to the individual nor employed at a facility where the individual is a patient or resident.⁸⁷

The agent's power is often referred to as "springing" because it is triggered when the patient loses capacity; and it vanishes when the

81. *Id.* In contrast, POLST forms overcome some of the obstacles of advance directives. Thaddeus M. Pope, *Controlling the Misuse of CPR with Certified Patient Decision Aids and POLST*, 17(2) AM. J. BIOETHICS 35 (2017); Thaddeus M. Pope & Melinda Hexum, *Legal Briefing: POLST (Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment)*, 23(4) J. CLINICAL ETHICS 353 (2012).

82. *Id.*

83. Pope, *Legal Fundamentals*, *supra* note 27, at 1075.

84. *Id.*; AM. BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON LAW AND AGING, SUBSTITUTE DECISION-MAKER TERMINOLOGY UNDER STATE LAW (July 2016), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/SubstituteDecision-MakingTerminology.authcheckdam.pdf.

85. *Id.*

86. *Id.* See also Joshua A. rolnick et al., *Delegalizing Advance Directives – Facilitating Advance Care Planning*, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2106 (2017). For some individuals, like long-term care residents, it may be difficult to comply with the mandatory execution formalities. These individuals are surrounded by facility employees who can neither serve as agent nor witness an appointment. But, in many states, these residents and patients can still designate a surrogate informally. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2507(b)(1) (2016). The individual makes the designation directly to the supervising provider in the presence of a witness. *Id.* The provider then confirms the designation on the medical record and has that signed by the witness. *Id.*

87. THE RIGHT TO DIE, *supra* note 34, § 7.05, at 7-69, 7-71, 7-74 to 7-78.

patient regains capacity.⁸⁸ Whenever authorized to act, the agent typically has the right to make all healthcare decisions that the patient could have made for herself, unless the patient has explicitly limited the agent's authority.⁸⁹ And providers must comply with decisions made in good faith by an agent to the same extent they would have to comply with decisions made by the patient herself.⁹⁰

E. Default Surrogates and Proxies

If there is no advance directive, no court-appointed guardian, and no patient-appointed agent, then the healthcare provider can select the surrogate.⁹¹ This is sometimes referred to as “devolved decision-making.”⁹² The provider makes the designation pursuant to default surrogate statutes in almost every state.⁹³

Because most individuals have neither completed nor effectively implemented advance directives appointing healthcare agents, most states have enacted “default statutes.”⁹⁴ These laws specify a hierarchy of surrogates to consent to medical treatment on behalf of incapacitated individuals.⁹⁵ These surrogates are automatically designated based on their familial, or otherwise defined, relationship to the incapacitated individual.⁹⁶

These statutes specify a priority list of individuals whom the physician should or must designate.⁹⁷ Typically, at the top of this hierarchy are the patient's spouse, adult child, parent, and adult sibling.⁹⁸ The hierarchy prioritizes those relatives who are typically more likely to know the convictions and beliefs of the patient and more likely to be concerned for the patient.⁹⁹ Default surrogates are

88. Pope, *Legal Fundamentals*, *supra* note 27, at 1075.

89. *Id.*

90. *Id.*

91. *Id.*

92. *Id.*; see also Karp & Wood, *Incapacitated and Alone*, *supra* note 4, at 21.

93. Pope, *Legal Fundamentals*, *supra* note 27, at 1076.

94. *Id.* at 1074. See also *infra* Section V.

95. Pope, *Legal Fundamentals*, *supra* note 27, at 1074.

96. *Id.* at 1076.

97. *Id.*

98. *Id.*

99. *Id.*

the most numerous type of surrogate.¹⁰⁰ Therefore, the sequence and manner in which they are designated from the list has great significance. But there are material differences among the states.¹⁰¹

F. Guardians and Conservators

In cases of conflict among potential surrogates or when no surrogate is reasonably available, it is sometimes necessary to petition a court to appoint a surrogate.¹⁰² A court-appointed surrogate is typically referred to as a “guardian” or “conservator.”¹⁰³ The petition is usually filed by a relative or by the administrator of a healthcare facility where the patient resides.¹⁰⁴ The court-appointed guardian may be a family member, a friend, a disinterested stranger, a non-profit or for-profit agency, or a public program.¹⁰⁵ Since the appointment is usually not directed by the patient herself, judicial appointment is sometimes referred to as “displaced decision-making.”¹⁰⁶

After the appointment, the court is supposed to supervise and monitor the guardian’s choices on behalf of the patient to ensure that the patient is getting appropriate medical care.¹⁰⁷ Because this entire process can be cumbersome and expensive, comparatively few surrogates are guardians.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, the guardianship system is currently the subject of significant scrutiny and reform.¹⁰⁹

For example, while capacity is decision-specific, guardianship is typically all-or-nothing. Once the patient is assessed as “incompetent,” the guardian has full power to make most, if not all,

100. *Id.*

101. *See infra* Section V. *See also* Erin S. DeMartino et al., *Who Decides When a Patient Can’t? Statutes on Alternate Decision Makers*, 376(15) NEW ENG. J. MED. 1478 (2017).

102. Pope, *Legal Fundamentals*, *supra* note 27, at 1076.

103. *Id.*

104. *Id.*

105. *Id.*

106. *Id.*; *see also* Karp & Wood, *Incapacitated and Alone*, *supra* note 4, at 21.

107. Pope, *Legal Fundamentals*, *supra* note 27, at 1076; *see also* Naomi Karp & Erica F. Wood, *Guardianship Monitoring: A National Survey of Court Practices*, 37 STETSON L. REV. 143, 146 (2007).

108. Pope, *Legal Fundamentals*, *supra* note 27, at 1076.

109. *Id.*; *see also* U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-678, INCAPACITATED ADULTS: OVERSIGHT OF FEDERAL FIDUCIARIES AND COURT-APPOINTED GUARDIANS NEEDS IMPROVEMENT 8 (2011).

decisions for the patient, even if the patient retains capacity to make some decisions or even all decisions some of the time.¹¹⁰ Policymakers are working to encourage the use of less restrictive alternatives; more limited, tailored guardianship orders; and more procedural due process protections.¹¹¹

G. Decision Making Standards

Through whichever of these mechanisms treatment decisions are made for an unbefriended patient, the decision-making standards are approximately the same. These standards are usually specified in state statutes in the U.S., and there is substantial uniformity across the country.¹¹²

A surrogate is an “extension of the patient”¹¹³ and stands in the shoes of the patient. Accordingly, the surrogate is “obligated to suppress his or her own judgment in favor of ‘channeling’ what the [patient] would have done.”¹¹⁴ The surrogate “must make the medical choice that the patient, if competent, would have made and not one that the surrogate might make for himself or herself.”¹¹⁵ There is generally a two-step hierarchy; surrogates should apply these standards sequentially: (1) substituted judgment and then (2) best interest.¹¹⁶

Under the substituted judgment standard, surrogates must engage in some speculation and “infer” patients’ wishes from their prior statements and conduct.¹¹⁷ Laws across several states are substantially similar. Alabama, for example, provides that a surrogate must make decisions “that conform as closely as possible to what the

110. Pope, *Legal Fundamentals*, *supra* note 27, at 1076.

111. *Id.* See also ABA Commission on Law and Aging, *Guardianship and Supported Decision-Making Law and Practice*, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/law_aging/resources/guardianship_law_practice.htm.

112. *Id.* at 1077.

113. AMA, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, Opinion 8.081.

114. See Lawrence A. Frolik, *Is a Guardian the Alter Ego of the Ward?*, 37 STETSON L. REV. 53, 65 (2007).

115. *In re Guardianship of Browning*, 568 So. 2d 4, 13 (Fla. 1990). Added period and space after so.

116. Pope, *Legal Fundamentals*, *supra* note 27, at 1076.

117. *Id.*

patient would have done or intended under the circumstances.”¹¹⁸ A surrogate must take into account “any evidence of the patient’s religious, spiritual, personal, philosophical, and moral beliefs and ethics.”¹¹⁹

There is often no reliable evidence of the unbefriended patient’s expressed wishes, values, or preferences. When this is the case, surrogates cannot apply the substituted judgment standard, and therefore must apply the best interest standard.¹²⁰ Surrogates must shift focus from the patient’s autonomy to the patient’s welfare.¹²¹ In the absence of subjective evidence about a patient’s wishes, a surrogate must rely on more objective grounds, on an outcome that best promotes the patient’s well-being.¹²²

Typically, these seven factors are used to guide the application of the best interest standard: (1) the patient’s present level of physical, sensory, emotional, and cognitive functioning; (2) quality of life, life expectancy, and prognosis for recovery with and without treatment; (3) the various treatment options and the risks, side-effects, and benefits of each; (4) the nature and degree of physical pain or suffering resulting from the medical condition; (5) whether the medical treatment being provided is causing or may cause pain, suffering, or serious complications; (6) the pain or suffering to the patient if the medical treatment is withdrawn; and (7) whether any particular treatment would be proportionate or disproportionate in terms of the benefits to be gained by the patient versus the burdens caused to the patient.¹²³

118. *Id.*

119. *Id.*; see also ALA. CODE § 22-8A-11(c) (2016).

120. Pope, *Legal Fundamentals*, *supra* note 27, at 1077; *In re YP*, 2015 INT 129 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Prob. Div. Apr. 10, 2017), http://www.thaddeuspope.com/images/In_re_YP_DC_Prob_2017_best_interest_stop_LST_.pdf.

121. Pope, *Legal Fundamentals*, *supra* note 27, at 1077.

122. *Id.* at 1077–78.

123. Thaddeus M. Pope, *The Best Interest Standard: Both Guide and Limit to Medical Decision Making on Behalf of Incapacitated Patients*, 22 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 134, 136 (2011).

II. Who Are Unbefriended and Unrepresented Patients?

The mechanisms directed at protecting prospective autonomy that are described in the last section help most incapacitated individuals. But none are available to protect the unbefriended. In this Section, I define the “unbefriended patient” and describe some competing terminology. I then assess the size of the unbefriended population, its demographics, and its causal factors. Importantly, the number of unbefriended patients continues to grow significantly.

A. Definition of “Unbefriended Patient”

The unbefriended are incapacitated individuals who cannot be helped by any of the standard legal mechanisms that protect and promote prospective autonomy. First, they have not left an instructional advance directive (a living will). Or, even if they have an instructional advance directive and it is available, it does not address the relevant clinical circumstances.¹²⁴ Second, the unbefriended have not appointed a healthcare agent (power of attorney). Or, if they have appointed an agent, none is reasonably available. Third, they have no court-appointed guardian.

This is normally the point at which default decision making mechanisms would be useful. But the unbefriended have no available friends or family to make medical decisions as “default” surrogates.¹²⁵ Unbefriended patients may have outlived, lost contact with, or been abandoned by family members. Or they may be loners who have spent much of their lives disconnected and in social isolation.

124. Pope, *Legal Fundamentals*, *supra* note 27, at 1075. While most unbefriended patients are individuals who have lost decision-making capacity, there are two other categories (1) individuals such as the mentally disabled who never had capacity, and (2) minors who have not yet acquired capacity. *See id.* at 1075.

125. Pope, *Legal Fundamentals*, *supra* note 27, at 1074. Sometimes, a patient’s unbefriended status is a factor not so much due to the *non-existence* of a surrogate, but to the *unavailability* of a surrogate, at the relevant time. For example, an unbefriended patient might have relatives, but those relatives may be unresponsive, uninvolved, or incapable of making treatment decisions for the patient. *Id.* at 1077.

B. Competing Terminology

Many different terms have been used to describe the unbefriended. Here are just eight words and phrases: “adult orphans,”¹²⁶ “friendless patients,”¹²⁷ “unrepresented patients,”¹²⁸ “patients alone,”¹²⁹ “solo citizens,”¹³⁰ “patients without a surrogate decision maker,”¹³¹ “patients without proxies,”¹³² “patients for whom no surrogate is identified as reasonably available, willing, or competent to act.”¹³³

The Reader has already seen that I employ the term “unbefriended.” Some commentators have criticized this term, because of its negative connotation. It arguably stigmatizes, insults, and demeans this population. And it signals to the young that their lives are not valuable. I am sympathetic to these concerns. But I continue to use the term “unbefriended,” because it seems to have the most currency in the bioethics, medical, and legal literature.¹³⁴

126. Farrell et al., *supra* note 3, at 14.

127. Casey Frank, *Surrogate Decision-Making for ‘Friendless’ Patients*, 34 COLO. LAW. 71, 71 (April 2005); CAL. LAW. REV. COMM’N, MEMORANDUM 98-63: HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: COMMENTS ON TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION 9 (Sept. 18, 1998).

128. VIKI KIND, THE CAREGIVER’S PATH TO COMPASSIONATE DECISION MAKING 46–48 (2010).

129. LINDA FARBER POST, JEFFREY BLUSTEIN & NANCY N. DUBLER, HANDBOOK FOR HEALTHCARE ETHICS COMMITTEES 205–08 (2007); See American Health Decisions, *The Patient Alone: Making Health Care Choices for Patients without Surrogates* (May 6-7, 2008).

130. See Karp & Wood, *Incapacitated and Alone*, *supra* note 4, at 31.

131. See generally Douglas B. White et al., *Life Support for Patients without a Surrogate Decision Maker: Who Decides?* 147 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 34 (2007) [hereinafter *Who Decides?*]; Douglas B. White et al., *Decisions to Limit Life-Sustaining Treatment for Critically Ill Patients Who Lack Both Decision-Making Capacity and Surrogate Decision-Makers*, 34(8) CRITICAL CARE MED. 2053 (2006) [hereinafter *Decisions to Limit Life-Sustaining Treatment*]; Steven J. Baumrucker et al., *A Cognitively Impaired Patient without a Surrogate: Who Makes the Decision?* 28 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE MED. 583 (2011); Am. Med. Dir. Ass’n., *supra* note 20.

132. See generally *Patients without Proxies: What’s Happening in Other States?* MID-ATLANTIC ETHICS COMMITTEE NEWSLETTER (L. & Health Care Program, U. of Md. Sch. of L. and the Md. Health Care Ethics Committee Network), Summer 2010, at 7; A. Robichaud & C. Griggins, *Patients without Proxies: Medical Decision-Making for Patients without Advocates*, PowerPoint presentation for Cleveland State University (Nov. 18, 2010), http://wapps.csuohio.edu/campusmailbag/forum_posts.asp?TID=6308.

133. See generally S. Res. 4098, 214th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2011).

134. See, e.g., Eric D. Isaacs and Robert V. Brody, *The Unbefriended Adult Patient*, 83(6) SAN FRANCISCO MED. 25, 25 (July-August 2010); Varughese et al., *supra* note 40; Robert M. Gibson, *How Do We Address the Unbefriended Patient’s Needs?*, CAL. ASS’N OF LONG-TERM CARE MED. (2015), http://www.calcm.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=194:how-do-we-address-the-unbefriended-patient-s-needs-&catid=22:news&Itemid=111; CHARLIE P. SABATINO, ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND ADVANCE CARE PLANNING: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 18 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2007), <http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/2007/>

Moreover, it is the term used by the American Bar Association.¹³⁵ Most recently, the American Geriatrics Society used the term “unbefriended” in its 2016 Position Statement, “Making Medical Treatment Decisions for Unbefriended Older Adults.”¹³⁶

Nevertheless, it is useful to distinguish two related though distinct concepts: “unbefriended” and “unrepresented.” One might limit the term “unbefriended” to describe individuals who have no available and willing friends or family. In contrast, one might limit the term “unrepresented” to describe individuals who have no legally authorized decision maker.

There are four possible relationships between being “unbefriended” and being “unrepresented”:

Unbefriended Unrepresented	Not unbefriended Unrepresented
Unbefriended Not unrepresented	Not unbefriended Not unrepresented

In category 1, the individual is both unbefriended and unrepresented. She has no family or friends who are available and willing to serve as surrogate. Nor does she have a court-appointed guardian. In category 2, the individual is not unbefriended. She has available friends or family. Or perhaps she has care-providers at her long-term care facility. Nevertheless, she is unrepresented, because her friends, family, or professional care-providers are not legally authorized decision makers. In category 3, the individual is unbefriended, because she lacks available friends or family. But, she is not unrepresented because she has a guardian or other decision

adacplpi.pdf.; Martin J. Gorbien & Amy R. Eisenstein, *Elder Abuse and Neglect: An Overview*, 21(2) CLINICS IN GERIATRIC MED. 279, 288 (2005); Marshall B. Kapp, *Medical Decision Making for Older Adults in Institutional Settings: Is Beneficence Dead in an Age of Risk Management?*, 11(1) ISSUES IN L. & MED. 29, 34 (1995); Michael A. Williams, *Unbefriended*, 67(11) NEUROLOGY 2088, 2088 (2006). The term “unbefriended” was apparently coined in a symposium, 1(2) J. ETHICS, L. & AGING (1995). One article attributes the term to Joanne Lynn. T.E. Finucane, R.D. Elon, J.M. Keenan, *The Medical Director in Non-Institutional Long-Term Care Programs*, 11(3) CLINICS IN GERIATRIC MED. 391 (1995).

135. Karp & Wood, *Incapacitated and Alone*, *supra* note 4, at 21.

136. Farrell et al., *supra* note 3.

maker. Finally, in category 4, the individual is neither unbefriended nor unrepresented. It would be better to use these separate terms with narrower and more precise meanings. But that is not common usage.

C. Size of the Unbefriended Patient Population

There are more than 70,000 unbefriended patients and long-term care residents in the United States.¹³⁷ The majority of the unbefriended are believed to live in hospitals and long-term care facilities. There are two significant hospital studies. One found that 16 percent of patients admitted to an intensive care unit (ICU) were unbefriended.¹³⁸ The other found that 5 percent of patients who died in the ICU were unbefriended.¹³⁹ There is one key long term care study.¹⁴⁰ It estimated that these individuals make up about 3 to 4 percent of the nursing home population.¹⁴¹

These are the three studies most often cited to substantiate the size of the unbefriended population.¹⁴² Still, other studies corroborate these estimates.¹⁴³ For example, a British study of hospitals found an unbefriended rate of 4 percent.¹⁴⁴ While clinicians usually discuss a

137. I computed this by adding 45,500 (3.5 percent of the 1.3 million in long-term care) and 25,000 (5 percent of the 500,000 in intensive care units).

138. *Decisions to Limit Life-Sustaining Treatment*, *supra* note 131, at 2053.

139. *Who Decides?*, *supra* note 131, at 34.

140. See Karp & Wood, *Incapacitated and Alone*, *supra* note 4, at 20; Muriel R Gillick, *Medical Decision-Making for the Unbefriended Nursing Home Resident*, 1(2) J. ETHICS, L. & AGING 87, 88 (1995); T. Miller & A.M. Cugliari, *Withholding and Withdrawing Treatment: Policies in Long-Term Care Facilities*, 30(4) GERONTOLOGIST 462 (1990).

141. See Karp & Wood, *Incapacitated and Alone*, *supra* note 4, at 20; Gillick, *supra* note 140, at 88; Miller & Cugliari, *supra* note 140.

142. Decision making for this population also comprises a significant percentage of ethics consults. Keith M. Swetz et al., *Report of 255 Clinical Ethics Consultations and Review of Literature*, 82(6) MAYO CLINIC PROCEEDINGS 686, 690 (2007). But almost no retrospective reports on ethics consults break out unbefriended as a separate category.

143. See, e.g., Jennifer Moyer et al., *Ethical Concerns and Procedural Pathways for Patients Who are Incapacitated and Alone: Implications from a Qualitative Study for Advancing Ethical Practice*, 29 HEC FORUM 171 (2017), DOI 10.1007/s10730-016-9317-9 (collecting citations); Combined Respondents' and Cross Appellants' Opening Brief at 28, California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform (CANHR) v. Chapman, No. A147987 (Cal. App. Jan. 17, 2017) (estimating 6000 to 12,000 in California); *but see* Andrew M. Courtwright et al., *The Role of a Hospital Ethics Consultation Service in Decision-Making for Unrepresented Patients*, 14 BIOETHICAL INQUIRY (2017), DOI:10.1007/s11673-017-9773-1 (reporting only 25 cases for unrepresented patients between 2007 and 2013).

144. ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, END OF LIFE CARE AUDIT – DYING IN HOSPITAL NATIONAL REPORT FOR ENGLAND 2016 31 tbl.14 (2016) [hereinafter END OF LIFE CARE AUDIT]

do not resuscitate order with the patient's surrogate, 4 percent of respondents explained that they were unable to do that either because "there was no nominated person important to the patient" or because "attempts . . . to contact the nominated person were unsuccessful."¹⁴⁵ Similarly, a study conducted by the American Bar Association, the Society of Critical Care Medicine, and the Society of Hospital Medicine surveyed 45,000 physicians; nearly 50 percent of respondents reported seeing at least one unbefriended patient per month.¹⁴⁶

Some state specific studies also confirm the size of the problem. A North Dakota study estimated there are 300 to 700 unbefriended individuals in that state.¹⁴⁷ If that figure were extrapolated nationwide, there would be 129,000 unbefriended.¹⁴⁸ A Massachusetts study estimates around 3200 to 3800 unbefriended in that state.¹⁴⁹ A Minnesota nursing facility survey identified an unbefriended rate of just under 2 percent.¹⁵⁰ Social services staff from Minnesota Volunteers of America estimated they handle approximately 250 calls per year regarding end-of-life decisions about people who have impaired decision-making capacity with no legally designated decision maker.¹⁵¹

D. Demographics and Causal Factors

These are significant numbers, and they continue to grow. While (a) the elderly is the largest group of unbefriended, they are not the

145. *Id.*

146. , Am. Bar Ass'n, Comm'n on Law and Aging, *Background Briefing: Health Care Decision Making Round Table: Who Decides If The Patient Cannot And There Is No Advance Directive: Research And Recommendations on Clinical Practice, Law and Policy*, (March 17, 2017).

147. Schmidt, *supra* note 2 at 84.

148. North Dakota's population is 740,000 and the U.S. population is 320,000,000. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts> (last visited Mar. 2, 2017).

149. JENNIFER MOYE ET AL., EXAMINING THE NEED FOR A PUBLIC GUARDIAN IN MASSACHUSETTS: PHASE I 15 (2016), <http://guardianship.institute/pdf/ExaminingtheNeedforaPublicGuardianinMassachusetts.pdf> (last visited May 4, 2017).

150. Douglas Silverman, St. Program Admin. Principle, Minn. Dep't. of Hum. Serv., PowerPoint Presentation at 2011 Minnesota Age & Disabilities Odyssey: Serving the Unbefriended Elder Population: Trends, Challenges, and Successes (June 21, 2011) (citing a study by Andrea Palumbo, Elder Justice Scholar, William Mitchell College of Law), <http://www.mnodyssey.org>.

151. Karp & Wood, *Incapacitated and Alone*, *supra* note 4, at 13.

only group who may be adversely affected by a lack of a surrogate—or a “reasonably available” surrogate.¹⁵² There are five other key populations of unbefriended individuals: (b) minors, (c) the homeless, (d) the mentally disabled, (e) individuals in same-sex relationships, and (f) individuals who have family or friends but who are nevertheless unbefriended due to a plethora of legal and other reasons.¹⁵³ I group these various populations into three categories: (1) permanently unbefriended, (2) legally unbefriended, and (3) temporarily unbefriended.

1. Permanently Unbefriended

Incapacitated patients without surrogates in four populations are properly described as “permanently unbefriended.” These four populations are: (1) the elderly, (2) the homeless, (3) the mentally ill, and (4) patients whose potential surrogates are unwilling or unable to serve.¹⁵⁴ These individuals literally have no one to make treatment decisions on their behalf. No available surrogate even exists.

a. The Elderly

Most of the unbefriended are elderly. For example, take Great-Aunt Sue, who “outlived her husband, never had any children, and has survived all of her siblings and their children.”¹⁵⁵ The 2010 U.S. Census indicates there were approximately 40,000,000 people over the age of 65 living in the U.S., 13 percent of the total population.¹⁵⁶ This is a 15 percent increase in that age group since 2000.¹⁵⁷ It is one

152. See generally Silverman, *supra* note 150.

153. See QUINN, *supra* note 21, at 111; Rupal M. Parekh & Gail Adorno, *Health Care Decision Making for Unbefriended, Incapacitated Adults: A Value-Committed Policy Transfer Analysis*, J. POL’Y PRACT., Sept. 8, 2016, DOI: 10.1080/15588742.2016.1222925.

154. Parekh & Adorno, *supra* note 153, at 2. One study flags the prevalence of transgender individuals among the unrepresented. Courtwright et al., *supra* note 143.

155. Mandy Moye, *From the Bench and Bar: Helping Great-Aunt Sue, an Unbefriended Elder*, CHEROKEE TRIBUNE & LEDGER NEWS (Feb. 5, 2017), http://www.tribuneledgernews.com/opinion/from-the-bench-and-bar-helping-great-aunt-sue-an/article_72bb10e2-eb60-11e6-b097-934032e642ac.html.

156. LINDSAY M. HOWDEN & JULIE A. MEYER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AGE AND SEX COMPOSITION: 2010 2 (May 2011), <http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-03.pdf>.

157. *Id.*

of the fastest growing age groups.¹⁵⁸ Moreover, the 65 and older age group will continue to grow at unprecedented rates because the boomer generation, born between 1946 and 1964, is one of the largest generations in U.S. history.¹⁵⁹

Because of a lower marriage rate, a higher divorce rate, and fewer children, among other factors, many in this growing population are aging alone.¹⁶⁰ Nearly one-half of those 75+ and 30 percent of those 65+ live alone.¹⁶¹ Social isolation is a significant and growing problem among the elderly and especially among the extreme elderly.¹⁶² This negatively affects the health of these individuals while they still have capacity.¹⁶³ And it causes them to become unbefriended when they lose capacity.

b. The Homeless

The homeless are another group who are likely to be permanently unbefriended. Often, it is difficult or impossible even to identify homeless patients.¹⁶⁴ Obviously, when the patient cannot be identified, it is difficult, even impossible, to identify her or his surrogate. Moreover, even when clinicians can identify the person,

158. *Id.*

159. Karp & Wood, *supra* note 107, at 149.

160. Sharon Jayson, *Alone and Aging: Creating A Safety Net for Isolated Seniors*, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Nov. 28, 2016), <http://khn.org/news/alone-and-aging-creating-a-safety-net-for-isolated-seniors/>; Katie Hafner, *Researchers Confront an Epidemic of Loneliness*, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/06/health/loneliness-aging-health-effects.html?_r=0; Carol Marak, *Senior Isolation – Ranking the 50 States*, SENIORCARE.COM (Mar. 10, 2017), <http://seniorcare.com/resources>.

161. U.S. ADMIN. ON AGING, A PROFILE OF OLDER AMERICANS (2016), https://aoa.acl.gov/aging_statistics/profile/index.aspx.

162. See U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging, *Hearing: Aging Without Community: The Consequences of Isolation and Loneliness* (April 27, 2017); Harry Owen Taylor et al., *Social Isolation, Depression, and Psychological Distress Among Older Adults*, J. AGING & HEALTH, Oct. 17, 2016, DOI:10.1177/0898264316673511.

163. See, e.g., NAT'L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG'G, AND MED, FAMILIES CARING FOR AN AGING AMERICA 73-122 (2016); Jennifer L. Wolff et al., *Supporting Family Caregivers of Older Americans* 375(26) NEW ENG. J. MED. 2513 (2016); Elizabeth Simpson, *For Want of a Ride, Norfolk Man Delays Eye Treatment*, VIRGINIA PILOT (Jan. 13, 2017), http://pilotonline.com/news/local/health/your-health-for-want-of-a-ride-norfolk-man-delays/article_dc163f25-5374-5eb6-b228-8a681e8b9fae.html.

164. See QUINN, *supra* note 21, at 111.

many homeless individuals do not have family or friends who are willing and able to make decisions on their behalves.¹⁶⁵

For example, Michelle Bateman, a 43-year-old woman, remained unconscious in the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania for four months before she was identified and her family located.¹⁶⁶ She went into cardiac arrest on August 13, 2010, and was brought to an area hospital and later transferred to Penn, but never regained consciousness.¹⁶⁷ Because no one could determine her identify and no family members were immediately present, the hospital was left to absorb all costs of treatment and presumably all decisions relating to that treatment.¹⁶⁸ Meanwhile, her family placed missing person reports and made phone calls, and the hospital ran nationwide fingerprint checks and asked for help from local TV stations and newspapers, but to no avail.¹⁶⁹ Finally, four months later, in December 2010, a friend recognized her picture in the newspaper and contacted her family.¹⁷⁰

c. Mentally Disabled

A third category of permanently unbefriended are those with mental disabilities. This category typically includes two populations: (1) developmentally disabled: people with conditions such as mental retardation, autism, cerebral palsy, or epilepsy, and (2) people who are mentally ill: people with conditions such as schizophrenia, manic-depressive disorder, and serious depression. Although these populations often overlap significantly with the homeless population, many others are served by special institutions.¹⁷¹ Because mentally

165. James J. O'Connell, *Raging Against the Night: Dying Homeless and Alone*, 16(3) J. CLINICAL ETHICS 262, 263 (Fall 2005); John Song, Edward R. Ratner, & Diane M. Bartels, *Dying While Homeless: Is It a Concern When Life Itself Is Such a Struggle?* 16(3) J. CLINICAL ETHICS 251, 251 (Fall 2005); Wendi M. Norris et al., *Treatment Preferences for Resuscitation and Critical Care among Homeless Persons*, 127(6) CHEST 2180, 2181 (2005).

166. Don Sapatkin, *Unconscious Woman is ID'd: Relatives Say They Filed Missing-Person Report in Aug.*, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Dec. 14, 2010, at A1.

167. *Id.*

168. *Id.*

169. *Id.*

170. *Id.*

171. Seena Fazel, Vivek Khosla, Helen Doll & John Geddes, *The Prevalence of Mental Disorders*

disabled patients are often easily identifiable and are especially vulnerable, many laws and programs have been developed specifically for their benefit and protection.¹⁷²

d. Unwilling or Unable

Finally, some patients are unbefriended despite the *existence* of family or friends. Although family or friends may exist, they are *unavailable* to make treatment decisions.¹⁷³ They might not be found or reachable by healthcare providers.¹⁷⁴ They may be unwilling to participate because of time constraints, physical location, or a poor relationship with the patient.¹⁷⁵ Other times, even if the potential surrogate is willing to participate, they may be unable to participate because of their own capacity issues or because the patient herself did not want them to serve.¹⁷⁶

2. Legally Unbefriended

In contrast to the permanently unbefriended, the “legally unbefriended” have someone available and willing to make treatment decisions on their behalf. But because of legalities, these patients may still become unbefriended. There are two key populations of legally unbefriended patients: (1) patients in same sex relationships, and (2) patients in other non-traditional relationships.

a. Same Sex Couples

Before June 26, 2013, only a minority of states legally recognized same-sex marriages.¹⁷⁷ Consequently, same-sex partners were often

among the Homeless in Western Countries: Systematic Review and Meta-Regression Analysis, 5(12) PUB. LIBR. SCI. MED. 1670, 1675–76 (2008).

172. *See infra* Part VIII.

173. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN § 5-605(a) (West 2016) (providing four definitions of “unavailable”).

174. *Id.*

175. *Id.*

176. *Id.*

177. *Same Sex Marriage Laws*, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (June 26, 2016), <http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-laws.aspx>.

not recognized as a patient's "spouse" for purposes of healthcare decision-making, unless the spouse had been appointed a surrogate in an advance directive.¹⁷⁸ This barrier was removed when the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires every state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex and to recognize same-sex marriages lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state.¹⁷⁹

b. Non-Traditional Relationships

Other non-traditional relationships are also at risk of being unbefriended. A recent study of over 100,000 patients found that only 93 percent identified a member of their nuclear family as next of kin.¹⁸⁰ Four percent selected friends or relatives outside their nuclear family as surrogates, including "baby momma," "common law spouse," and "live-in soul mate."¹⁸¹ One percent chose unrelated individuals to whom they had a different social tie, including "landlady," "priest," "roommate," or "sponsor."¹⁸² While those in the study had capacity to identify and nominate these non-nuclear family surrogates—if they had not already done so in an advance directive—, incapacitated individuals have no such opportunity. Because many states do not recognize these relationships as authorizing healthcare decision-making, these patients may become legally unbefriended.

Alternatively, one might say that patients in same-sex relationships are not "unbefriended." After all, they have close friends available to serve as surrogates. Yet, these patients remain "unrepresented," because their friends are not legally authorized or recognized to serve as substitute decision makers.

178. MATTHEW STIFF, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS: AN ADMINISTRATOR'S GUIDE TO STATE LAW AND BEST POLICY PRACTICE FOR LGBT HEALTHCARE ACCESS 8, 9 (2009).

179. See generally *Obergefell v. Hodges*, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).

180. Andrew B. Cohen, Mark Trentalange & Terri Fried, *Patients with Next of Kin Relationships Outside the Nuclear Family*, 313(13) JAMA 1369, 1369 (2015).

181. *Id.* at 1370. See also Colleen Galambos et al., *Analysis of Advance Directive Documentation to Support Palliative Care Activities in Nursing Homes*, 41 HEALTH & SOCIAL WORK 228, 231 (2016) (finding in a study of 1900 nursing home residents that 14 percent designated "other relative," 2 percent designated "friend," and 8 percent designated an "unknown" individual).

182. Cohen, Trentalange & Fried, *supra* note 180, at 1370.

3. *Temporarily Unbefriended*

The permanently unbefriended have no available surrogate. The legally unbefriended have a willing and available surrogate, but that person is not authorized to serve as surrogate. In contrast, the temporarily unbefriended “have” a surrogate that is legally authorized and willing to serve. But the surrogate is not available within the relevant timeframe for healthcare decision-making. There are two main populations of temporarily unbefriended patients: (1) minors and (2) those with momentarily unreachable surrogates.

a. Minors

With a few limited exceptions, individuals under the age of majority, typically 18, may not legally consent to medical treatment.¹⁸³ Consent must be given by a parent, guardian, or other legally authorized adult.¹⁸⁴ Typically, a parent will attend doctors’ appointments with minor children, but children often present to a medical facility without an adult.¹⁸⁵ In the absence of an adult who can legally consent, physicians are urged to refrain from treating minors in non-emergency situations.¹⁸⁶ Physicians who provide care without proper consent may be subject to civil liability.¹⁸⁷

There are many reasons why parents or guardians might not be available. First, family living arrangements vary greatly, and many children reside with an adult who is not a legal guardian, such as a grandparent, aunt, uncle, or stepparent.¹⁸⁸ Second, children may be brought to medical facilities by a childcare provider.¹⁸⁹ It is increasingly common for both parents to work, resulting in children

183. American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Pediatric Emergency Medicine & Committee on Bioethics, *Consent for Emergency Medical Services for Children and Adolescents*, 128(2) PEDIATRICS 427 (2011) [hereinafter *Consent for Emergency*].

184. *Id.*

185. *Id.*

186. *Id.* at 428.

187. *Id.*

188. Jan Ellen Berger & Comm. on Med. Liability, American Acad. of Pediatrics, *Consent by Proxy for Nonurgent Pediatric Care*, 112(5) PEDIATRICS 1186, 1189 (2003).

189. *Id.*

spending large amounts of time with childcare providers.¹⁹⁰ Such providers are not legal guardians, and, therefore, do not have legal authority to consent to treatment.¹⁹¹ Third, children may be traveling out-of-state without a parent when a need for treatment arises.¹⁹² In certain states, noncustodial parents may not consent to medical treatment.¹⁹³ Or the parents may go on vacation, leaving their minor child at home.¹⁹⁴ Fourth, many children live in foster homes, and often no one has asked the court to appoint a legal guardian.¹⁹⁵

These challenges may seem surprising given the enhanced communication available in today's culture.¹⁹⁶ But many hospitals and emergency personnel find it difficult or impossible to achieve real-time contact with parents or guardians, as many facilities do not have adequate systems in place to achieve this.¹⁹⁷ Some states have expanded the ability of individuals to appoint proxies and agents.¹⁹⁸ For example, in 2015, Florida enacted legislation permitting parents or guardians to appoint an agent who can authorize non-emergency medical treatment for a minor.¹⁹⁹

b. Momentarily Unreachable Surrogates

Just as parents may be momentarily unreachable to make healthcare decisions for their children, other types of surrogates may also be temporarily unreachable. One study found that 45 percent of incapacitated patients' next-of-kin could not be reached to make treatment decisions.²⁰⁰

190. *Id.* at 1189.

191. *Id.*

192. *Id.* at 1190.

193. *Id.*

194. Berger, *supra* note 188, at 1194.

195. *Id.* at 1190.

196. *See Consent for Emergency, supra* note 183, at 430–31.

197. *Id.*

198. H.B. 889, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2015) (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.2035 (West 2016)).

199. *Id.*

200. Andrew M. Fader, Steven R. Gambert, Maureen Nash & Krishan L. Gupta, *Implementing a "Do-Not-Resuscitate" (DNR) Policy in a Nursing Home*, 37(6) J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 544, 547 (1989).

III. Risks and Patient Safety Problems

Unbefriended patients are vulnerable to many undesirable, and possibly dangerous or life-threatening, situations. They often have multiple chronic conditions such as Alzheimer's disease, cancer, heart problems, diabetes, and kidney failure.²⁰¹ With no available formal decision-making mechanism, their healthcare providers are left in a quandary.²⁰²

On the one hand, they might treat the patient without consent. On the other hand, providers might refuse to treat until they can obtain valid consent. Providers in the U.S. take both approaches, exposing the patients to two different types of risks: overtreatment and undertreatment.²⁰³ In addition, because there is no one to authorize discharge, the unbefriended often remain in inappropriate healthcare settings.²⁰⁴ Finally, apart from physical risks, the unbefriended are likely to receive treatment that is discordant with their preferences and values.²⁰⁵

A. Physical Risks from Overtreatment

The unbefriended are often overtreated. The absence of an authorized surrogate often results in "maximum medical intervention, whether or not a medical 'full court press' is clinically and ethically warranted."²⁰⁶ The unbefriended receive unnecessary or unwanted treatment for various reasons, including physicians' fear of civil liability for failure to treat, institutional fear of regulatory sanctions, physicians' economic incentives to treat, and physicians' general interventionistic philosophy of medicine.²⁰⁷

201. Karp & Wood, *Incapacitated and Alone*, *supra* note 4, at 12.

202. *Id.* at 20–21.

203. Robert N. Swidler, *New York's Family Health Care Decisions Act: The Legal and Political Background, Key Provisions, and Emerging Issues*, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N HEALTH L.J., June 2010, at 20.

204. *Id.* at 19–20.

205. *Id.*

206. *Surrogate Decision-Making*, *supra* note 22, at 22.

207. *Unbefriended Elders: Matching Values with Decisions*, VOLUNTEERS OF AM.–MINN. (April 30 2010), <http://www.mngero.org/downloads/UnbefriendedElders.pdf> [hereinafter *Unbefriended Elders*].

B. Physical Risks from Undertreatment

Not only are the unbefriended overtreated, they are also undertreated. Many physicians refuse to provide any type of treatment without informed consent.²⁰⁸ Consequently, important decisions may be “postponed dangerously, [or] forgone altogether.”²⁰⁹ Some physicians will wait until an emergency, and then consent is implied, and therefore, there is no need for a surrogate to authorize treatment.²¹⁰

However, delaying treatment while waiting for emergency situations may result in longer periods of suffering and indignity, and increases the chance of morbidity to the patient.²¹¹ The absence of a surrogate can “stymie decision-making and possibly leave . . . patients to linger in pain and discomfort.”²¹² The Institute of Medicine found it ethically “troublesome” to wait “until the patient’s medical condition worsens into an emergency so consent to treat is implied.”²¹³ Such an approach “compromises patient care and prevents any thorough and thoughtful consideration of patient preferences or best interests.”²¹⁴

C. Physical Risks from Inappropriate Setting

Unable to secure consent for discharge, the unbefriended patient often remains at the wrong healthcare setting, such as a hospital, for too long.²¹⁵ The delay lengthens the patient’s stay and the risk of nosocomial infections.²¹⁶ Whether through interacting with other

208. *Id.*

209. *The ‘Voluntary’ Status of Nursing Facility Admissions*, *supra* note 22, at 12.

210. *See supra* Section I.B.

211. *Surrogate Decision-Making*, *supra* note 22, at 18; *Unbefriended Elders*, *supra* note 207.

212. THE RIGHT TO DIE, *supra* note 34, § 3.16[F].

213. DYING IN AMERICA, *supra* note 23, at 146 (internal quotations omitted).

214. *Id.* at 147.

215. Rosalind Abdool et al., *Difficult Healthcare Transitions: Ethical Analysis and Policy Recommendations for Unrepresented Patients*, 23(7) NURSING ETHICS 770 (2016); Moye et al., *supra* note 143.

216. Mary F. Marshall, *Editorial: Improving Guardianship Processes for Unrepresented Adult Patients Who Lack Decisional Capacity: An Ethical and Institutional Imperative*, 40(9) JOINT COMMISSION JOURNAL ON QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 387, 387 (2014); CAL. SENATE RULES COMM., OFFICE OF SENATE FLOOR ANALYSIS, SENATE FLOOR ANALYSIS, S.B. 481, 2017-18 Leg., Reg. Sess., at

patients or just being in the hospital environment, 10 percent to 20 percent of patients develop urinary tract infections, pneumonia, or other hospital-acquired infections.²¹⁷ The longer the stay, the higher the risk. Furthermore, the unbefriended patient may be deprived of needed care such as the benefits of hospice.²¹⁸ Or they might progressively lose their ability for rehabilitation.²¹⁹

D. Risks to Patient Autonomy

Physical harm is not the only type of risk posed to the unbefriended. A serious affront to individual self-determination is also a threat. Whether overtreated or undertreated, the unbefriended are susceptible to treatment decisions that do not conform to their personal values, morals, or beliefs.²²⁰ The Institute of Medicine observes: “‘Unbefriended’ patients who have neither decision-making capacity nor a surrogate decision maker are at particular risk of not having their wishes known or followed.”²²¹

For instance, several studies report that physicians often make decisions based upon their own preferences.²²² They may not know the patient, or they may not be willing or able to take the time to learn the patient’s preference. A treatment decision that is not based upon a patient’s own preferences and values is particularly offensive in a society that places a premium on personal autonomy. To the extent that a patient’s preferences and values can be ascertained, treatment decisions should be determined through substituted

6 (2017), file:///Users/landonreed/Downloads/201720180SB481_Senate%20Floor%20Analyses-.pdf (quoting California Hospital Association).

217. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, PREVENTING HEALTHCARE-ASSOCIATED INFECTIONS 1 (2016).

218. Timothy W. Kirk & Nancy Neveloff Dubler, *Let Hospice Be Available to Everyone*, TIMES UNION (June 11, 2015, 6:35 PM), <http://www.timesunion.com/tuplus-opinion/article/Let-Hospice-be-available-to-everyone-6322179.php>.

219. MOYE ET AL., *supra* note 149, at 28. Of course, the lack of a surrogate may not be the only obstacle to discharge. *See, e.g.*, Jennifer L. Herbst, *Permanent Patients: Hospital Discharge Planning Meets Housing Insecurity*, 47(1) HASTINGS CENTER REP. 6 (Jan.-Feb. 2017).

220. *See* DYING IN AMERICA, *supra* note 23, at 147-52.

221. *Id.* at 146.

222. Miller, Coleman & Cugliari, *supra* note 38, at 370 (“Without a surrogate, decisions may be less open, less clearly articulated, and more susceptible to judgments about the patient’s social and individual worth.”); *see* Norris et al., *supra* note 165, at 2185.

judgment; otherwise, they should be consistent with the patient's best interests.

IV. Prevention Is the Best Solution

Before examining “special” decision-making mechanisms for the unbefriended, it is important to first examine ways to prevent a patient from becoming unbefriended in the first place. Using established autonomy-protective strategies can often preclude the need to resort to “alternative” decision-making mechanisms. Three key preventative strategies are: (1) vigilant and ultracareful capacity assessments, (2) more and better advance care planning, and (3) diligent searching for surrogates.

A. Vigilant and Ultracareful Capacity Assessment

Obviously, the best person to make healthcare decisions for the patient is the patient herself. With support, time, and good communication, seemingly unbefriended individuals may be able to make decisions that at first blush appear not to be possible. The individuals might not actually be unbefriended. But for a diagnostic or assessment error, clinicians would assess them as still having capacity to make their own treatment decisions.²²³

Many bioethicists are concerned that unbefriended individuals are more likely to be the victim of an incorrect determination of incapacity by a physician.²²⁴ Indeed, patients often present to a hospital with an initial appearance of incapacity that later “dissipates under scrutiny.”²²⁵ For example, in one reported case, an elderly woman who entered Massachusetts General Hospital for a heart

223. See Michael Church & Sarah Watts, *Assessment of Mental Capacity: A Flow Chart Guide*, 31 *The Psychiatrist* 304, 304–306 (2007) (reviewing “properly supported processes” sufficient to enable the patient to make the decision in question, such as: multiple learning trials with corrected feedback and enhanced structure using computer-based presentations); Norris et al., *supra* note 165, at 2185.

224. M.S. Chin & V.A. Brown, *The Dilemma of Capacity: Respecting Patient Wishes and Preferences and Decision Making Ability*, 2(1) *J. HOSPITAL ETHICS* (2010).

225. Cristina Papanikos, *Establishing the Guardianship*, 8 *FLA. GUARD. PRAC.* § 12.16; Lesley Charles et al., *Physician Education on Decision-Making Capacity Assessment*, 63 *CANADIAN FAMILY PHYSICIAN* e21 (2017) (finding that physicians are poorly trained and vary in their approaches to assessing capacity).

condition found herself just days later declared mentally ill and transferred involuntarily to a nursing home.²²⁶ Her hearing in Suffolk Probate Court lasted about two minutes.²²⁷ A subsequent, more detailed evaluation convinced the original judge to void the guardianship and restore her freedom.²²⁸

Capacity is not all-or-nothing. While nearly half of long-term-care residents may lack capacity, a quarter still had partial capacity.²²⁹ For example, although patients may lack the capacity to make complex treatment decisions, they may have sufficient capacity to appoint a surrogate.²³⁰ The Volunteers of America-Minnesota program found that even though half its clients had a cognitive impairment, they still had sufficient capacity to complete an advance directive.²³¹ An unbefriended patient might still have capacity to share what she thinks “about death, life, her current living situation, and her hopes for the future.”²³² In short, the unbefriended should be allowed to participate in making decisions to the extent that they can.²³³

226. *Old, Sick, and Unbefriended*, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 18, 2008), http://archive.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/editorials/articles/2008/01/18/old_sick_and_unbefriended/.

227. *Id.*

228. *Id.*

229. Miller, Coleman & Cugliari, *supra* note 38, at 369.

230. See Gillick, *supra* note 140, at 87; AMERICAN BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON LAW AND AGING & AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, ASSESSMENT OF OLDER ADULTS WITH DIMINISHED CAPACITY: A HANDBOOK FOR PSYCHOLOGISTS 52 (2008); Scott Y. H. Kim and Paul S. Appelbaum, *The Capacity to Appoint a Proxy and the Possibility of Concurrent Proxy Directives*, 24 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 469 (2006).

231. ORTIZ, *supra* note 7, at 8.

232. See Baumrucker et al., *supra* note 131, at 587. The concept of the “least restrictive alternative” is a centerpiece of guardianship reform. See MENTAL HEALTH LEGAL ADVISORS COMM., THE HANDBOOK ON GUARDIANSHIP AND THE ALTERNATIVES 6 (2007).

233. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES art.12 (2008). It states that utilize the traditional process, substantial efforts are underway to develop practical alternatives and guardian prevention methods. Darlene Payne Smith & Sharon B. Gardner, *Complex Family Matters in Guardianship, Advanced Elder Law and Advanced Guardianship*, in ADVANCED GUARDIANSHIP COURSE 2009 ch.11 at 1 (Houston, TX: State Bar of Texas, 2009). For instance, the Texas legislature recently mandated the development of an additional program to assist those individuals with mental disabilities and no guardian in making decisions. H.B. 1454, 2009 Leg., 81st Sess. (Tx. 2009). The statute requires the Health and Human Services Commission to develop and evaluate two Volunteer Supported Decision-Making Advocate Programs. *Id.*; The programs will assist these individuals in making life decisions such as where to live and with whom and where to work. *Id.*; See *Volunteer Supported Decision-Making*, TX. COUNCIL FOR DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, <http://www.tcdd.texas.gov/projects/grants-completed-projects/the-arc-of-san-angelo/> (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).

Particularly encouraging is the growth of “supported decision making.”²³⁴ This is a process in which adults who need assistance with decision making—for example, some people with intellectual or developmental disabilities—receive the help they need and want to understand the situations and choices they face—so they can make life decisions for themselves—without the need for a substitute decision maker.²³⁵

Perhaps the patient really does lack capacity. Even then, that may not be a necessary or permanent condition. Perhaps the incapacity is caused by medical conditions such as infections, dehydration, delirium, malnutrition, pain, or medication side effects. Perhaps it is caused by sensory deficits such as hearing or vision loss. Perhaps incapacity is caused by psychological conditions such as stress, grief, or depression. Many of these conditions can be treated. Thereby, the patient’s capacity could be restored.²³⁶

234. G. Davidson et al., *Supported Decision Making: A Review of the International Literature*, 38 INT’L J. L. & PSYCH. 61, 61 (2015); Nina A. Kohn et al., *Supported Decision-Making: A Viable Alternative to Guardianship?*, 177(4) PENN. STATE L. REV. 1111, 1113 (2013). In 2014, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Community Living, awarded a grant to Quality Trust for Individuals with Disabilities to create a Supported Decision Making Technical Assistance and Resource Center. *National Resource Center for Supported Decision-Making is Accepting Applications for the Second Year of State Grant Program*, NAT’L RES. CTR. FOR SUPPORTED DECISION MAKING (Aug. 17, 2016), <http://www.supporteddecisionmaking.org/news/national-resource-center-supported-decision-making-accepting-applications-second-year-our-state>. Relatedly, Nevada created a special advance directive for adults with intellectual disabilities. Assemb. B. 128, 2015 Leg., 78th Sess. (Nev. 2015) (enacted as Chapter 337).

235. Danielle Ofri, *Documenting My Patient’s Next of Kin*, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2015, 10:06 AM), https://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/05/21/documenting-my-patients-next-of-kin/?_r=0; Chris Serres, *Minnesota Nonprofits Seek to Overhaul Legal Guardianship System for Vulnerable Adults*, STAR TRIBUNE (Dec. 12, 2016, 5:57 AM), <http://www.startribune.com/minn-nonprofits-seek-to-overhaul-legal-guardianship-system-for-vulnerable-adults/405955396/>. Notably, we utilize something akin to supported decision making to communicate with horses and dolphins. Helen Briggs, *Horses Can Communicate with Us Scientists*, BBC NEWS (Sept. 24, 2016), <http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-37450952>. So, we definitely should use it to communicate with patients when possible.

236. MOYE ET AL., *supra* note 149, at 21 (reporting in some cases “a clinical intervention improves capacity (e.g. delirium clears or medication enhances acuity)” and emphasizing “attention to enhancing and restoring capacity”); Moye et al., *supra* note 143 (offering checklists on how to enhance capacity); Courtwright et al., *supra* note 143 (finding 20% of unrepresented patients had “fluctuating” capacity); AM. BAR ASS’N, PRACTICAL TOOL, *supra* note 33, at 6 (2016).

B. More and Better Advance Care Planning

Better capacity assessment can reduce the number of unbefriended patients. Some can make treatment decisions for themselves. Others can at least nominate an agent or surrogate to make treatment decisions on their behalf. But these are limited solutions. Many unbefriended are permanently unconscious or otherwise “definitely” incapacitated.²³⁷ Yet, even for many of these patients, prevention can help. But it must come earlier.

If patients leave adequate guidance about their post-capacity treatment, then they can avoid the risks of being unbefriended. All individuals are strongly encouraged to engage in advance care planning.²³⁸ Even isolated individuals who are unable to appoint a family member might still be able to appoint a friend or a “professional” surrogate.²³⁹

A Minnesota program nicely illustrates the use of advance care planning to prevent at-risk individuals from becoming unbefriended.²⁴⁰ From 2008 to 2011, supported in part by a grant from the Minnesota Department of Human Services, the Volunteers of America-Minnesota (VOAMN) ran a program called “The Unbefriended Elders: Matching Values with Decisions.”²⁴¹ The program served elderly residents of certain counties who had no written healthcare directive on file and who were at risk of guardianship proceedings because of the absence of any available default surrogate.²⁴² The program consisted of local volunteers who were trained to identify and work with the unbefriended before they became incapacitated.²⁴³ The volunteers helped the at-risk elderly to complete healthcare directives and identify, locate, and support potential surrogate decision makers.²⁴⁴ Evaluations of the project

237. See Gillick, *supra* note 140, at 87.

238. END OF LIFE CARE AUDIT, *supra* note 144 at 10; Farrell et al., *supra* note 3.

239. See Gillick, *supra* note 140, at 90.

240. ORTIZ, *supra* note 7, at 8.

241. *Id.* at 8–9.

242. *Id.*

243. *Id.*

244. *Id.*

indicate 62.5 percent of those served completed healthcare directives and 80 percent named an agent.²⁴⁵

The program evaluators concluded that it is very feasible to serve this vulnerable population, and that there is a growing need for training and education regarding their unmet needs.²⁴⁶ The grant that funded the VOAMN project expired and the program has formally ended.²⁴⁷ But the Care Management and Consultation branch of the VOAMN still provides assistance for the unbefriended and those caring for them.²⁴⁸

Even if a patient has not engaged in advance care planning before admission to a hospital or long-term care facility, it still may not be too late. Clinicians should, at least at that point, clarify the patient's preferences about who should serve as surrogate in the event the patient loses capacity. Indeed, these very inquiries are legally mandated both by state law²⁴⁹ and by the Patient Self Determination Act.²⁵⁰

Furthermore, some have suggested that electronic physician orders for life sustaining treatment registries can help track the wishes of the unbefriended.²⁵¹ Several additional states have enacted Provider

245. Douglas Silverman, Minn. Dep't Health and Human Servs., *Serving the Unbefriended Elder Population 40* (June 21, 2011), <http://mn.gov/web/prod/static/odyssey/live/2011/PowerPoint/Monday/McDonnell-B/9-30am/SilvermanOdysseyFinal.pptx>.

246. *Id.* at 42.

247. ORTIZ, *supra* note 7, at 9.

248. VOLUNTEERS OF AM.: MINN. & WIS., CARE MANAGEMENT & CONSULTATION 2, https://www.voamnwi.org/pdf_files/care-management-brochure.

249. For example, a New York Statute mandates the following:

Within a reasonable time after admission as an inpatient to the hospital of each adult patient, the hospital shall make reasonable efforts to determine if the patient has appointed a health care agent or has a guardian. . . . With respect to a patient who lacks capacity, if no such health care agent, guardian or potential surrogate is identified, the hospital shall identify, to the extent reasonably possible, the patient's wishes and preferences, including the patient's religious and moral beliefs, about pending health care decisions, and shall record its findings in the patient's medical record.

N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 2994-g(1) (2015).

250. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f)(1) (2012); 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(b)(3) (2012); 42 C.F.R. § 489.102(a)(4) (2017).

251. Jeffrey Duncan et al., *Electronic End-of-Life Care Registry: the Utah ePOLST Initiative*, 2013 AIMA ANN. SYMP. PROC. 345, 352 (2013), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3900183/pdf/amia_2013_symposium_345.pdf.

Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment (POLST) legislation.²⁵² In just the past several years, these include: Delaware, Indiana, and Nevada.²⁵³ While limited to a certain set of life-sustaining treatments for seriously ill patients, POLST permits individuals to create clear, actionable, transferable orders for their post-capacity treatment, so to better avoid some of the risks of being unbefriended.

The promise of advance care planning may be even greater today. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) included advance care planning in the 2016 Medicare Physician Fee Schedule.²⁵⁴ There are now two new current procedural technology (CPT) codes for these services: 99497 and 99498.²⁵⁵ The former covers “advance care planning including the explanation and discussion of advance directives such as standard forms (with completion of such forms, when performed), by the physician or other qualified healthcare professional; first 30 minutes, face-to-face with the patient, family member(s), and/or surrogate.”²⁵⁶ The latter covers the same for “each additional 30 minutes.”²⁵⁷

In short, these new CPT codes address one of the most significant barriers to advance care planning: inadequate Medicare reimbursement. If physicians are paid to explore end-of-life options, then these discussions will occur more often.²⁵⁸ Indeed, the evidence supports this. Nearly 14,000 providers billed almost \$35 million for advance care planning conversations for about 223,000 patients from January through June 2016.²⁵⁹

252. Other states have tried to enact POLST legislation. *See, e.g.*, S.B. 165, 131st Gen Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2016); H.B. 385, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2013).

253. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 16 §§ 2501–2520 (2015); IND. CODE §§ 16-36-6-1–16-36-6-20 (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.691–449.697 (2013).

254. Thaddeus M. Pope, *Legal Briefing: Medicare Coverage of Advance Care Planning*, 26 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 362, 366 n.12 (2015).

255. *Id.* at 366 n.13.

256. *Id.*

257. *Id.*

258. Thaddeus M. Pope, *Legal Briefing: The New Patient Self Determination Act*, 24 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 156, 161 (2013); Thaddeus M. Pope, *Legal Briefing: Advance Care Planning*, 20 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 362, 366 (2009) [hereinafter *Advance Care Planning*].

259. JoNel Aleccia, *Docs Bill Medicare for End-of-Life Advice as ‘Death Panel’ Fears Reemerge*, USA TODAY (Feb. 9, 2017, 6:06 PM), <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/02/09/kaiser-docs-bill-medicare-end-of-life-advice-death-panel-fears-reemerge/97715784/>.

While more advance care planning can help limit the number of unbefriended, it will never be a complete solution. Among other obstacles, homeless, institutionalized, or migratory individuals may lack access to appropriate witnesses or notaries to complete an advance directive.²⁶⁰

C. Diligent Search for Surrogates

Better capacity assessment and more advance care planning are two proven prevention strategies.²⁶¹ A third is diligent searching.²⁶² For many individuals who are initially thought to be unbefriended, a diligent search often turns up an available surrogate.²⁶³ The search should be, and is often legally required to be, aggressive and rigorous.²⁶⁴ Before reverting to “special” mechanisms for the unbefriended, many states first require a very careful documentation of efforts to locate “natural” surrogates.²⁶⁵

For example, facility staff should contact nursing homes, neighbors, and relevant service agencies.²⁶⁶ They should attempt to legally gain access to a patient’s home or apartment.²⁶⁷ They should construct a genogram (a graphic of a person’s family relationships and medical history) and an eco-map (a graphic of the systems at play in a person’s life).²⁶⁸ Staff should examine patients’ personal effects, health records, social media, and other records such as

260. L.S. Castillo et al., *Lost in Translation: The Unintended Consequences of Advance Directive Law on Clinical Care*, 154 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 121, 121–22, 124 (2011).

261. See *Advance Care Planning*, *supra* note 258, at 362, 367 n.1.

262. See Sapatkin, *supra* note 166; Farrell et al., *supra* note 3.

263. See *id.*

264. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 313.005(b) (stating the “attending physicians shall make a reasonably diligent effort to contact . . . persons eligible to serve as surrogate decision-makers”).

265. See FLA. STAT. § 765.401(h) (2016).

266. L.M. Peterson, *Clinical Decision Making for the Unbefriended Patient*, 17 LAHEY CLINIC J. MED. ETHICS 1, 3 (2010).

267. *Id.*

268. S.F. Cohn and M.H. Rieff, Assoc. Dir. & Exec. Dir. Jarvie Commonwealth Serv., 18th Annual Jarvie Colloquium: Care Management Challenges in Serving Un-Befriended Older Adults with Compromised Cognitive Capacity (Apr. 29, 2011), http://www.jarvie.org/docs/Unbefriended_Elder_with_Cogn_Impairment_presentation.pdf.

benefits and pension plans.²⁶⁹ In this way, surrogates were found for nearly half of those who were initially thought to be unbefriended.²⁷⁰

Of course, there is not always time to engage in all these efforts. But even if the identification of a surrogate is not possible, prior healthcare providers and others may have information about a patient's history, past relationships, wishes, values, or priorities.²⁷¹ Even if a surrogate cannot be found, providers may still be able to gather "scattered bits and pieces of information, clues from a patient's past."²⁷² In short, even an unsuccessful search can be valuable, because clinicians may gather evidence that clarifies a patient's values relating to healthcare, and preferences regarding treatment under different circumstances.²⁷³

This is important, because whoever makes the treatment decision should exercise substituted judgment to the extent possible.²⁷⁴ Decision making on other grounds is illegitimate.²⁷⁵ For example, a 2012 decision of the Appeals Court of Massachusetts reversed a lower court's order authorizing an abortion and sterilization of a 32-year-old mentally ill woman.²⁷⁶ While incapacitated, the woman clearly and consistently had expressed her opposition to an abortion.²⁷⁷ Similarly, a lawsuit in Washington, D.C., alleged that the D.C. government consented to elective surgeries for mentally disabled residents without considering their wishes.²⁷⁸ Only if

269. See Peterson, *supra* note 266, at 8.; MOYE ET AL., *supra* note 149, at 41–42; Moye et al., *supra* note 143 (including detailed checklists on how to locate friends and family).

270. See Robichaud & Griggins, *supra* note 132, at 8. On the other hand, social work resources are limited. Resources devoted to extensive searching are resources that cannot benefit other patients.

271. *Id.* at 7.

272. See Karp & Wood, *Incapacitated and Alone*, *supra* note 4, at 18.

273. M. Jurchak, ASBH Ninth Annual Meeting, *Creating a Voice for Absent or Inadequate Surrogates*, AM. SOC'Y BIOETHICS & HUMANITIES, <http://asbh.confex.com/asbh/2007/techprogram/P6154.HTM> (last visited Feb. 21, 2017). The policy at Brigham and Women's Hospital (in Boston) suggests that "weaving these fragments of experience and knowledge together produces a 'synthetic judgment' of the patient's preferences." *Id.*

274. *In re Guardianship of Moe*, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 136, 140 (2012).

275. *Id.*

276. *Id.* at 141.

277. *Id.* at 137.

278. *Does v. District of Columbia*, No. 01-2398 (HHK) (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2011) (order granting motion to file second amended complaint).

evidence of patient wishes is not available should surrogates make healthcare decisions on the grounds of objective best interests.

V. Prevention with Better Default Surrogate Lists

Healthcare providers can and should take measures to help prevent individuals from becoming unbefriended. But lawmakers can help too. If the statutory list of authorized surrogates were longer or broader, then it is more likely that a surrogate will be found. Similarly, if the list allowed clinicians more flexibility in nominating a surrogate, then it would be more likely that a surrogate will be found.²⁷⁹

A. Longer Default Surrogate Lists

Most individuals have either not completed, or at least not effectively implemented, advance directives appointing healthcare agents or durable powers of attorney.²⁸⁰ In response, most states have enacted “default statutes,” which specify a hierarchy of surrogates to consent to medical treatment on behalf of incapacitated individuals.²⁸¹ These surrogates do not need to be designated or appointed by the patient or by a court.²⁸² Instead, they are automatically designated, based on their familial, or otherwise defined, relationship to the incapacitated individual.²⁸³ U.S. statutes normally provide a list in order of priority.²⁸⁴ Most give spouses the

279. Farrell et al., *supra* note 3. Clinicians in states without any default lists whatsoever have already developed *ad hoc* and flexible processes. C.L. Brigman, *How Long Can Michigan Tread Water without a Family Consent Law?*, 93 MICH. BAR. J. 32, 35 (2014).

280. Charles P. Sabatino, *The Evolution of Health Care Advance Planning Law and Policy*, 88(2) MILBANK Q. 211, 221–22 (2010).

281. *Id.* at 215–16.

282. *Id.*

283. *Id.* In most states, the surrogate is authorized solely because of her familial relationship to the patient. But some, like North Dakota, add a condition that the family member must have “maintained significant contacts with the incapacitated person.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-12-13 (2017).

284. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.030(d) (2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3231(A)(6) (2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2507 (2016); D.C. CODE § 21-2210 (2017); FLA. STAT. § 765.401(g) (2016); O.C.G.A. § 31-9-2(7) (2016); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 40/25(a)(7) (2016); ME. STAT. tit. 18-A, § 5-805 (2016); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-605(a)(2) (2016); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-5 (2017); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-d(1)(f) (2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (2016); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-12-13 (2017); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.635(2)(g) (2016); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5461 (2016); TENN. CODE ANN.

highest priority and typically also include, in various sequences, parents, siblings, adult children, and grandparents.²⁸⁵

With a broader and longer statutory list of authorized surrogates, it is more likely that a surrogate can be found, and, thus, less likely that a patient will be unbefriended.²⁸⁶ After all, one catches more fish with a bigger net.²⁸⁷ Recently, several states expanded their default surrogate lists.²⁸⁸ In addition, some states' default priority lists are now broader because of unrelated legislation. For example, the term "spouse" in all surrogate lists now includes same-sex partners.²⁸⁹ Most notable among these surrogate list amendments is that many states have amended their laws to allow "close friends," or some variation of "interested adult," to make decisions when no family member is available.²⁹⁰

§ 68-11-1806(c)(3) (2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986(A)(7) (2016); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-8 (2016); WIS. STAT. § 50.06 (2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-406 (2016).

285. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.030(d); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3231(A)(6); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2507; D.C. CODE § 21-2210; FLA. STAT. § 765.401(g); O.C.G.A. § 31-9-2(7); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 40/25(a)(7); ME. STAT. tit. 18-A, § 5-805; MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-605(a)(2); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-5; N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-d(1)(f); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322; N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-12-13; OR. REV. STAT. § 127.635(2)(g); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5461; TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1806(c)(3); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986(A)(7); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-8; WIS. STAT. § 50.06; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-406.

286. MOYE ET AL., *supra* note 149, at 20 (reporting that 95% of interviewees "believe that a Default Consent provision would decrease the number of guardianships overall . . . reserving public guardianship as truly a last resort function"). My own informal interviews revealed that clinicians in Indiana and Minnesota push families to seek guardianship when the default surrogate list does not clearly recognize their authority. Some states, like Delaware, also have comparatively shorter lists of eligible relatives. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2507. In contrast, other states include, near the bottom of the list, "nearest living relative" or "close adult relative." *See, e.g.*, D.C. CODE ANN. tit. § 21-2210; FLA. STAT. § 765.401. The shorter the list of surrogates, the more likely it is that patients will be unbefriended. On the other hand, the variations in statutory lists may be mitigated by the fact that "overwhelmingly . . . clinical practice is to talk with everyone who is present and demonstrating knowledge . . . concern for the patient." David Godfrey, *Clinical Realities in Healthcare Decision Making*, 38(4) BIFOCAL 57, 57 (April 2017).

287. *Cf. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States*, 55 Fed. Cl. 575, 575 n.2, 581 n.9 (2003). On the other hand, while a longer surrogate list helps prevent patients from becoming unbefriended, this may not necessarily improve the quality of healthcare decision making. Some default surrogate lists recognize surrogates who may not perform well.

288. *See, e.g.*, S.B. 302, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2014).

289. *See Obergefell v. Hodges*, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015).

290. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.030(d) (2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3231(A)(6) (2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19a-571 (2016); D.C. CODE § 21-2210 (2017); FLA. STAT. § 765.401(g) (2016); O.C.G.A. § 31-9-2(7) (2016); IDAHO CODE § 39-4503 (2016); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 40/25(a)(7) (2016); ME. STAT. tit. 18-A, § 5-805 (2016); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-605(a)(2) (2016); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-5 (2017); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-d(1)(f) (2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (2016); N.D.

For example, New Mexico permits “an adult who has exhibited special care and concern for the patient, who is familiar with the patient’s personal values and who is reasonably available” to act as a surrogate when no family member listed in the statutory hierarchy is available.²⁹¹ Similarly, Pennsylvania allows “an adult who has knowledge of the principal’s preferences and values, including, but not limited to, religious and moral beliefs, to assess how the principal would make healthcare decisions.”²⁹² The Veterans Health Administration also includes “close friend” in its default surrogate list.²⁹³

The Delaware Health Care Decisions Act purports to include close friends as default surrogates.²⁹⁴ When no family member is available, the statute authorizes “an adult who has exhibited special care and concern for the patient, who is familiar with the patient’s personal values and who is reasonably available” to make medical treatments.²⁹⁵ But the statute awkwardly authorizes a close friend only if the chancery court appoints that person as a guardian.²⁹⁶ Commentators often write that Delaware includes close friends as default surrogates,²⁹⁷ but since providers cannot informally designate close friends, close friends are not really part of Delaware’s default priority list.

CENT. CODE § 23-12-13 (2017); ORE. REV. STAT. § 127.635(2)(g) (2016); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5461 (2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12C-1 (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1806(c)(3) (2016); VA. CODE § 54.1-2986(A)(7) (2016); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-8 (2016); WIS. STAT. § 50.06 (2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-406 (2016). Delaware includes “close friend,” but only if appointed as guardian. DEL. CODE ANN. 16, § 2507 (2016).

291. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-5(c) (West 1997). However, the statute further dictates that a surrogate “may not be an owner, operator or employee of a health-care institution at which the patient is receiving care.” *Id.* § 24-7A-5(j).

292. 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5461 (West 2006).

293. 38 C.F.R. § 17.32(e)(4) (2009); VETERANS HEALTH ADMIN., HANDBOOK 1004.01, INFORMED CONSENT FOR CLINICAL TREATMENTS AND PROCEDURES 1 (2009) [hereinafter VHA HANDBOOK].

294. 16 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2507(b)(3)(a) (West 2016).

295. *Id.* § 2507(b)(2–3).

296. *Id.* § 2507(b)(4–5).

297. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON LAW AND AGING, DEFAULT SURROGATE CONSENT STATUTES 3 (2014), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/2014_default_surrogate_consents.authcheckdam.pdf; *Healthcare Equality Index: Default Surrogate Selection Laws*, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (Nov. 14, 2014), <http://www.hrc.org/resources/healthcare-equality-index-default-surrogate-selection-laws>.

Over the past several years, several additional states have added “close friends” as authorized surrogates in their default statutes.²⁹⁸ For example, in 2010, a Georgia bill added “adult friends” to its list of default surrogates.²⁹⁹ This new category includes an “adult who has exhibited special care and concern for the patient, who is generally familiar with the patient’s health care views and desires, and who is willing and able to become involved in the patient’s health care decisions and to act in the patient’s best interest.”³⁰⁰

In 2010, New York also added “close friend” as its ultimate default surrogate or decision-maker of last resort.³⁰¹ Under the New York Family Health Care Decisions Act, “close friend” includes an individual “who has maintained such regular contact with the patient as to be familiar with the patient’s activities, health, and religious or moral beliefs, and who presents a signed statement to that effect to the attending physician.”³⁰² In 2011, New Jersey introduced legislation, closely patterned after the New York act, which would have authorized the patient’s close friend as the ultimate default surrogate.³⁰³

In 2014, Louisiana added “adult friend” to the end of its priority list.³⁰⁴ An adult friend is one “who has exhibited special care and concern for the patient, who is generally familiar with the patient’s health care views and desires, and who is willing and able to become involved in the patient’s health care decisions and to act in the patient’s best interest.”³⁰⁵ The statute requires the adult friend to sign

298. See, e.g., *infra* note 299. Close friends are also included in healthcare decisions statutes of many foreign jurisdictions. See, e.g., *Guardianship Act of 1987* (NSW) cl 3E (Austl.).

299. O.C.G.A. § 31-9-2 (2010).

300. S.B. 367, 150th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2010).

301. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-d(1)(f) (McKinney 2017). Like most state statutes, New York’s contains certain restrictions on who may serve as a surrogate, even if the individual would otherwise qualify as a close friend. *Id.* § 2994-d(2). Notably, healthcare providers typically cannot qualify as close friends. *Id.*

302. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-a(4) (McKinney 2017).

303. A4098, 214th Legis., 2011 Sess. (N.J. 2011). The bill was reintroduced in the next legislative session. A1835, 215th Legis., 2012 Sess. (N.J. 2012).

304. S.B. 302, 2014 Leg., 40th Reg. Sess. (La. 2014).

305. *Id.*

an “acknowledgment form . . . certifying that he or she meets such criteria.”³⁰⁶

B. More Flexible Default Surrogate Lists

Instead of making the default list longer, some states have given healthcare providers more flexibility and discretion.³⁰⁷ Instead of specifying a strict sequence in hierarchical priority, these lists allow the providers to select the individual they judge will make the best surrogate.³⁰⁸

Tennessee has an interesting variation on the statutory default priority list that places the physician in a powerful position. A recent Tennessee court case held that despite existing custom, a patient’s next of kin is *not* automatically authorized to make healthcare decisions upon the patient’s incapacity.³⁰⁹ If a patient has not appointed an agent and a court has not appointed a guardian, then the treating physician is authorized to appoint a decision maker.³¹⁰ The statutory default list is not a mandate but only a guideline. The physician does not mechanically follow the sequence in the statute.

Instead, the physician must choose “an adult who has exhibited special care and concern for the patient, who is familiar with the patient’s personal values, who is reasonably available, and who is willing to serve.”³¹¹ Physicians may consider family members or next of kin, but are not bound to do so.³¹² They may choose any adult, so long as that person satisfies the listed criteria.³¹³

Like Tennessee, West Virginia similarly gives an attending physician or advanced nurse practitioner discretion to select the best

306. *Id.*

307. *See, e.g.*, TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1806(c) (2016).

308. *Id.*

309. *Barbee v. Kindred Healthcare Operating Inc.*, No. W2007-00517-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 4615858, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2008).

310. TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1806(c). The Tennessee Department of Health provides an “*Appointment of Surrogate Form*.” TENN. DEP’T OF HEALTH, DIV. OF HEALTH LICENSURE AND REGULATION, PROVIDER IDENTIFICATION OF SURROGATE, <https://tn.gov/assets/entities/health/attachments/PH-4269.pdf>.

311. TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1806(c)(2).

312. *See e.g., id.*

313. TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1806(c)(3).

qualified surrogate, even if that person would be lower in a common ranking of surrogates.³¹⁴

Colorado and Hawaii have similar variations on the default priority list, but which leave the physician with some discretion, though less than in Tennessee and West Virginia.³¹⁵ After determining that a patient is incapacitated, the attending physician may initiate proceedings to nominate a surrogate decision maker to act on behalf of the patient.³¹⁶ The physician seeks out as many interested persons as possible, including the patient's spouse, family, and close friends³¹⁷. There is no automatic hierarchy.³¹⁸ Instead, all interested parties must meet and decide amongst themselves who will be the decision maker.³¹⁹

Hopefully, the group will choose the person who is most familiar with and most likely to honor the patient's wishes and values. The nominated individual is then legally authorized to make decisions for the patient, and should make decisions based on the substituted judgment or best interest standard.³²⁰

314. W. VA. CODE § 16-30-8(b)(2016). The West Virginia Center for End-of-Life Care has developed a useful "Checklist for Surrogate Selection." WEST VIRGINIA CENTER FOR END-OF-LIFE CARE, CHECKLIST FOR SURROGATE SELECTION, <http://wvendlife.org/media/1024/surrogate-selection.pdf>.

315. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18.5-103(3) (West 2016); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327E-5(c)-(d) (West 2016). A 2006 roundtable meeting of the Elder Law Section of the Colorado Bar addressed that this statute needs to be amended to provide for an isolated individual with no close family or friends. ELDER LAW SECTION, COLO. BAR ASS'N, MEETING OF ELDER LAW SECTION OF THE CBA 7 (2006), http://www.mentoredforgood.net/repository/Inside_Bar/Elder/ELS%20Minutes%20January%202016.pdf.

316. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18.5-103(3); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327E-5(b).

317. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18.5-103(1.5)(a); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327E-5(b).

318. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18.5-103(4)(a); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327E-5(d).

319. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18.5-103(4)(a); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327E-5(d).

320. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18.5-103(4)(c)(V); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327E-5(g). The nominated Colorado surrogate, like default surrogates in several other states, may elect to withhold or withdraw artificial nourishment or hydration only under certain conditions. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18.5-103(6)(a). Two physicians—the attending and a second, independent physician—must certify that such care is only "prolonging the act of dying and is unlikely to result in the restoration of the patient to independent neurological functioning." *Id.* The statute requires that the healthcare facility provide the assistance of its medical ethics committee to any surrogate decision maker who is deciding to withhold or withdraw medical treatment. *Id.* § 15-18.5-103(6.5).

C. First Time Default Surrogate List

While a number of states have recently amended already existing priority lists, more than a half dozen other states considered adding completely new default surrogate lists for the first time.³²¹ For example, seeking a mechanism for medical decision making that would “minimize extraneous delay,” Massachusetts considered enacting a default surrogate list.³²² The proposed priority included: (1) guardian, (2) spouse, (3) adult child, (4) parent, (5) adult sibling, (6) adult grandchild, and (7) close friend.³²³

In 2014, New Hampshire enacted legislation that created a strict priority list of default surrogates.³²⁴ The statute provides that if there is no reasonably available agent or guardian, a physician or an advanced practice registered nurse (APRN) may identify a surrogate.³²⁵ The list includes: the patient’s (1) spouse or civil union partner, unless there is a divorce proceeding, separation agreement, or restraining order limiting that person’s relationship with the patient; (2) adult child; (3) parent; (4) adult sibling; (5) adult grandchild; (6) close friend; (7) agent with financial power of attorney; and (8) guardian of the estate.³²⁶

In 2014, New Jersey considered legislation that would have created a strict priority list of default surrogates.³²⁷ “A health care facility shall designate one person from the following list, as applicable, from the class highest in priority when persons in prior classes are not reasonably available, willing, and competent to act, to serve as surrogate for an adult patient who is determined to lack decision-making capacity.”³²⁸ The list included the patient’s: (1) spouse, partner in a civil union couple, or domestic partner, if not

321. AM. BAR ASS’N Comm’n on Law and Aging, *supra* note 84, at 3.

322. S.B. 853, 2015 Leg., 189th Sess. (Mass. 2015).

323. *Id.*

324. H.B. 1434, 2014 Leg., 163d Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2014).

325. *Id.*

326. *Id.*

327. S.B. 1233, 216th Leg., 2014 Sess. (N.J. 2014); Assemb. B. 1934, 216th Leg., 2014 Sess. (N.J. 2014).

328. Assemb. B. 1934, 216th Leg., 2014 Sess. (N.J. 2014).

legally separated from the patient; (2) adult child; (3) parent; (4) adult sibling; and (5) close friend.³²⁹

In 2015, Vermont considered legislation that would have authorized “surrogates.”³³⁰ But unlike other states, these surrogates could make decisions only about DNR (do-not-resuscitate) orders or COLST (clinician orders for life sustaining treatment).³³¹ The bill defined “surrogate” to include the patient’s: (1) spouse, (2) adult child, (3) adult sibling, (4) adult grandchild, and (5) clergy person.³³² It also included an “interested person” who has “exhibited special care and concern for the patient” and who is personally familiar with the patient’s values.³³³

In 2017, Nebraska and Massachusetts considered default surrogate legislation. The Nebraska bill would have established a strict sequence: (1) spouse unless legally separated, (2) adult child, (3) parent, (4) adult brother or sister, and (5) “an adult who has exhibited special care and concern for the patient, who is familiar with the patient’s personal values.”³³⁴ In contrast, the Massachusetts bill was more flexible, allowing the physician to “select a proposed surrogate who is ranked lower in priority if, in his or her judgment, that individual is best qualified.”³³⁵

In 2017, both Oklahoma and Montana successfully enacted default surrogate legislation. The Oklahoma statute provides a strict sequence: (1) guardian, (2) healthcare proxy, (3) attorney-in-fact, (4) spouse, (5) adult children, (6) parents, (7) adult siblings, (8) other adult relatives of the patient in order of kinship, and (9) close friends.³³⁶ But none of these individuals may act if they were “convicted of, pled guilty to, or pled no contest” to specified crimes,

329. *Id.*

330. S.B. 62, 2015–16 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2015).

331. *Id.*

332. *Id.*

333. *Id.*

334. Legis. B. 104, 105th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2017).

335. S.B. 783, 190th Gen. Ct., 2017 Sess. (Mass. 2017).

336. H.B. 1894, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2017) (to be codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 3102.4 (effective Nov. 1, 2017)).

or if they were “found to have committed abuse, verbal abuse or exploitation.”³³⁷

In contrast, Montana adopted a more flexible approach like Colorado. The attending clinician shall make reasonable efforts to locate and notify as many interested persons as practicable. These are the patient’s spouse, parents, adult children, siblings, grandchildren, and close friends. The clinician informs the “interested persons” of the patient’s lack of decisional capacity and asks that they select a lay proxy decision-maker. Those interested persons—and others they invited—must make reasonable efforts to reach a consensus as to who among them will make medical treatment decisions on behalf of the patient.³³⁸

D. Limitations of Default Surrogate Laws

Expanded or more flexible default surrogate laws offer protection to the unbefriended by expanding the categories of individuals who qualify as authorized healthcare decision makers. For example, even those patients who have no available family may still have a close friend.

But expanding default surrogate lists remains only a limited solution. Even close friend laws are of little value to patients who do not have any known or reasonably available close friends. Many times, such patients have had meaningful interactions only with healthcare providers. But providers are almost always prohibited from serving as surrogates, even if they would otherwise qualify as close friends.³³⁹

337. H.B. 1894, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2017) (to be codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 3102.5 (effective Nov. 1, 2017)).

338. S.B. 92, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess., 2017 Mont. Laws Ch. 285.

339. *E.g.*, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-5(C) (West 2017); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-d(2) (McKinney 2017) (“An operator, administrator, or employee of a hospital or a mental hygiene facility from which the patient was transferred, or a physician who has privileges at the hospital or a health care provider under contract with the hospital may not serve as the surrogate for any adult who is a patient of such hospital, unless such individual is related to the patient by blood, marriage, domestic partnership, or adoption, or is a close friend of the patient whose friendship with the patient preceded the patient’s admission to the facility.”).

Perhaps the most vivid example of the limitations of default surrogate lists comes from Colorado.³⁴⁰ That state already had a flexible default list.³⁴¹ But clinicians still confronted significant numbers of unbefriended patients. So, policymakers found it necessary to develop a special decision making mechanism for the unbefriended.³⁴²

VI. Guardianship Is Rarely a Good Solution

Default surrogate laws are preventative.³⁴³ They help assure that an individual who knows and cares about the patient will be a legally authorized decision maker.³⁴⁴ But even longer or more flexible default surrogate lists cannot help everyone. For that subset of individuals there is one more standard solution: guardianship. Indeed, in most states, guardianship remains the only officially recognized mechanism by which treatment decisions can be made on behalf of the unbefriended.³⁴⁵

But guardianship is neither a preferred nor an adequate solution.³⁴⁶ Commentators have overwhelmingly concluded that the disadvantages of guardianship significantly outweigh the advantages.³⁴⁷ Consequently, guardianship is generally considered to be a last resort option, to be used only after all other less restrictive alternatives have been exhausted.³⁴⁸ Even then, providers are often unable to obtain a guardian or at least obtain one soon enough to make the healthcare decisions at hand.³⁴⁹

In this Section, I first (a) summarize why guardianship is not seen as a good solution. I then look at four specific types of guardians: (b)

340. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18.5-104(3) (West 2017).

341. *Id.*

342. *See infra* Section VIII.

343. *See supra* Section V.

344. *See supra* Section V.

345. *See* A. KIMBERLEY DAYTON ET AL., 3 ADVISING THE ELDERLY CLIENT § 34:10 (2016).

346. *See infra* Section VI.A.

347. AM. BAR ASS'N, PRACTICAL TOOL, *supra* note 33, at 6.

348. *Id.*

349. Robin J. Bandy et al., *Medical Decision-making During the Guardianship Process for Incapacitated, Hospitalized Adults: A Descriptive Cohort Study*, 25 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1003, 1006 (2010).

private guardians, (c) volunteer guardians, (d) public guardians, and (e) temporary and emergency guardians.

A. Problems with Guardianship

Guardianship is a legal relationship that is created by state courts when a judge determines that individuals are incapacitated and unable to make decisions on their own behalf.³⁵⁰ The court creates a relationship in which the guardian is given legal authority to make decisions for an incapacitated individual—referred to as the *ward*—regarding that person or that person’s property, or both.³⁵¹ Every state provides for guardianship.³⁵² Indeed, most states provide no other healthcare decision-making mechanism for the unbefriended.³⁵³ So, especially for the unbefriended, “there might be no alternative to a guardianship if such an adult becomes incompetent without executing appropriate planning documents.”³⁵⁴

On the surface, this might appear to be entirely appropriate and adequate.³⁵⁵ The formal judicial process helps to assure neutrality, impartiality, and public accountability.³⁵⁶ The procedural due process afforded by the courts helps to assure that all perspectives and alternatives are aggressively pursued, and it provides important protections against improper decision making.³⁵⁷ While the courts may lack expertise in healthcare decision making, they can draw on the advice and recommendations of treating and independent clinicians.³⁵⁸ Consequently, guardianship might appear to be a mechanism ideally suited to protecting vulnerable unbefriended

350. Utah Law Review, *Third National Guardianship Summit Standards and Recommendations*, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1191, 1191 (2012).

351. *Id.*

352. Karp & Wood, *Incapacitated and Alone*, *supra* note 4, at 10.

353. *Id.*

354. DAYTON ET AL., *supra* note 345, at § 34:10.

355. *See id.*

356. *See id.*; THE RIGHT TO DIE, *supra* note 34, at § 3.26[A][2].

357. THE RIGHT TO DIE, *supra* note 34, at § 3.26[A][2]; Lou-Anne M. Beauregard, *Ethics in Electrophysiology: Who Speaks for this Man?*, 35 PACING & ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 564, 566 (2012).

358. THE RIGHT TO DIE, *supra* note 34, at § 3.26[D].

patients.³⁵⁹ Indeed, the American College of Physicians posits that a court-appointed guardian should be utilized in every case.³⁶⁰

Nevertheless, despite the widespread utilization of the guardianship procedure, commentators generally believe that the disadvantages of guardianship significantly outweigh the advantages.³⁶¹ The five main deficiencies are: (1) slow speed, (2) high cost, (3) limited competence, (4) low availability, and (5) restricted authority.

1. Too Slow.

Perhaps the most frequently mentioned criticism of guardianship is the time

that it takes.³⁶² In terms of *speed*, court proceedings are problematic, because they are very time consuming, and, in these situations, time is of the essence.³⁶³ Guardianship proceedings regularly take at least six to eight weeks,³⁶⁴ and they frequently take much longer than that.³⁶⁵

Medical decisions must be made in the interim, because the patient will need diagnostic and therapeutic interventions.³⁶⁶ A 2010 study noted the lack of data describing how decisions are made for patients while they are awaiting a court-appointed guardian.³⁶⁷ The study

359. DAYTON, *supra* note 345, at § 34:10.

360. Lois Snyder, *American College of Physicians Ethics Manual: Sixth Edition*, 156 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 73, 78 (2012).

361. See Moye et al., *supra* note 143; QUINN, *supra* note 21, at 112; Edward J. Larson & Thomas A. Eaton, *Limits of Advance Directives: A History and Assessment of the Patient Self Determination Act*, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 249, 290 (1997).

362. J.J. Chen et al., *Barriers Beyond Clinical Control Affecting Timely Hospital Discharge for a Patient Requiring Guardianship*, 56 PSYCHOSOMATICS 206, 206 (2015).

363. THE RIGHT TO DIE, *supra* note 34, at § 3.26[C]. Cf. Jenny Kitzinger & Celia Kitzinger, *Causes and Consequences of Delays in Treatment Withdrawal from PVS Patients: A Case Study of Cumbria NHS Clinical Commissioning Group v. Miss S and Ors [2016] EWCOP 32*, J. MED. ETHICS (2016), DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2016-103853.

364. THE RIGHT TO DIE, *supra* note 34, at § 3.26[C]; Rains v. Belshe, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 185, 189 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (seven-month delay in obtaining judicial decision authorizing treatment).

365. Jean Callahan et al., *Guardianship Proceedings in New York State: Findings and Recommendations*, 37 BIFOCAL 83, 84 (2016); Deb Bennett-Woods, Jean Abbott & Jackie Glover, *Giving Voice to the Voiceless: The Colorado Response to Unrepresented Patients* (2017).

366. Smith & Luck, *supra* note 11, at 167; S. Brown, "Medical Decision Making for the Unbefriended: Who Will Decide?"

367. PAMELA B. TEASTER ET AL., PUBLIC GUARDIANSHIP: IN THE BEST INTEREST OF INCAPACITATED

revealed that, in many cases, a treatment decision was necessary prior to the appointment of a guardian.³⁶⁸ Many commentators charge that it is “morally untenable and clinically unconscionable” for a patient to wait.³⁶⁹

To some degree, the waiting period problem can be mitigated. For example, to speed up the process, the Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center in New Hampshire has coordinated its efforts with the court.³⁷⁰ For example, hearings are now held by teleconference, and the social work staff prepares petitions in just the way that the court needs.³⁷¹ But courts in many jurisdictions will be unable to move faster.

2. Too Expensive

Not only are guardianship procedures too slow but they are also too expensive. In terms of *cost*, guardianship proceedings require a significant investment.³⁷² A facility must pay medical experts to assess the patient’s capacity, and must pay an attorney to prepare and argue the petition.³⁷³ It must often pay for a guardian *ad litem*, another attorney or an independent evaluator, to represent the interests of the ward,³⁷⁴ and the facility must pay filing fees and other court costs.³⁷⁵ All these expenses will likely total \$5,000 to \$8,000.³⁷⁶

PEOPLE? 4 (ABC-CLIO, 2010).

368. *Id.* at 21.

369. J.J. Chen et al., *supra* note 362, at 207.

370. J.J. Chen et al., *A Clinical Pathway for Guardianship at Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center*, 40 JOINT COMMISSION J. ON QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 389, 390 (2014).

371. *Id.* at 390, 394.

372. See *The ‘Voluntary’ Status of Nursing Facility Admissions*, *supra* note 22, at 10; Larry A. Frolik, *How to Avoid Guardianship*, 23 EXPERIENCE 26, 26 (2013); THE RIGHT TO DIE, *supra* note 34, at § 3.26[F].

373. L.A. FROLIK & R.L. KAPLAN, ELDER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 251 (5th ed., West, 2010).

374. *Id.* at 251–52.

375. See *id.*

376. See, e.g., Bernard A. Krooks, *How Much Does It Cost to Appoint a Guardian?*, LITTMAN KROOKS, LLP (June 2, 2015), <http://www.specialneedsnewyork.com/2015/06/how-much-does-it-cost-to-get-a-guardian-appointed/>. Recently proposed legislation would provide a tax credit for legal expenses paid with respect to establishing guardianship. H.R. 878, 112th Cong. (2011).

3. *Too Unavailable*

Even if guardianship worked in terms of time and costs, there is often no guardian for the court to appoint. In terms of *availability*, an appointed guardian is typically and ideally a willing family member or friend.³⁷⁷ Companies also provide professional guardianship services for families who can afford them.³⁷⁸ However, neither of these options is viable for unbefriended individuals without family, friends, or resources. Courts are forced to find other alternatives, such as volunteer guardians and public guardians;³⁷⁹ unfortunately, even these resources are usually inadequate to meet the need.³⁸⁰

4. *Too Incompetent*

Even if guardianship were more accessible in terms of time, cost, and availability, it is unclear what caliber of decision-making guardians can provide. In terms of *competence*, in most guardian situations, the guardian does not know the patient and is unable to make decisions based on the patient's morals and values.³⁸¹ Moreover, most states have no provision for guardian licensing, certification, or registration. Guardians are poorly trained, and, given very high caseloads, they are often unable to properly supervise their wards.³⁸² In short, it is unclear whether guardians can or do make

377. QUINN, *supra* note 21, at 73.

378. *Id.* at 86–89; Ellen Waldman, *No Family? Resources Still Available for Aging Seniors*, ASHLAND DAILY TIDING (Feb 22, 2017, 2:00 AM), <http://www.dailytidings.com/news/20170222/no-family-resources-still-available-for-aging-seniors>

379. QUINN, *supra* note 21, at 95, 99, 104.

380. *Id.* at 104.

381. N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, *supra* note 7, at 52–53.

382. Jeff Kelly, Maggie Kowalski & Candice Novak, *Courts Strip Elders of their Independence*, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 13, 2008), http://archive.boston.com/news/local/articles/2008/01/13/courts_strip_elders_of_their_independence/. The Boston Globe published an article discussing the dire guardianship situation in Massachusetts, and noted that there are no prerequisite training requirements to become a guardian. *Id.* The article discusses how “guardianship businesses” open up, but the compensation is so low that, in order to survive, the businesses take on too many wards to adequately monitor all of them; the wards become neglected and ignored, some receiving only two visits a year from their guardian. *Id.* The article notes that courts are too overburdened to properly monitor the guardians and fail to demand the filing of required paperwork. *Id.* For instance, guardians in Massachusetts are required to file an inventory of property and an annual accounting. *Id.* But in one county, 262 of the 308 guardian cases in the probate court had no filing at all. *Id.* See also U.S. GAO, THE EXTENT OF ABUSE BY GUARDIANS IS UNKNOWN, BUT SOME MEASURES EXIST TO HELP PROTECT

better decisions for unbefriended patients than other potential surrogates, such as attending physicians and ethics committees.³⁸³

Encouragingly, efforts to improve the guardianship system are ongoing. For example, in the U.S. in 2011, at least 27 states passed new adult guardianship legislation.³⁸⁴ The Third National Guardianship Summit, convened by 10 national organizations in October 2011, resulted in 43 standards for the performance of guardians and 21 recommendations for court and legislative action.³⁸⁵ At the federal level, legislation like the Guardian Accountability and Senior Protection Act would provide funding for state courts to assess and improve handling of adult guardianship proceedings.³⁸⁶

But, even if enacted tomorrow, the impact of reform remains years away. The current guardianship situation is not generally perceived as effective for the unbefriended.³⁸⁷ It is encumbered with “onerous formalities”³⁸⁸ that are “untenable most of the time.”³⁸⁹ Consequently, guardianship is generally viewed as an option of last resort.³⁹⁰

5. Limited Authority

Finally, assuming one were able to navigate the time, costs, availability, and competence obstacles, one more obstacle remains.

OLDER ADULTS (2016).

383. N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, *supra* note 7, at 53.

384. *State Adult Guardianship Legislation: Directions of Reform – 2011*, AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON LAW & AGING, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/2011/2011_aging_gship_reform_12.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2017).

385. *Third National Guardianship Summit Standards and Recommendations*, *supra* note 350, at 1191; *Third National Guardianship Summit Standards and Recommendations*, AM. BAR ASS’N (Aug. 6–7, 2012),

http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/rpte_ereport/2012/5_october/te_alert.authcheckdam.pdf.

386. S.1744, 112th Cong. (2011).

387. QUINN, *supra* note 21, at 104.

388. Frank, *supra* note 127, at 75.

389. Cynthia Griggins, *Patients without Proxies: What’s Happening in Other States?* MID-ATLANTIC ETHICS COMM. NEWSL., (Univ. of Md. Francis King Carey School of Law, Baltimore, Md.), Summer 2010, at 7.

390. Lisa Nerenberg, *Unbefriended Elders Receive Court Protection in California*, 27(3) AGING TODAY 10 (2006); CAL. PROB. CODE § 4650 (2016) (“[A] court is normally not the proper forum in which to make healthcare decisions, including decisions regarding life-sustaining treatment.”); QUINN, *supra* note 21, at 99.

Guardians often lack—or perceive that they lack—authority to make certain treatment decisions.³⁹¹ For example, in Georgia, an appellate court affirmed the dismissal of a hospital’s petition for an “emergency guardian.”³⁹² St. Joseph’s/Candler Health System wanted an emergency guardian to authorize the discharge of its patient, Claudine Tapley Farr.³⁹³ But the court denied the request, because there was no “emergency,” no “immediate and substantial risk of death or serious physical injury, illness, or disease.”³⁹⁴ When courts apply similar rules, hospitals may be relegated to serving as de facto homeless shelters.

Although Georgia narrowed the role of guardians, other states expanded their role.³⁹⁵ Minnesota and Michigan now permit guardians to make end-of-life decisions.³⁹⁶ In 2014, the Minnesota Supreme Court confirmed that guardians have the authority to consent to the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, without court approval, when “all interested parties agree that removal is in the ward’s best interest.”³⁹⁷ In 2013, Michigan enacted legislation that permits guardians to consent to a DNR order.³⁹⁸

B. Private Guardians

Even if a treating facility engages in the cumbersome, lengthy guardianship process for an unbefriended patient, there is often yet another obstacle: a shortage of available guardians.³⁹⁹ Most guardians are family or friends.⁴⁰⁰ But these are obviously unavailable to the

391. Karna Sandler, *A Guardian’s Health Care Decision-Making Authority: Statutory Restrictions*, 35(4) BIFOCAL 106 (Apr. 2014); J. Freeman, *End-of-Life Care Decisions—Challenges for Patients under Guardianship*, 104(1) IOWA MED. 14 (2014).

392. *In re Farr*, 743 S.E.2d 615, 615 (Ga. App. 2013).

393. *Id.*

394. *Id.* at 616.

395. See H.B. 4382, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess., (Mich. 2013); *In re Tschumy*, 853 N.W.2d 728, 747 (Minn. 2014).

396. H.B. 4382, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess., (Mich. 2013); *In re Tschumy*, 853 N.W.2d at 747.

397. *In re Tschumy*, 853 N.W.2d at 747.

398. H.B. 4382, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess., (Mich. 2013).

399. See GEORGIA APPLESEED, CARING FOR GEORGIA’S UNBEFRIENDED ELDERLY: VIEWS FROM THE PROBATE BENCH ON THE 2010 AMENDMENTS TO THE SURGICAL AND MEDICAL CONSENT STATUTE 6 (Alston & Bird LLP, 2013).

400. *Id.* at 5.

unbefriended. Professional guardians are willing to serve only if they will be compensated and compensation usually comes from the patient's estate.⁴⁰¹ But since the unbefriended are often indigent, professional guardians are usually unavailable.⁴⁰² Frequently, there is nobody else. In short, it is often difficult to find individuals willing to serve as guardians for the unbefriended.⁴⁰³

C. Volunteer Guardians

In response to the challenges with obtaining private guardians, some states have developed volunteer programs. For example, in Akron, Ohio, under the leadership of Probate Judge Elinore Marsh Stormer, Jewish Family Service recruits, screens, and trains volunteer guardians to serve as surrogate decision makers.⁴⁰⁴

Similarly, the Colorado Guardianship Alliance (the Alliance) developed a program to recruit volunteers to serve as court appointed guardians for the unbefriended.⁴⁰⁵ It screens all potential guardians and requires them to go through a training program, free of charge.⁴⁰⁶ When a medical facility or nursing home has an incapacitated patient, it calls the Alliance, which provides a volunteer guardian, when possible.⁴⁰⁷ The guardian may determine where the ward should live, make medical treatment decisions, and see that daily needs such food, clothing, and shelter are met.⁴⁰⁸ The guardian provides annual reporting to the Alliance as well as to the court.⁴⁰⁹

401. Karp & Wood, *Incapacitated and Alone* *supra* note 4, at 9–10.

402. *Id.* at 14.

403. GEORGIA APPLESEED, *supra* note 399, at 6.

404. Ed Meye, *Volunteer Guardian Program Set Up by Summit County Probate Court*, AKRON BEACON J. (June 18, 2014, 7:07 PM), <http://www.ohio.com/news/local/volunteer-guardian-program-set-up-by-summit-county-probate-court-1.496799>; *Volunteer Guardians*, JEWISH FAMILY SERVICE OF AKRON <https://jfsakron.org/volunteer-guardians> (last visited June 16, 2017).

405. *Guardianship Alliance Programs and Services*, ABILITY CONNECTION COLO., <http://www.abilityconnectioncolorado.org/guardianshipallianceofcolorado/volunteer-guardian-program/> (last visited Feb. 28, 2017). This program may be superseded by 2016 legislation in Colorado that provides an intramural mechanism for healthcare decision making on behalf of the unbefriended. *See infra* Section VIII.

406. *Guardianship Alliance Programs and Services*, *supra* note 405.

407. *Id.*

408. *Id.*

409. *Id.*

As in Akron and Colorado, citizens in Indiana forged a statewide initiative to create and fund volunteer guardianship programs.⁴¹⁰ The Indiana Adult Guardianship Services Project (IAGSP) was formed in 2008 and is heavily involved in this initiative.⁴¹¹ Its stated purpose is to “build a framework of community-based adult guardianship services projects/programs across the state.”⁴¹² IAGSP sponsors research projects to further explore the ethics, standards, and regulations surrounding guardianships.⁴¹³ As of 2014, IAGSP was working to implement pilot guardianship programs in six counties across the state.⁴¹⁴ It convened a multidisciplinary task force to support development of these programs.⁴¹⁵

Importantly, Indiana law provides that the court may appoint a volunteer advocate for a senior or incapacitated adult.⁴¹⁶ These guardians may consent to medical care or other treatment needs for an incapacitated adult.⁴¹⁷ As a result of the statewide initiative, Wishard Health Services began funding the Wishard Volunteer Advocates Program. There are dozens of trained volunteers who have served as court-appointed guardians of more than 300 unbefriended patients in Marion County, Indiana hospitals and nursing homes.⁴¹⁸

The program has experienced significant success.⁴¹⁹ Program consultants report seeing fewer unbefriended patients re-admitted, and greater Medicaid reimbursement to hospitals, due to the

410. *Advance Directives Resource Center*, IND. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, <http://www.in.gov/isdh/25880.htm> (last visited Feb. 28, 2017).

411. *Id.*

412. *Id.*

413. IND. ADULT GUARDIANSHIP SERVS. PROJECT, WHO’S OVERSEEING THE OVERSEERS? A REPORT ON THE STATE OF ADULT GUARDIANSHIP IN INDIANA 9 (2012), <http://www.in.gov/judiciary/admin/files/ad-guard-2012-full-report.pdf>.

414. *Id.* at 12.

415. *Id.* at 1. The task force consists of various organizations and state agencies, including the Indiana State Guardianship Association (ISGA). *Id.* at 4. The ISGA is a non-profit organization formed to strengthen guardianship and related services through networking, education, and tracking, and commenting on legislation. *Id.* at 10. The 2012 report appears to be the last one available.

416. IND. CODE § 29-3-8.5-1 (2016).

417. IND. CODE § 29-3-8.5-4(a)(1) (2016).

418. *See id.*

419. Robin Bandy et al., *Wishard Volunteer Advocates Program: An Intervention for At-risk, Incapacitated, Unbefriended Adults*, 62 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 2171, 2172 (2014).

guardians who assist patients with the application process.⁴²⁰ In short, the volunteer program trained enough volunteers to create an effective and quality mechanism. In 2011, the Center for At Risk Elders assumed the responsibilities of the Wishard program, now known as the CARE Volunteer Advocates Program.⁴²¹

D. Public Guardians

Recognizing that the general guardianship situation is poor, most U.S. states have implemented variations of traditional guardianships.⁴²² Notable among these variations are “public guardianship” programs.⁴²³ These programs follow four different models.⁴²⁴ Most public guardians are either publicly funded social service organizations or county government public officials.⁴²⁵

For instance, Mr. Yeager was an unbefriended individual in Colorado.⁴²⁶ His physician concluded that attempting resuscitation would be futile.⁴²⁷ The court affirmed the right of the Morgan County Department of Human Services to authorize a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) order and granted the Department unlimited authority to make medical decisions on behalf of Yeager.⁴²⁸ A minority of states have taken a different approach, instead establishing public guardians as either officials of the court or as employees of an independent state office within the executive branch of government.⁴²⁹

Unfortunately, in whatever form they have been established, public guardianship services suffer from three serious problems. First, the programs are generally overburdened, understaffed, and

420. *Id.* at 2171.

421. *What We Do, About Care*, CENTER FOR AT RISK ELDERS, <http://indianacare.org/what-we-do> (last visited June 16, 2017). Similar programs have been launched in Central Indiana. *See, e.g.*, No One Dies Alone (NODA), ESKENAZI HEALTH, <http://www.eskenazihealth.edu/programs/noda>.

422. *See* TEASTER ET AL., *supra* note 367, at 16.

423. *Id.*

424. *Id.* at 17.

425. PAMELA B. TEASTER ET AL., *WARDS OF THE STATE: A NATIONAL STUDY OF PUBLIC GUARDIANSHIP I* (2005).

426. *See In re Yeager*, 93 P.3d 589, 591 (Colo. App. 2004).

427. *Id.* at 592–93.

428. *Id.* at 595.

429. *See* TEASTER ET AL., *supra* note 367, at 23.

underfunded.⁴³⁰ Consequently, most states have significant unmet needs for public guardianship.⁴³¹ At the same time, some jurisdictions give guardians ridiculously high numbers of clients, far above the recommended 1:20 ratio.⁴³² Second, education and training requirements vary considerably. Only 15 states have licensing, certification, or regulation systems.⁴³³ Third, public guardians often have—or at least perceive that they have—limited authority regarding decisions surrounding life-sustaining treatment.⁴³⁴ Sometimes, they decline to exercise their authority, because they assume that patients are ‘safe’ as long as they are in the hospital.

Some states have moved to develop new or better public guardianship programs. For example, in Oregon, individual counties have long been permitted to fund and establish their own public guardian programs.⁴³⁵ But almost none of the counties could sustain their programs.⁴³⁶ So, in 2009 the state convened a task force and renewed it in 2011.⁴³⁷ The task force estimated that between 1,500 and 3,000 Oregon adults needed public guardianship services.⁴³⁸ Following the task force’s recommendations, in 2014, the legislature authorized the Oregon Office of the Long-Term Care Ombudsman, an independent state agency, to appoint a public guardian.⁴³⁹ The first

430. See Karp & Wood, *Incapacitated and Alone*, *supra* note 4, at 28–29; PAMELA B. TEASTER, ERICA F. WOOD, WINSOR C. SCHMIDT, JR. & SUSAN A. LAWRENCE, PUBLIC GUARDIANSHIP AFTER 25 YEARS: IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF INCAPACITATED PEOPLE 94 (A.B.A. 2007), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/PublicGuardianshipAfter25YearsInTheBestInterestsofIncapacitatedPeople.authcheckdam.pdf.

431. TEASTER, WOOD, SCHMIDT & LAWRENCE, *supra* note 430, at 93.

432. *Id.* at 101, 197.

433. *Id.*

434. *E.g.*, MINN. R. 9525.3055(2) (2017); *In re Shirey*, No. 98005210-DD (Mich. Prob. Ct., Montgomery Cty., 17 Oct. 2005).

435. See Yuxing Zheng, *Oregon Public Guardian, Conservator Program Could be Created by Lawmakers*, THE OREGONIAN (Dec. 18, 2013), http://www.oregonlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/12/oregon_public_guardian_conserv.html.

436. *See id.*

437. ORE. JOINT INTERIM TASK FORCE ON PUB. GUARDIAN AND CONSERVATOR, JOINT INTERIM TASK FORCE ON PUBLIC GUARDIAN AND CONSERVATOR (HB 2237) REPORT 2 (Dec. 2011).

438. S. Travis Wall, *Oregon’s New Public Guardian Program*, LUND REPORT (Mar. 12, 2015), <https://www.thelundreport.org/content/oregon%E2%80%99s-new-public-guardianship-program>.

439. S.B. 1553, 77th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ore. 2014) (codified at ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 125.675 to 125.730 (West 2017)).

public guardian was appointed in late 2014.⁴⁴⁰ The program has begun to provide services but is still being developed.⁴⁴¹

Nebraska also recognized that its “present system of obtaining a guardian . . . for an individual which often depends on volunteers is inadequate.”⁴⁴² So, like Oregon, Nebraska established the public guardian as a decision maker of last resort.⁴⁴³ In January 2015, the state started to develop processes, guidelines, and personnel policies to implement the law.⁴⁴⁴ The Nebraska public guardian program is now in operation and has handled more than 100 cases.⁴⁴⁵

Most recently, Colorado has also been considering a public guardian program.⁴⁴⁶ In 2013, a multi-disciplinary collaborative prepared a white paper that colorfully illustrates the problems of the unbefriended.⁴⁴⁷ For example, the white paper reports how the unbefriended remain in acute care with disproportionately burdensome treatment.⁴⁴⁸ But for the lack of an authorized decision maker, they could be moved to a more appropriate, less restrictive, and less costly setting.⁴⁴⁹

Among other examples, the Colorado Collaborative for Unrepresented Patients described a patient who had dry gangrene that

440. ORE. LEG. COMM. SERVS., GUARDIANSHIPS & OREGON PUBLIC GUARDIAN AND CONSERVATOR 3 (Sept. 2011).

441. Wall, *supra* note 438; Oregon Long Term Care Ombudsperson, *Public Guardian*, OREGON.GOV, <https://www.oregon.gov/LTCO/Pages/Oregon-Public-Guardian.aspx>. Notably, the Oregon Public Guardian and Conservator Program (OPG) prioritizes cases into three levels of priorities. *Public Guardian, supra*. Healthcare decisions fall into the third category. *Id.* Because of the OPG’s “limited capacity” to provide services, it is “only serving individuals who fall into the highest of these priorities.” *Id.*

442. L.B. 920, 103d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2014) (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-4101 to 4118 (West 2017)).

443. *Id.*

444. *Office of the Public Guardian*, NEB. JUDICIAL BRANCH, <https://supremecourt.nebraska.gov/print/11541> (last visited Mar. 1, 2017).

445. Michalle Chaffee, *Introduction to the Nebraska Office of Public Guardian*, NEB. LAW. 41, Nov.-Dec. 2015, at 41; NEBRASKA OFFICE OF PUBLIC GUARDIAN, 2016 REPORT, <https://supremecourt.nebraska.gov/20885/2016-report-nebraska-office-public-guardian>.

446. *See generally*, COLO. COLLABORATIVE FOR UNREPRESENTED PATIENTS, ADDRESSING GAPS IN HEALTHCARE DECISION MAKING FOR UNREPRESENTED ADULTS: A PROPOSAL FOR THE INCLUSION OF A PUBLIC HEALTHCARE GUARDIAN IN THE OFFICE OF PUBLIC GUARDIANSHIP (2013), https://www.courts.state.co.us/Courts/Supreme_Court/Committees/Committee.cfm?Committee_ID=41

447. *See generally, id.*

448. *Id.* at 7.

449. *See id.* at 7.

was not causing sepsis.⁴⁵⁰ Since this was not an emergency, clinicians could not act on the basis of implied consent.⁴⁵¹ Since there was no authorized decision maker, clinicians had to wait until the condition deteriorated.⁴⁵² In 2014, the Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court appointed a task force that recommended a pilot public guardianship program.⁴⁵³ But unlike Oregon and Nebraska, no bills have been introduced.

E. Temporary and Emergency Guardians

Yet another variation on traditional guardianship is to allow for temporary and emergency guardianships.⁴⁵⁴ Such petitions are filed with the court when there is no time to conduct normal “plenary” or full guardianship hearings, which may take several weeks or months.⁴⁵⁵ These procedures are neither as cumbersome nor as expensive as full guardianship.⁴⁵⁶

Temporary and emergency guardians are authorized to make one or a series of decisions, but do not have unlimited or ongoing decision-making powers.⁴⁵⁷ They are appointed to make the immediate treatment decisions only and then their authorization ends.⁴⁵⁸ For instance, Indiana provides for emergency guardian appointments when an adult needs immediate attention and there is no known person who can consent to treatment.⁴⁵⁹ A temporary

450. *Id.* at 8.

451. *Id.* at 8.

452. COLO. COLLABORATIVE FOR UNREPRESENTED PATIENTS, *supra* note 446, at 8.

453. COLO. PUB. GUARDIANSHIP ADVISORY COMM., THE PUBLIC GUARDIANSHIP ADVISORY COMMITTEE’S REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT 7 (2014), https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/Court_Probation/Supreme_Court/Committees/Public_Guardian/2014_OfficeofPublicGuardianship-FinalReport%282%29.pdf.

454. Related to these are “single court transactions,” where the judge directly makes the treatment decision. See QUINN, *supra* note 21, at 112; VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-1101 (West 2016), *amended by* S.B. 371, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012).

455. *E.g.*, CAL. PROB. CODE § 3208 (West 2016); FLA. PROB. RULE 5.900 (2017); O.C.G.A. § 31-36A-7 (2016) (placement only); IND. CODE § 16-36-1-8 (2016); N.J. CT. RULE 4:86-12 (2016) (special medical guardian); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS. § 34-12C-4 (2016); VA CODE ANN. § 37.2-1101(B) (West 2016), *amended by* S.B. 371, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012).

456. See Karp & Wood, *Incapacitated and Alone*, *supra* note 4, at 29.

457. *Id.*

458. *Id.*

459. IND. CODE § 29-3-3-4 (2017).

guardian is appointed for a maximum of 90 days, or until a permanent guardian is appointed.⁴⁶⁰

In 2010, Georgia gave hospitals and other healthcare facilities the right to petition the court for expedited appointment of a temporary guardian to make medical decisions.⁴⁶¹ The statute provides: “In the absence, after reasonable inquiry, of any [other surrogate] to consent for the patient, a hospital or other healthcare facility or any interested person may initiate proceedings for expedited judicial intervention to appoint a temporary medical consent guardian.”⁴⁶² But the law restricts the guardian from withdrawing life-sustaining procedures unless specifically authorized by the court.⁴⁶³

VIII. Mechanisms Lacking Adequate Due Process

If we cannot prevent the individual from becoming unbefriended through better capacity assessment, advance care planning, or expanded default surrogate lists, and if guardianship is not a reasonable option; then we need some mechanism by which to authorize treatment decisions.⁴⁶⁴

Fortunately, the laboratories of the states are busy experimenting with solutions.⁴⁶⁵ Nevertheless, the dominant approach is the “solo” physician model in which the attending physician alone makes the

460. *Id.*

461. O.C.G.A. § 31-9-2(a.1) (2017).

462. *Id.* Sample petition forms for the appointment of a temporary medical consent guardian are available at <http://www.gaprobate.org/forms/forms10/pdf/11GPCSF%2036.pdf>. The implementation of this act is being studied. *Safeguarding Seniors: Informed End of Life Decision Making*, SEEDS OF JUSTICE (Ga. Appleseed Ctr. for Law & Justice, Atlanta, Ga.), 2012, https://gaappleseed.org/media/docs/newsletter_2011-12.pdf.

463. O.C.G.A. § 29-4-18(i) (2017).

464. This briefing does not address some related issues. First, it does not address decision-making mechanisms for special and extraordinary medical situations such as sterilization and the administration of psychotropic medication. Additional protections are usually required in such situations. *See* FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.113 (West 2016). Second, this briefing does not address the situation in which the incapacitated unbefriended patient “objects” to treatment. Third, while this briefing focuses on healthcare decision making, such decisions are often intertwined with those concerning finances. For example, it might be necessary to authorize someone to sell a patient’s property so that she or he can qualify for Medicaid and long-term care placement. Fourth, this briefing does not address the participation of the unbefriended in biomedical research.

465. Godfrey, *supra* note 286, at 58 (“Fourteen states have developed nine different statutory models.”).

healthcare decision herself.⁴⁶⁶ But that approach affords little oversight and protection. Consequently, many commentators argue that more is needed. But “how much” of a second opinion is required?⁴⁶⁷ In this Section, I describe models which afford too little procedural due process: (a) solo physician unilateral authority, (b) second physician confirmation, (c) California interdisciplinary teams, and (d) California prison healthcare.

A. Solo Physician Unilateral Authority

There is significant disagreement about how to handle healthcare decision making for the unbefriended. But the dominant approach is for the attending physician to make the healthcare decision herself.⁴⁶⁸

Sometimes, this approach is explicitly authorized by state law.⁴⁶⁹ For example, in South Carolina, healthcare services may be provided without the consent of the patient or surrogate if, “in the reasonable judgment of the attending physician or other healthcare professional, the healthcare is necessary for the relief of suffering or restoration of

466. Thaddeus M. Pope, *Legal Briefing: Adult Orphans and the Unbefriended: Making Medical Decisions for Unrepresented Patients without Surrogates*, 26(2) J. CLINICAL ETHICS 180, 182 (2015) [hereinafter Pope, *Adult Orphans and the Unbefriended*].

467. I owe this phrasing to Paul McLean, vice president of the nonprofit Community Voices in Medical Ethics and blogger and social network coordinator for the affiliate Community Ethics Committee. I have recently outlined basic notions of procedural due process. Thaddeus M. Pope, *Procedural Due Process and Intramural Hospital Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: The Texas Advance Directives Act*, 10 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 93 (2017) [hereinafter Pope, *Procedural Due Process*]. Theories of procedural fairness can also be found outside constitutional law. *See, e.g.*, NORMAN DANIELS & JAMES E. SABIN, SETTING LIMITS FAIRLY: CAN WE LEARN TO SHARE MEDICAL RESOURCES? (2002); Jocelyn Downie et al., *Next Up: A Proposal for Values-Based Law Reform on Unilateral Withholding and Withdrawal of Potentially Life-Sustaining Treatment*, 54(3) ALBERTA L. REV. 803 (2017).

468. *See* Pope, *Adult Orphans and the Unbefriended*, *supra* note 466, at 182. On the other hand, only 11 percent of respondents in a recent survey conducted by the ABA Commission on Law and Aging, the Society for Hospital Medicine, and the Society for Critical Care Medicine reported that they would “make a decision yourself, abiding by professional ethics and standards.” David Godfrey, *Older Adults and Healthcare Decision Making in Clinical Settings*, JUSTICE IN AGING ISSUE BRIEF (Mar. 2017), at 2–3, <http://www.justiceinaging.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Older-Adults-and-Health-Care-Decision-Making-in-Clinical-Settings-Issue-Brief.pdf>. Nearly 50% would consult a second physician, risk management, or an ethics committee. *Id.* Around 40% would seek a guardian. *Id.*

469. *See* CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-571(a) (2016). Sometimes physicians are given far narrower roles with respect to the unbefriended. *See* UTAH ADMIN. CODE § R432-31-11(3) (2017). For example, in Utah, physicians may “complete and sign new Life with Dignity Orders for individuals with prior forms who no longer have capacity to complete new orders, and who do not have a surrogate/guardian to authorize the new order.” *Id.*

bodily function or to preserve the life, health, or bodily integrity of the patient.”⁴⁷⁰ The healthcare provider is not liable for providing, in good faith, healthcare without consent unless the provision of care is negligent.⁴⁷¹ A 2011 Missouri bill was virtually identical.⁴⁷²

With respect to life-sustaining treatment, North Carolina provides: “If none of the [surrogates] is reasonably available then at the discretion of the attending physician the life-prolonging measures may be withheld or discontinued upon the direction and under the supervision of the attending physician.”⁴⁷³ Oregon’s law is virtually identical.⁴⁷⁴ Connecticut law oddly provides that the physician need only “consider” the patient’s wishes and need only “consult” the surrogate.⁴⁷⁵

While only a handful of states authorize clinicians to treat without consent, some commentators have suggested including healthcare providers on the statutory priority list of authorized surrogates.⁴⁷⁶ After all, even when there is no available family member or close friend, there is almost always an available physician. Indeed, there is evidence that some patients prefer physicians over guardians as surrogate decision makers.⁴⁷⁷ In short, there is some legal authorization and even broader clinical practice of physicians making healthcare decisions for their unbefriended patients.

Nevertheless, many are uncomfortable with this status quo. Some have charged it with “unacceptable ethical arbitrariness.”⁴⁷⁸ The Institute of Medicine warns that “having a single health professional

470. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-66-50 (2016).

471. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-66-70(D) (2016).

472. Adult Health Care Consent Act, H.B. 392, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011).

473. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(b) (2016).

474. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.635(3) (2016).

475. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-571(a) (2016).

476. Etienne Phipps & Richard Allman, *Potential Impact of Advance Directive Law Act 169 on Decisions and Care for Patients at End of Life: Reflections of Ethics Consultants* 20 POPULATION HEALTH MATTERS NO. 2, 2–3 (2007), <http://jdc.jefferson.edu/hpn/vol20/iss2/8/>.

477. Norris et al., *supra* note 165, at 2184. Many states specifically prohibit healthcare providers or employees of a facility to which a patient has been admitted from serving as a patient’s surrogate unless they are related to the patient or are a close friend whose friendship preceded the patient’s admission. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2503(h) (2016).

478. See Ozar, *supra* note 9. Ozar also argues that having a physician as surrogate is problematic because of the regular rotation of hospitalists, physicians who specialize in hospital-based medicine. *Id.* The patient needs a “longitudinal partner.” *Id.*

make unilateral decisions for an unbefriended patient is ethically unsatisfactory in terms of protecting patient autonomy and establishing transparency.⁴⁷⁹

Notably, 38 states and the District of Columbia expressly prohibit a patient's providers from serving as their own patient's surrogate or court appointed guardian.⁴⁸⁰ Commentators have increasingly challenged the basis for this widespread prohibition.⁴⁸¹ But its persistence is a powerful statement that public policy disfavors clinicians serving as surrogates for their patients even with their consent.

There are three main concerns. First, there are long-standing and well-grounded concerns that giving physicians unilateral authority to make treatment decisions is risky due to conflicts of interest.⁴⁸² When the treating physician is the decision maker, she suffers from a conflict of interest, given both her own and her facility's financial incentives. For example, The Greater New York Hospital Association lost \$13 million in nine months awaiting appointment of guardians for 400 undischarged patients.⁴⁸³ Similar studies across the field show that hospitals have a strong financial incentive to have an

479. DYING IN AMERICA, *supra* note 23, at 146.

480. AM. BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON LAW AND AGING, DEFAULT SURROGATE CONSENT STATUTES (2016), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/2014_default_surrogate_consent_statutes.authcheckdam.pdf (identifying AL, AK, CA, CT, DE, DC, GA, HI, ID, IL, IA, KS, KY, ME, MD, MA, MN, MS, NE, NV, NH, NJ, NY, NC, ND, OH, OR, PA, RI, SC, TX, VT, WA, WV, WI and WY). *See, e.g.*, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.5-04, 30.1-28-11 (2012).

481. *See, e.g.*, Philip M. Rosoff & Kelly M. Leong, *An Ethical and Legal Framework for Physicians as Surrogate Decision-Makers for Their Patients*, 43(4) J. L. MED. & ETHICS 857 (2015).

482. *See* Larson & Eaton, *supra* note 361, at 290; *Who Decides?*, *supra* note 131, at 38.

483. Winsor C. Schmidt, *Public Guardianship Issues for New York: Insights from Research*, 6(3) ELDER L. ATTY. 31 (Fall 1996); Winsor C. Schmidt, Endowed Chair and Distinguished Scholar in Urban Health Policy, Uni. of Louisville Sch. of Medicine, Presentation at Third National Guardianship Summit, slide 63 (Oct. 12, 2011). *See also* Winsor C. Schmidt, *Development and Trends in the Status of Public Guardianship: Highlights of the 2007 National Public Guardianship Study*, 33(5) MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 728 (Sept.-Oct. 2009) (reporting that Florida saved \$3.9 million in health care costs in one year with appropriate public guardian services for 2,208 individuals); PAMELA B. TEASTER & KAREN A. ROBERTO, VIRGINIA PUBLIC GUARDIAN AND CONSERVATOR PROGRAMS: A PROFILE OF PROGRAMS, REPORT TO THE VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT FOR THE AGING (2003) (finding that Virginia saved \$5.6 million in health care costs with public guardian services for 85 patients); VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, GUARDIANSHIP PRACTICE: A SIX-YEAR PERSPECTIVE 7 (Dec. 2011) (reporting their New York City guardianship project saved Medicaid \$2.5 million for 111 clients).

expeditious mechanism to make healthcare decisions for unbefriended patients.⁴⁸⁴

Second, when the treating physician is the decision maker, the decision may be too influenced by the physician's *own* personal values and biases.⁴⁸⁵ Non-clinician surrogates regularly make decisions guided by their own values, rather than the patient's values.⁴⁸⁶ The evidence of such physician biases is too voluminous even to digest here. Examples include the impact of the physician's race on treatment⁴⁸⁷ and the incentive to make decisions that comport with the interests of hospital management.⁴⁸⁸ The risk is especially high, because the unbefriended—physically disabled, homeless, racial minorities—are often the targets of negative assumptions.⁴⁸⁹

Third, this “solo” decision making may result in less carefully considered treatment plans. When physicians need not reduce the result of their thought processes and justify their treatment recommendation, they may not think through the plan as carefully.⁴⁹⁰ Clinicians “will give more careful consideration . . . if they are

484. Schmidt, *supra* note 2, at 95–96 (collecting studies); *see also* Parekh & Adorno, *supra* note 153, at 14; MASSACHUSETTS GUARDIANSHIP POLICY INSTITUTE, 2017 REPORT 1 (2017), <http://guardianship.institute/pdf/2017+Report+With+Meetings.pdf> (finding public guardianship could save \$10 million); Courtwright et al., *supra* note 143 (“Compared to the general inpatient population, a greater percentage of unrepresented patients were underinsured (15.6 per cent versus 64 per cent)”); Nina Bernstein, *To Collect Debts, Nursing Homes Are Seizing Control Over Patients*, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/26/nyregion/to-collect-debts-nursing-home-seizing-control-over-patients.html?_r=0 (reporting that nursing homes seek guardianship when the healthcare agent fails to pay).

485. *See* Pope, *Adult Orphans and the Unbefriended*, *supra* note 466, at 182.

486. *Cf.* Phillip M. Rosoff, *Licensing Surrogate Decision-Makers*, 29(2) HEC FORUM 145 (2017).

487. S.C. Modi et al., *Influence of Patient and Physician Characteristics on Percutaneous Endoscopic Gastrostomy Tube Decision-making*, 10(2) J. PALLIATIVE MED. 359 (2007).

488. David L. Williamson et al., *Incapacitated and Surrogateless Patients: Decision Making for the Surrogateless Patient: An Attempt to Improve Decision Making*, 16(2) AM. J. BIOETHICS 83 (2016); Morten Magelssen et al., *Sources of Bias in Clinical Ethics Case Deliberation*, 40(10) J. MED. ETHICS 678 (2014); Thaddeus M. Pope, *Multi-Institutional Healthcare Ethics Committees: The Procedurally Fair Internal Dispute Resolution Mechanism*, 31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 257, 274-99 (2009).

489. Bennett-Woods, Abbott, & Glover, *supra* note 365; Ruqaiyah Yearby, *Breaking the Cycle of ‘Unequal Treatment’ with Health Care Reform: Acknowledging and Addressing the Continuation of Racial Bias*, 44(4) CONN. L. REV. 1281 (2012).

490. *See* Pope, *Procedural Due Process*, *supra* note 467, at 140-42 (arguing that decisions are better when the decision maker must state not only the end result but also the process by which they reached it); Volpe & Steinman, *supra* note 11.

required to state not only the end result of their inquiry but the process by which they reached it.”⁴⁹¹

B. Second Physician Confirmation

While the solo physician approach is the most common in practice, it is only explicitly authorized in fewer than five states.⁴⁹² Another approximately ten states authorize attending physicians to make treatment decisions on behalf of the unbefriended only with some confirmation or “double-check” on their clinical decision making.⁴⁹³

This additional review is widely perceived as an important safeguard.⁴⁹⁴ The Ethics Committee of the American Geriatrics Society maintains that the patient’s team of treating providers should make a decision.⁴⁹⁵ Second physician confirmation normally takes one of three forms: (1) concurrence of a second physician, (2) concurrence of an institutional committee, or (3) concurrence of an external committee. The first model is described here, and the second two are described in following sections.

For example, in Tennessee, if no family or close friend is reasonably available, the treating physician is then authorized to make medical decisions, but only after obtaining concurrence from a second independent physician.⁴⁹⁶ Texas law similarly provides: “if none of the [surrogates] is available, then treatment decisions ‘must be concurred in by another physician who is not involved in the

491. *United States v. Merz*, 376 U.S. 192, 199 (1964); cf. FRANK M. COFFIN, *THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL APPELLATE BENCH 57* (Houghton Mifflin Company Boston 1980).

492. See e.g., Bonnie Booth, *Doctor’s Request to End Patient’s Care Denied*, AM. MED. NEWS (June 12, 2006); John Agar, *Judge Rules Lawton Woman’s Life Must Be Preserved*, KALAMAZOO GAZETTE, 25 April 2006. Several years ago, in Michigan, a physician was treating 97-year-old Hazel Wagner, a heart attack victim with no chance of recovery. Agar, *supra*. The patient was screaming to the physician, “Help me Jesus!” *Id.* The physician petitioned the court to end life support efforts, but the court denied the petition. *Id.* The court ruled that the petition would have to come from the patient’s guardian and that a physician’s role was not to advocate, but simply to advise. *Id.*

493. THE RIGHT TO DIE, *supra* note 34, at § 3.25[A][3][a].

494. Miller, Coleman & Cugliari, *supra* note 38, at 371; Farrell et al., *supra* note 3.

495. Ethics Committee of the Am. Geriatrics Soc’y, *Making Treatment Decisions for Incapacitated Older Adults without Advance Directives*, 44(8) J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 986, 986 (1996).

496. TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1806(c)(5) (2016) (alternatively allowing confirmation from an ethics committee).

treatment of the patient or who is a member of an ethics or medical committee of the healthcare facility.”⁴⁹⁷

Likewise, in North Carolina, “the patient’s attending physician, in the attending physician’s discretion, may provide healthcare treatment without the consent of the patient or other person authorized to consent for the patient if there is confirmation by a physician other than the patient’s attending physician of the patient’s condition and the necessity for treatment.”⁴⁹⁸ Arizona similarly provides: “If the health care provider cannot locate any of the [surrogates], the patient’s attending physician may make health care treatment decisions for the patient after the physician consults with . . . a second physician who concurs with the physician’s decision.”⁴⁹⁹

In 2014, Louisiana proposed making the attending physician the surrogate of last resort.⁵⁰⁰ The bill provided that if no other decision maker is reasonably available, then the patient’s attending physician “shall have the discretion to provide or perform any surgical or medical treatment or procedures . . . and may also make decisions regarding continued services needed by the patient, including but not limited to approving the placement or transfer of the patient to another facility.”⁵⁰¹ But the bill would have required that “prior to taking such action, the attending physician shall obtain confirmation from another physician of the patient’s condition and the medical necessity for such action.”⁵⁰²

497. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 166.039(e), 166.088(f) (“If there is not a qualified relative available . . . an out-of-hospital DNR order must be concurred in by another physician who is not involved in the treatment of the patient or who is a representative of the ethics or medical committee of the health care facility in which the person is a patient.”).

498. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.13(c1) (2016).

499. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3231(B) (2016). The statute prefers that the attending physician consult with and obtain the recommendations of an institutional ethics committee. *Id.* But if this is not possible, then concurrence of second physician is sufficient. *Id.*

500. S. Res. 302, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2014) (proposed section § 40:1299.53 (D)).

501. *Id.* Similarly, Article 7 of Taiwan’s new Hospice and Palliative Care Law authorizes the palliative care team to act as sole decision makers on behalf of an incompetent, terminally ill patient’s best interests if no family member is available. Yi-Chen Su, *When Ethical Reform Became Law: The Constitutional Concerns Raised by Recent Legislation in Taiwan*, 40(7) J. MED. ETHICS 484, 484 (2014).

502. S. Res. 302, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2014) (proposed section § 40:1299.53 (D)).

Since 1993, Oregon has had a mechanism for making life-sustaining treatment decisions for the unbefriended.⁵⁰³ But it has had no mechanism for making decisions regarding major medical treatment.⁵⁰⁴ So, in 2011, Oregon enacted a new law permitting a hospital “to appoint a health care provider . . . who has received training in health care ethics.”⁵⁰⁵ If the appointed provider is the patient’s attending physician, then that individual must obtain a second opinion from another healthcare provider.⁵⁰⁶

In Mississippi:

[C]onsent may be given by an owner, operator or employee of a residential long-term health-care institution at which the patient is a resident if there is no advance health-care directive to the contrary and a licensed physician who is not an owner, operator or employee of the residential long-term health-care institution at which the patient is a resident has determined that the patient is in need of health care.”⁵⁰⁷

But this power to consent is limited to those healthcare services determined necessary by the physician.⁵⁰⁸ And it does not include the power to consent to “withholding or discontinuing any life support, nutrition, hydration or other treatment, care or support.”⁵⁰⁹

In West Virginia, the surrogate of last resort can include “any other person or entity, including, but not limited to, public agencies, public guardians, public officials, public and private corporations and other persons or entities which the Department of Health and Human

503. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.635(3) (West 2016) (“If none of the persons described in subsection (2) of this section is available, then life-sustaining procedures may be withheld or withdrawn upon the direction and under the supervision of the attending physician.”).

504. Jeffrey M. Cheyne, *Legislative Update for Estate Planners*, OR. ST. B. ELDER L. NEWSL. (Or. State Bar, Tigard, Or.), Oct. 2011, at 5.

505. S.B. 579 § 2(a), 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2011). I thank Barbara Glidwell, the longtime patient advocate at Oregon Health Sciences University, for her generous telephone interview (Sept. 27, 2011).

506. S.B. 579 § 2(a), 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2011).

507. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-215(9) (2017).

508. *Id.*

509. *Id.*

Resources [DHHR] may from time to time designate.”⁵¹⁰ In a 2003 regulation, the DHHR designated three categories of individuals and entities as eligible surrogates for patients in DHHR facilities: (1) any organization authorized under state or federal laws, or under contract with the DHHR, to advocate for individuals in DHHR facilities; (2) any organization authorized under federal or state laws, or under contract with DHHR, to provide surrogacy, guardianship, or conservator services for persons in DHHR facilities; and (3) any DHHR employee not otherwise precluded from serving as a surrogate.⁵¹¹

C. California Interdisciplinary Teams

A second physician confirmation entails more robust vetting than a solo physician approach. Similarly, slightly more robust than second physician confirmation is a special decision-making mechanism for the unbefriended in California long-term care facilities. A 1992 statute authorizes these facilities to establish interdisciplinary teams (IDTs), sometimes known as Epple committees,⁵¹² to make decisions for unbefriended residents.⁵¹³

An IDT must include at least two to four members: “the resident’s attending physician, a registered professional nurse with responsibility for the resident, other appropriate staff in disciplines as determined by the resident’s needs, and, where practicable, a patient representative, in accordance with applicable federal and state requirements.”⁵¹⁴

510. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-30-8(a)(7) (West 2016).

511. W. VA. CODE R. § 64-86-4 (2016).

512. IDTs are sometimes known as “Epple Committees” because they are named after the California State Assemblyman, Bob Epple, who sponsored the legislation that created them. *See* H.D., 3209, 1991–92 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1992).

513. Robert M. Gibson, *Decision-Making in Long Term Care: A Poster Presented at the 40th CALTCM Annual Meeting*, CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF LONG-TERM CARE MEDICINE (Dec. 2011), http://www.caltcm.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=232:decision-making-in-long-term-care—a-poster-presented-at-the-40th-caltcm-annual-meeting&catid=22:news&Itemid=111.

514. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1418.8(e) (2016). *Rains v. Belshe*, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 185, 187 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).

IDTs are widely recognized as “the best solution to a troubling problem.”⁵¹⁵ Indeed, looking to this IDT model, California considered a “surrogate committee” for other, non-long-term-care patients.⁵¹⁶ But none was enacted as part of the 1999 Health Care Decisions Act.⁵¹⁷ So, the IDT model is not officially available for California hospitals.

Despite two decades of apparently successful use, in 2013, California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform (CANHR) filed a lawsuit in Alameda County Superior Court challenging the constitutionality of the IDT statute.⁵¹⁸ Finally, nearly two years later, in February 2015, Judge Evelio Grillo issued a tentative ruling in two parts. First, he rejected CANHR’s several claims that the IDT statute was “facially” unconstitutional, because a California appellate court had already upheld its constitutionality 20 years ago.⁵¹⁹ Second, Judge Grillo asked the parties to address CANHR’s “as applied” challenges.⁵²⁰

515. Robert M. Gibson & James G. Boyd, *Medical Decision-Making in California Long-Term Care Facilities: Health and Safety Code section 1418.8, a Mandated Alternative to Conservatorship*, 19(1) CAL. TRUSTS & ESTATES Q. 5, 10 (2013), http://www.pltcweb.org/uploads/documents/Gibson_&_Boyd,_2013.pdf; Robert M. Gibson, *How Do We Address the Unbefriended Patient’s Needs?*, CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF LONG TERM CARE MEDICINE, http://www.caltcm.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=194:how-do-we-address-the-unbefriended-patient-s-needs-&catid=22:news&Itemid=111 (last visited June 16, 2017); Robert M. Gibson & Rebecca Ferrini, *More Challenges to California’s IDT Decision-Making Statute*, CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF LONG TERM CARE MEDICINE, http://www.caltcm.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=189:more-challenges-to-california-s-idt-decision-making-statute&catid=22:news&Itemid=111 (last visited June 16, 2017).

516. CAL. L. REV. COMM’N, MEMO 99-39, 1 (Oct. 6, 1999), <http://www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/1999/M99-39.pdf>.

517. The original bill, A.B. 891 (1999) (Alquist), proposed new Probate Code sections 4720 to 4725, which would have addressed decision making for the unbefriended. Indeed, the problem of the unbefriended was an original and key motivation for the entire Health Care Decisions Act. But, these provisions were politically controversial. They were removed so that the rest of the bill could move forward. CAL. L. REV. COMM’N., MEMO 99-39, 1 (Oct. 6, 1999), <http://www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/1999/M99-39.pdf>; CAL. L. REV. COMM’N., 2000 HEALTH CARE DECISIONS LAW AND REVISED POWER OF ATTORNEY LAW 31 (2000), <http://www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/Printed-Reports/Pub208.pdf>.

518. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform v. Chapman, No. CGC-13-528046 (Cal. Super. Ct., Jan. 10, 2013). Disability Rights California reported on a similar case: Pamila Lew & Leslie Morrison, *The Deadly Failure of a Hospital to Follow a Patient’s Decisions about his Medical Care*, 7026.01 DISABILITY RTS. CAL. 1, 8 (2013), <http://www.disabilityrightsca.org/pubs/702601.pdf>.

519. Rains v. Belshe, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 185, 189 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).

520. Order Granting Petition for Writ of Mandate in Part and Denying in Part, California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform v. Chapman, No. RG13700100 (Alameda Cty. Super. Court, Cal. 22 Oct. 2013).

CANHR made three “as applied” challenges to the IDT statute. First, CANHR argued that the IDT statute is unconstitutional because there is no absolute requirement that a “patient representative” be present.⁵²¹ CANHR alleged that many long-term care facilities regularly fail to include a patient representative.⁵²² Second, CANHR contended that IDTs lack authority to prescribe anti-psychotics.⁵²³ Third, CANHR contended that IDTs lack authority to make end-of-life decisions, for example, complete a POLST or refer to hospice.⁵²⁴

In his tentative ruling, Judge Grillo suggested that since the IDT statute specifically requires that there be a patient representative “where practicable,” CANHR might prevail, if it can demonstrate that long-term care facilities regularly and customarily fail to include patient representatives.”⁵²⁵ Indeed, the leading case on the IDT statute held:

While there may be exigent circumstances in which the participation of such a representative is not practicable, due to temporary unavailability, illness, or similar causes, the Legislature clearly required the routine and ongoing participation of a patient representative in such medical care decisions to ensure that nothing is over-looked from the patient’s perspective.⁵²⁶

On the other hand, it is unclear who counts as a “patient representative.”⁵²⁷ For example, social workers often serve as advocates for patients.⁵²⁸ But it is unclear whether they are disqualified as “patient representatives” because they are employed by the facility.

521. *Id.* at 21.

522. *Id.* at 23.

523. *Id.* at 25.

524. *Id.* at 33.

525. *Id.* at 24.

526. *Rains v. Belshe*, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 185, 189 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).

527. L. Schwartz, *Is There an Advocate in the House? The Role of Health Care Professionals in Patient Advocacy*, 28 J. MED. ETHICS 37, 37 (2002).

528. Ellen L. Csikai & Shadi S. Martin, *Bereaved Hospice Caregivers’ Views of the Transition to Hospice*, 49(5) SOC. WORK IN HEALTH CARE 387, 398 (2010).

Judge Grillo also indicated the need for further litigation on CANHR's other two arguments.⁵²⁹ He suggested that IDTs may lack authority to make treatment decisions regarding either antipsychotics or end-of-life care.⁵³⁰ Judge Grillo observed that the leading case construing the IDT statute had determined that the law "by its own terms applies only to the relatively nonintrusive and routine, ongoing medical intervention, which may be afforded by physicians in nursing homes; it does not purport to grant blanket authority for more severe medical interventions."⁵³¹

Judge Grillo entered a final judgment in January 2016.⁵³² Both parties cross-appealed the order and it remains stayed pending appeal.⁵³³ While a ruling for CANHR might make the process better comport with procedural due process, that would entail some serious risks. Restricting the authority of IDTs to make end-of-life decisions consigns the unbefriended to the prospect of a prolonged and potentially unnecessarily painful death. Restricting the authority of IDTs to prescribe antipsychotics leaves the unbefriended unplaceable in nursing facilities, which may result in unnecessary decompensation and hospitalization.⁵³⁴

Pending the outcome of the litigation, the California Legislature has been considering bills that would amend the IDT statute. A 2016 bill would have required that IDTs include "independent" medical consultants and "independent" patient advocates.⁵³⁵ CANHR objected that these individuals would not be sufficiently independent since they would still be hired and "paid" by the long-term care facility.

529. *See generally* Brief for Petitioner, California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform v. Chapman, No. RG13700100 (Cal. Super. Ct., 2015).

530. *Id.* at 32, 40.

531. *Id.* at 25.

532. California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform v. Chapman, No. RG13700100 (Cal. Super. Ct., Jan. 27, 2016) (Judgment), http://thaddeuspope.com/images/CANHR_v_Chapman.pdf.

533. Appellant Reply Brief, California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform (CANHR) v. Chapman, No. A147987 (Cal. App. May 22, 2017); Combined Reply and Respondent's Brief, California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform (CANHR) v. Chapman, No. A147987 (Cal. App. June 13, 2017).

534. I thank Robert Gibson for helping me appreciate the significance of this case.

535. S.B 503, 2015-16 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016).

A 2017 bill would have added notice requirements to the IDT statute.⁵³⁶ It would have required the facility to communicate to the resident orally and in writing that: (1) the attending physician determined the resident lacks capacity, (2) the facility was unable to locate a surrogate, (3) the medical intervention recommended, (4) the role of the IDT, and (4) the right of the resident to challenge the determinations. CANHR objected that this notice comes too late. Coming after the capacity determination and IDT meeting, it “does not give the resident a reasonable opportunity to participate in the team-decision process.”⁵³⁷

D. California Prison Healthcare

Just as the challenges to the IDT statute were heating up in 2015, California enacted a statute authorizing healthcare decisions for unbefriended prisoners.⁵³⁸ Under this law, the prison physician or dentist files a petition with the Office of Administrative Hearings to request appointment of a surrogate decisionmaker. But despite the procedural due process protections afforded by a formal proceeding, the law includes an odd loophole.

On the one hand, the statute provides that “an employee of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or other peace officer, shall not be appointed surrogate decisionmaker for health care for any inmate patient.”⁵³⁹ On the other hand, the statute includes a broad exception for staff not engaged in direct care of the inmate.

The individual is a health care staff member in a managerial position and does not provide direct care to the inmate patient. A surrogate decisionmaker appointed under this subparagraph may be specified by his or her functional role at the institution, such as “Chief Physician and

536. S.B. 481, 2017-18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).

537. CAL. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., S.B. 481, 2017-18 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 7 (2017), file:///Users/landonreed/Downloads/201720180SB481_Senate%20Judiciary-.pdf.

538. A.B. 1423, 2015-16 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015), codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 2604 (West 2017).

539. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2604(q)(2).

Surgeon” or “Chief Medical Executive” to provide clarity as to the active decisionmaker at the institution where the inmate patient is housed, and to anticipate potential personnel changes.⁵⁴⁰

This hardly seems sufficient to mitigate bias and conflict of interests that healthcare management will have with respect to inmate patients.

VIII. Mechanisms with Sufficient Due Process

In the last section, I argued that several prominent approaches lack adequate due process: (1) solo physician unilateral authority, (2) second physician confirmation, (3) California IDT, and (4) California prison healthcare. In contrast, other approaches are sufficiently fair. These include: (a) tiered approaches correlating the amount of oversight to the gravity of the decision at hand, (b) approaches requiring ethics committee consent, (c) approaches requiring external consent, and (d) approaches for discharge and transfer.

A. Tiered Approaches Correlating Oversight to Gravity

At first glance, New York’s 2010 Family Health Care Decisions Act (FHCDA) looks like it authorizes the solo physician approach. But on closer examination, it becomes clear that the discretion of the attending physician narrows as the invasiveness or burden of the treatment rises.⁵⁴¹ Specifically, the FHCDA divides treatment into three categories: (1) routine medical treatment, (2) major medical treatment, and (3) life-sustaining treatment.⁵⁴²

540. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2604(q)(2)(B). There is also an exception if the DOCR employee is a “family member or relative of the inmate patient.” *Id.* § 2604(q)(2)(A).

541. Varughese et al., *supra* note 40, at 80.

542. A fourth category of medical treatment is emergency treatment. *See supra* Section I.B. For decision-making purposes, some even identify a fifth category: futile treatment. *See* Karp & Wood, *Incapacitated and Alone*, *supra* note 4, at 17; also *Application of Justice Health; re a Patient* (2011) 80 NSWLR 354, 354 (Austl.).

1. Routine Medical Treatment

Routine medical treatment includes those treatments, services, and procedures for which providers do not ordinarily seek specific consent. Examples of such treatment include drawing blood for tests or providing medication for high blood pressure. These interventions involve little or no risk to patients and are clearly beneficial.⁵⁴³ An attending physician is authorized to unilaterally decide about the provision of routine medical treatment for unbefriended patients.⁵⁴⁴

2. Major Medical Treatment

Major medical treatment includes those treatments, services, and procedures that involve the use of general anesthesia; any significant risk to the patient; or any significant invasion of bodily integrity requiring an incision, producing significant pain, or having a significant recovery period. Examples of such treatment include lumbar puncture, colonoscopy, and hernia repair.

These types of decisions carry greater risks and burdens and incorporate important nonmedical considerations. Accordingly, the decision-making process is more extensive. First, the attending physician must consult with the staff directly responsible for the patient's care, including nurses, social workers, nurse aids.⁵⁴⁵ Second, the attending physician must obtain an independent concurring determination from a second physician.⁵⁴⁶

543. The New York State Health Facilities Association has developed model forms that help assure compliance with the statute. N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N, NEW YORK'S FAMILY HEALTH CARE DECISIONS ACT, MODEL NURSING HOME FORMS FOR THE FAMILY HEALTH CARE DECISIONS ACT, www.nyshfa.org/files/2014/01/FHCDA_Forms2.doc.

544. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-g(3)(B) (McKinney 2011); Assemb. B. 4098 § 3(a)(1), 214th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2011). In these cases, pursuant to its institutional policy that is not expressly authorized by Ohio law, the Cleveland Clinic also requires a "social work consultation" to locate surrogates, to assess whether guardianship is appropriate, and to confirm that the patient's best interests are being served. *Cleveland Clinic Policy on Medical Decision-Making for Patients Lacking Decision-Making Capacity Who Do Not Have a Surrogate Decision-Maker*, CLEVELAND CLINIC (Apr. 20, 2009), http://my.clevelandclinic.org/Documents/Bioethics/Policy_on_Patients_without_Surrogates.pdf [hereinafter *Policy on Decision-Making*].

545. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-g(4)(B)(i) (McKinney 2011).

546. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-g(4)(B)(ii) (McKinney 2011); *see also* Assemb. B. 4098 § 2(b)(2), 214th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2011). In facilities other than general hospitals, the medical director shall make the independent determination that the recommendation is appropriate. Assemb. B.

3. *Life-sustaining Treatment*

Life-sustaining treatment includes the use of any medical device or procedure to sustain a vital bodily function. Typical treatments include cardiopulmonary resuscitation, mechanical ventilation, dialysis, and clinically assisted nutrition and hydration.⁵⁴⁷

Because of the life and death stakes, decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment are subject to the closest scrutiny. An attending physician may make such decisions only if she or he determines, with the concurrence of an independent physician, that the treatment either “would violate accepted medical standards” or “offers the patient no medical benefit because the patient will die imminently, even if the treatment is provided.”⁵⁴⁸ Otherwise, withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment requires judicial approval.⁵⁴⁹

The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) follows a process very similar to that outlined in the New York FHCDA. For those treatments or procedures that involve minimal risk, practitioners can make a decision after attempting to explain the nature and purpose of the proposed treatment to the patient.⁵⁵⁰ In contrast, for procedures that require signature consent, both the attending physician and the

4098 § 3(a)(2)(c), 214th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2011). In these cases, the Cleveland Clinic also requires a “social work consultation” and a “consultation by the ethics consult service.” See CLEVELAND CLINIC *supra* note 544.

547. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2994-a(19), 2994-g(3)(A)–(4)(A) (McKinney 2011); Assemb. B. 4098 § 1, 214th Leg. Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2011).

548. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-g(5)(b) (McKinney 2011); Assemb. B. 4098 § 3(b)(2), 214th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2011).

549. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-g(5) (McKinney 2011); Assemb. B. 4098 § 3(b), 214th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2011). The Cleveland Clinic does not have a substantive rule like New York. Instead, it requires both a “concurring medical opinion” and approval of a “multidisciplinary subcommittee of the ethics committee.” See *Policy on Medical Decision-Making*, *supra* note 544. Before the June 2010 enactment of the FHCDA, New York authorized attending physicians to write DNR orders for unbefriended patients when resuscitation would be medically futile. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2966(1)(a) (McKinney 2010).

550. 38 C.F.R. § 17.32(f) (2017); VHA HANDBOOK, *supra* note 293, at 1004.01(14)(c). Still, treatment must not be provided indefinitely without review of the treatment plan at least every six months by the attending practitioner of record and the service chief, or designee, to ensure that clinical objectives are being met and the treatment plan is in the best interests of the patient. *Id.*

chief of service or his or her designee must indicate approval of the treatment decision in writing.⁵⁵¹

In the VHA, as in New York, decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment require a more elaborate process. They must be reviewed by a multidisciplinary committee appointed by the facility director.⁵⁵² The committee functions as the patient's advocate and may not include members of the treatment team.⁵⁵³ The committee must submit its findings and recommendations in a written report to the chief of staff, who must note his or her approval of the report in writing.⁵⁵⁴ After reviewing the record, the facility director may concur with the decision to withhold or withdraw life support or request further review by regional counsel.⁵⁵⁵

A new Colorado statute also authorizes a tiered approach.⁵⁵⁶ For routine treatments and procedures that are “low-risk and within broadly accepted standards of medical practice,” the attending physician may make health care treatment decisions.⁵⁵⁷ For treatments that otherwise require a “written, informed consent, such as treatments involving anesthesia, treatments involving a significant risk of complication, or invasive procedures,” the attending physician shall obtain the written consent of the surrogate—another physician—and a consensus with the medical ethics committee.⁵⁵⁸ For end-of-life treatment that is nonbeneficial and involves withholding or withdrawing specific medical treatments, the attending physician shall obtain an independent concurring opinion from a physician other than the surrogate, and obtain a consensus with the medical ethics committee.⁵⁵⁹ In 2017, Montana enacted a virtually identical statute.⁵⁶⁰

551. VHA HANDBOOK, *supra* note 293, at 1004.01(14)(c)(2).

552. *Id.* at 1004.01(14)(c)(3)(b).

553. *Id.*

554. *Id.*

555. *Id.* at 1004.01(14)(c)(3)(d).

556. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-185-103(4)(c)(V) (West 2017).

557. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-185-103(4)(c)(V)(A).

558. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-185-103(4)(c)(V)(B).

559. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-185-103(4)(c)(V)(C). The statutory rules are elaborated upon in informal guidance. Colorado Collaborative for Unrepresented Patients (CCUP), *Decision Making for Unrepresented Patients Who Lack Capacity: Guidelines for Health Care Facilities in Colorado* (Nov. 4,

Like New York, the VHA, Colorado, and Montana, some foreign jurisdictions also follow a tiered approach. In New South Wales, for example, medical treatment for unbefriended patients may be carried out without consent so long as it is “minor.”⁵⁶¹ But for “major” treatment, consent must be obtained from a Guardianship Tribunal.⁵⁶²

B. Approaches Requiring Ethics Committees

Whether or not authorized by law, many treatment decisions for the unbefriended are made by physicians without institutional or judicial review, and even without the concurring opinion of another physician.⁵⁶³ In other words, much decision making is informal and *ad hoc*. As discussed above, many commentators and policy makers have expressed concern with leaving treatment decisions solely in the hands of individual physicians or other facility employees.

To address these concerns, the American Medical Association, among others, has recommended a more thorough process to better ensure accountability, objectivity, and independence. Specifically, the AMA recommended consulting “an ethics committee to aid in identifying a surrogate decision-maker or to facilitate sound decision-making.”⁵⁶⁴ Below, I review the advantages of ethics committees. I then review laws both requiring and recommending ethics committee review. Finally, I look at institutional policies requiring ethics committee consent even when not legally mandated.

2016). These rules work fine for inpatients. But, a guardian is still needed for patients with permanent incapacity who will need continuity of services.

560. S.B. 92, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess., 2017 Mont. Laws Ch. 285..

561. *Guardianship Act 1987* (NSW) s 37 (2)–(3) (Austl.).

562. *Guardianship Act 1987* (NSW) s 36(1)(b) (Austl.).

563. *See supra* note 468 and accompanying text.

564. CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 8.081 (A. MED. ASS’N 2015); AMA COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, SELECTION OF HEALTH CARE DECISION-MAKING SURROGATES, CEJA Report 3-A-04. The AMA recently revised its code. It now provides “Consult an ethics committee or other institutional resource when . . . no surrogate is available.” CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 2.1.2(f) (A. MED. ASS’N 2016), <https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ama-code-medical-ethics>.

1. *Advantages of Ethics Committees*

A committee has some advantages over a single decision maker.⁵⁶⁵ With an individual decision maker, there is always a concern that the decision will be based upon financial incentives or upon the peculiar biases of that person.⁵⁶⁶ A committee, on the other hand, can better offer various perspectives and can utilize a multifaceted array of both medical and ethical considerations.⁵⁶⁷ A committee is more likely to view a patient as an individual, considering, in addition to the medical benefits and burdens, any known moral or personal values and the nature of a patient's previous lifestyle.⁵⁶⁸ At the same time, committees provide quicker, more accessible, and more personalized decisions than the court system.

On the other hand, committees are sometimes impractical because of the necessary logistics. First, it often takes too much time: (1) to convene a committee, (2) to thoroughly evaluate patients and their treatment options, (3) to collectively deliberate, and (4) to issue a decision.

Patients in need of medical care often do not have this much time. Decisions must be made quickly. Many facilities deal with this by

565. Just as a committee may offer more perspectives and greater deliberation than an individual decision maker, some jurisdictions require the involvement of additional individuals. While not authorized as surrogates, these individuals do provide some oversight of and support for those making the treatment decisions. See Karp & Wood, *Incapacitated and Alone*, *supra* note 4, at 37–38. One example is the long-term care ombudsperson or patient advocate. *Id.* at 35. Another is the “independent mental capacity advocate” required by the U.K. Mental Capacity Act of 2005. See Mental Capacity Act 2005, c.9 (UK), <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/9>.

566. Diane E. Meier, *Voiceless and Vulnerable: Dementia Patients without Surrogates in an Era of Capitation*, 45(3) J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 375, 375 (1997).

567. See generally Insoo Hyun et al., *When Patients Do Not Have a Proxy: A Procedure for Medical Decision Making When There is No One to Speak for the Patient*, 17(4) J. CLINICAL ETHICS 323 (2006); Moye et al., *supra* note 143.

568. Hyun et al., *supra* note 567, at 327–328. This article cites two case examples of patients without a surrogate. *Id.* Mr. T was an older gentleman; his physician recommended that a feeding tube be inserted, due in part to Mr. T's poor nutrition. *Id.* A committee was convened, and after discussion with the patient and the nursing home where he had been living, the committee advised against the tube. *Id.* They noted that eating was one of his only remaining pleasures, and the life-extending benefits to Mr. T were unimpressive. *Id.* In contrast, Mr. A's physician also recommended a feeding tube, due to Mr. A's poor nutrition. *Id.* But Mr. A was much younger and had better prospect for an improved quality of life. Hyun et al., *supra* note 567, at 327–328. The committee noted that the feeding tube was very effective for short-term nutrition, and recommended the tube for Mr. A. *Id.* These decisions exemplify how committees can evaluate medical decisions subjectively, based on the individual characteristics of each patient, as opposed to simply the objective medical benefits. *Id.* at 328.

having treatment decisions for the unbefriended reviewed by just a subgroup, which is more easily convened.⁵⁶⁹ A second practical obstacle is that these committees are usually burdened with underfunding, understaffing, and under-trained members.

2. Laws Requiring Ethics Committee Consent

Not only are ethics committees used in many states without any specific mandate or authority, but several states have enacted statutes allowing institutional committees to guide decision making for the unbefriended.⁵⁷⁰ The New York approach is described above. This approach is widely supported.

In Alabama, for example, decisions may be made by “a committee composed of the patient’s primary treating physician and the ethics committee of the facility where the patient is undergoing treatment or receiving care, acting unanimously.”⁵⁷¹ If there is no ethics committee, then decisions can instead be made:

[B]y unanimous consent of a committee appointed by the chief of medical staff or chief executive officer of the facility and consisting of at least the following: (i) the primary treating physician; (ii) the chief of medical staff or his or her designee; (iii) the patient’s clergyman, if known and available, or a member of the clergy who is associated with, but not employed by or an independent contractor of the facility, or a social worker associated with but neither employed by nor an independent contractor of the facility.⁵⁷²

569. See Griggins, *supra* note 389, at 8.

570. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-11 (2016); O.C.G.A. § 31-39-4(e) (2017).

571. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-11(d)(7) (2016). “In the event a surrogate decision is being made by an ethics committee or appointed committee of the facility where the patient is undergoing treatment or receiving care, the facility shall notify the Alabama Department of Human Resources for the purpose of allowing the department to participate in the review of the matter.” *Id.*

572. *Id.*

In Georgia, with respect to DNR orders, “an attending physician may issue an order not to resuscitate” for a patient, provided three conditions are satisfied.⁵⁷³ First, the physician must determine with the concurrence of a second physician, in writing in the patient’s medical record, that such patient is a candidate for non-resuscitation.⁵⁷⁴ Second, “an ethics committee or similar panel” must concur in the opinion of the attending physician and the concurring physician that the patient is a candidate for non-resuscitation.⁵⁷⁵ Third, the patient must be receiving inpatient or outpatient treatment from, or is a resident of, a healthcare facility other than a hospice or a home health agency.⁵⁷⁶

As discussed above, many states authorize attending physicians to make decisions regarding routine medical treatment. But safeguards typically increase proportionately with the gravity of the treatment. These safeguards often include the approval of an ethics committee.⁵⁷⁷ For example, in the VHA, ethics committees are utilized for decisions involving withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.⁵⁷⁸ Such decisions by an ethics committee must be approved by a multidisciplinary committee acting as the patient’s advocate.⁵⁷⁹

Most recently, Colorado and Montana adopted approaches requiring ethics committee consent.⁵⁸⁰ Effective in late 2016, a Colorado attending physician “may designate another willing physician to make health care treatment decisions as a patient’s proxy

573. O.C.G.A. § 31-39-4(e).

574. O.C.G.A. § 31-39-4(e)(1).

575. O.C.G.A. § 31-39-4(e)(2).

576. O.C.G.A. § 31-39-4(e)(3).

577. *DeKalb Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Hawkins*, 655 S.E.2d 823, 824 (Ga Ct. App. 2007); GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION, *supra* note 5, at 40.

578. VHA HANDBOOK, *supra* note 293, at 16.

579. 38 C.F.R. § 17.32(f)(2) (2017); VHA HANDBOOK, *supra* note 293, at 15. The chief of staff and the facility director must approve the withdrawal of any life sustaining treatment. *Id.* The patient’s record must be documented accordingly. *Id.* The treating physician is not permitted to be a member of the committee. *Id.* The committee must use the substituted judgment standard, if possible, and, if not, must decide based on the best interest of the patient. *Id.* The committee should seek input from the patient’s religious, ethnic, or cultural groups. *Id.*

580. H.B. 1101, 70th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2016); S.B. 92, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2017).

decision-maker.”⁵⁸¹ But the attending must first (1) obtain the “independent determination of the patient’s lack of decisional capacity,”⁵⁸² and (2) “consult[] with and obtain[] a consensus on the proxy designation with the medical ethics committee.”⁵⁸³ If the health care facility does not have a medical ethics committee, the facility can use the medical ethics committee at another health care facility.”⁵⁸⁴ In 2017, Montana enacted a virtually identical statute.⁵⁸⁵

3. *Laws Recommending Ethics Committee Consent*

Some states prefer, but do not strictly require, ethics committee review. In Arizona, for example, an attending physician may make a treatment decision after consulting and obtaining the recommendation of an institutional ethics committee.⁵⁸⁶ But the statute recognizes that may not always be possible. If it is not possible, the statute alternatively allows a physician to make the treatment decision after consulting with and obtaining the concurrence of a second physician.⁵⁸⁷

Similarly, Arkansas provides that if none of the specified individuals eligible to act as a surrogate are reasonably available, then the “designated physician may make healthcare decisions for the principal” after she “consults with and obtains the recommendations of an institution’s ethics officers.”⁵⁸⁸ Alternatively, the designated physician may “obtain concurrence from a second physician” who is “not directly involved” in the patient’s health care and independent of the designated physician.⁵⁸⁹

581. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18.5-103(4)(c)(I) (West 2017).

582. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18.5-103(4)(c)(I)(B).

583. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18.5-103(4)(c)(I)(D).

584. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18.5-103(4)(c)(II). The statutory rules are elaborated upon in informal guidance. Colorado Collaborative for Unrepresented Patients (CCUP), *Decision Making for Unrepresented Patients Who Lack Capacity: Guidelines for Health Care Facilities in Colorado* (Nov. 4, 2016).

585. S.B. 92, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2017). Montana also allows an advanced practice registered nurse to be a surrogate. *Id.*

586. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3231(B) (2016).

587. *Id.*

588. Arkansas Health Care Decisions Act, 2017 Arkansas Laws Act 974.

589. Arkansas Health Care Decisions Act, 2017 Arkansas Laws Act 974. “Independent” means the second physician: (1) Does not serve in a capacity of decision making, influence, or responsibility over

Finally, even when not given a formal decision-making role, ethics committees are often given at least a consulting role in treatment decisions for the unbefriended. For example, a 2011 Oregon statute expressly provides that a healthcare facility may appoint an ethics committee to “participate in making decisions.”⁵⁹⁰

4. Institutional Policies Requiring Ethics Committee Consent

In addition to these decision-making processes specifically authorized by state or federal law, it is important to note that many facilities in other U.S. states authorize institutional committees to make treatment decisions for the unbefriended even though not expressly authorized by law.⁵⁹¹ Such innovation is important in the absence of explicit authorizing law.⁵⁹² “[T]he legal risk of not pursuing a guardianship (which would provide clear legal authority for any decision made) is generally considered quite low, and the benefits of not requiring an extensive legal proceeding . . . quite high.”⁵⁹³

the designated physician; and (2) Does not serve in a capacity under the authority of the designated physician’s decision making, influence, or responsibility. *Id.*

590. S.B. 579 § 2(b), 2011 Leg., 76th Sess. (Or. 2011).

591. Eric D. Isaacs & Robert V. Brody, *The Unbefriended Adult Patient: The San Francisco General Hospital Approach to Ethical Dilemmas*, 83(6) S.F. MED. 1, 25 (2010) (describing the process at San Francisco General Hospital); *Who Decides?*, *supra* note 131. This is what Karp and Wood refer to as “flying below the radar screen.” See Karp & Wood, *Incapacitated and Alone*, *supra* note 4, at 38–40; Kapp, *supra* note 22, at 12 (noting physicians act as “de facto surrogates . . . covertly and with hesitation”). Isaacs and Brody argue that it is unclear that a more elaborate process does or would produce better results. Isaacs & Brody, *supra*. For example, judges usually follow the medical recommendation. Because the New York SDMC votes to go forward with the medical procedure in 96 percent of cases, some have observed that this review “may not substantially improve decisions.” See Miller, Coleman & Cugliari, *supra* note 38, at 371; *In re Guardianship of Browning*, 543 So. 2d 258, 271 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (“Until we see evidence of some abuse by an informal forum, we believe its advantages outweigh its disadvantages.”); Karp & Wood, *Incapacitated and Alone*, *supra* note 4, at 41 (describing concerns about “the due processization of medical decision-making”); Kapp, *supra* note 22, at 34 (arguing that requiring legally authorized surrogates may reduce beneficent behavior on the part of facility staff who often “functioned in essence in the role of family for the resident who had no one else”). On the other hand, the prospect of accountability matters. Thaddeus M. Pope, *Multi-Institutional Healthcare Ethics Committees: The Procedurally Fair Internal Dispute Resolution Mechanism*, 31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 257, 323 (2009); *Who Decides?*, *supra* note 131.

592. Lauren Sydney Flicker, *A Patient (Not) Alone*, 28(2) J. CLINICAL ETHICS 102 (2017); Matthew Wynia, *Civic Obligations in Medicine: Does “Professional” Civil Disobedience Tear, or Repair, the Basic Fabric of Society?*, 6(1) AMA J. ETHICS (Jan. 2004), <http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2004/01/pfor1-0401.html>.

593. Courtwright et al., *supra* note 143.

For example, the California Health Care Decisions Act fails to address medical decision making for the unbefriended. Nevertheless, the Santa Clara County Medical Association wanted a less cumbersome and more immediately responsive decision-making process than guardianship.⁵⁹⁴ So, in 2001, it developed a model policy for facilities in the county.⁵⁹⁵ It has since been adopted not only by institutions in Santa Clara, but also by institutions in other parts of California.⁵⁹⁶

One hospital that adopted the model Santa Clara policy noted that it wanted to make “appropriate healthcare decisions” for unbefriended patients in “a timely and transparent manner.”⁵⁹⁷ Here, basically, is how it works. Once a patient is determined to be unbefriended, the policy calls for the physician of record to ask the chair of the ethics committee to appoint and chair a “multidisciplinary committee” to make treatment decisions.⁵⁹⁸ The policy recommends, but does not require, that a community member and a representative of the patient’s cultural, ethnic, or religious community serve on the committee.⁵⁹⁹ The attending physician is a nonvoting member of the committee.⁶⁰⁰ Consensus is required, and in cases of withholding and withdrawing treatment, the approval of the hospital’s medical director is also required.⁶⁰¹

C. Approaches Requiring Independent External Consent

Review by an institutional committee provides more accountability than review by an attending physician alone.⁶⁰² But some are

594. See Karp & Wood, *Incapacitated and Alone*, *supra* note 4, at 35–36. While not specifically authorized in California law, the Santa Clara policy has received judicial endorsement and deference. *Id.*

595. *Ethics Subcommittee Surrogate for Patients*, AHC MEDIA (Sept. 1, 2004), RRPope - GA ST U L REV (Author Review) TMP 05-07-17.dochttps://www.ahcmmedia.com/articles/3979-ethics-subcommittee-surrogate-for-patients.

596. See Karp & Wood, *Incapacitated and Alone*, *supra* note 4, at 35–36.

597. SANTA CLARA VALLEY MED. CTR., VMC 301.14, ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL: HEALTH CARE DECISIONS FOR INCAPACITATED PATIENTS WITHOUT SURROGATES 1 (2011).

598. *Id.* at 2.

599. *Id.* at 3.

600. *Id.*

601. *Id.* at 4.

602. See Pope, *supra* note 591, at 321.

concerned that such a process is still too much of an “inside job.”⁶⁰³ Ethics committees are, after all, primarily comprised of individuals who are economically dependent upon the facility.⁶⁰⁴

Responsive to this concern, New York, Texas, and Iowa have enacted statutes that authorize extra-institutional, “external” surrogate committees to make treatment decisions for certain unbefriended persons.⁶⁰⁵ While the Iowa committees serve all unbefriended patients, the New York and Texas committees serve only certain current and former residents of facilities for the mentally disabled.⁶⁰⁶ In contrast, Florida authorizes independent social workers to make treatment decisions for any unbefriended person.⁶⁰⁷

1. New York Surrogate Decision Making Committee

In 1985, the New York legislature determined that the judicial process to appoint a guardian was not meeting the needs of its mentally disabled citizens.⁶⁰⁸ So, it enacted legislation establishing a “statewide quasi-judicial surrogate decision-making process.”⁶⁰⁹ At the heart of this process is the Surrogate Decision Making Committee (SDMC).

The SDMC consists of volunteers appointed by the state Commission on Quality of Care and Advocacy.⁶¹⁰ These volunteers

603. Abdool et al., *supra* note 215, at 777; Iris C. Freeman, *One More Faulty Solution Is Novelty without Progress: A Reply to “Medical Decision-Making for the Unbefriended Nursing Home Resident*, 1 J. ETHICS, L. & AGING 93 (1995).

604. See Pope, *supra* note 591, at 277–78. In addition, intramural mechanisms are of little use for the chronically ill who will present across multiple care settings.

605. IOWA CODE § 135.29(1) (2010); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 80.05(c)(i) (McKinney 2009); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 597.042(a) (West 1999).

606. IOWA CODE § 135.29(2); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 80.03(b) (McKinney 2011); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 597.001(2) (West 2015).

607. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.401(1)(h) (2016).

608. Clarence J. Sundram et al., *The First Ten Years of New York’s Surrogate Decision-Making Law: History of Development*, in REPRESENTING PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES (Peter Danziger et al. eds., 3d ed. 2007); Stanley S. Herr & Barbara L. Hopkins, *Health Care Decision Making for Persons with Disabilities: An Alternative to Guardianship*, 271(13) JAMA 1017, 1018 (1994); Clarence J. Sundram, *Informed Consent for Major Medical Treatment of Mentally Disabled People: A New Approach*, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1368, 1369 (1988); Robert S. Olick & K. Faber-Langendoen, *Caring for Patients Without Surrogates Under the Family Health Care Decisions Act*, BIOETHICS IN BRIEF (Upstate Med. Univ., New York, N.Y.), Mar. 1, 2011, at 1.

609. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 80.01 (McKinney 2009).

610. *Id.* § 80.05(b).

come from four distinct categories: (1) physicians, nurses, psychologists, or other healthcare professionals; (2) family or advocates of a mentally disabled person; (3) New York attorneys; and (4) other individuals with “recognized expertise” in the treatment of mentally disabled persons.⁶¹¹ Sitting in panels of four, these volunteers make treatment decisions for the unbefriended patient.⁶¹²

A SDMC must first determine, through clear and convincing evidence, that a patient lacks capacity.⁶¹³ The committee then decides whether the proposed treatment is in the best interest of the patient.⁶¹⁴ In making its decision, the SDMC fully considers any evidence of the patient’s previously expressed desires.⁶¹⁵ A decision by an SDMC is legally valid consent, as if the person had made a capacitated decision on her or his own behalf.⁶¹⁶ But, the SDMC’s decision is valid only for the specifically proposed treatment presented, not for any future medical care.⁶¹⁷ And certain designated individuals, including staff at the patient’s residential facility, may appeal the decision to court.⁶¹⁸ The use of SDMCs became statewide in 2001.⁶¹⁹

The program boasts that it is superior to judicially appointed guardians because it is inexpensive, expeditious, and ethical.⁶²⁰ First, there is no cost for training or hearings.⁶²¹ There are no court costs or attorneys’ fees.⁶²² Second, an average decision takes only 14 days,

611. *Id.* § 80.05(c)(i).

612. *Id.* § 80.05(f).

613. *Id.* § 80.07(e).

614. *Id.* § 80.07(f).

615. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 80.07(f) (McKinney 2009).

616. *Id.*

617. *Id.*

618. *Id.* § 80.07(h).

619. George E. Pataki, *Improving Lives, Protecting Rights*, COMMISSION ACTIVITIES (N.Y. St. Commission on Quality of Care for the Mentally Disabled, Schenectady, N.Y.), 2001, at 14.

620. N.Y. JUSTICE CTR. FOR THE PROT. OF PEOPLE WITH SPECIAL NEEDS, SURROGATE DECISION MAKING COMMITTEE PROGRAM: PANEL MEMBER HANDBOOK (March 2017), [HTTPS://WWW.JUSTICECENTER.NY.GOV/SITES/DEFAULT/FILES/DOCUMENTS/SDMA-PANEL-MEMBER-HANDBOOK.PDF](https://www.justicecenter.ny.gov/sites/default/files/documents/SDMA-PANEL-MEMBER-HANDBOOK.PDF); *Frequently Asked Questions – Information for Prospective Volunteer Panelists*, JUSTICE CTR FOR THE PROT. OF PEOPLE WITH SPECIAL NEEDS, <https://www.justicecenter.ny.gov/faq/61> (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).

621. *Frequently Asked Questions – Information for Prospective Volunteer Panelists*, *supra* note 620 (“The Surrogate Decision-Making Committee (SDMC) program is . . . cost-free.”).

622. *See id.*

and expedited hearings are available.⁶²³ Hearings are held statewide at the convenience of the individuals involved.⁶²⁴ Third, the committees utilize a person-centered approach to medical decision making.⁶²⁵

In 2009, the regulations governing SDMCs were amended to conform the program to statutory amendments that expanded the jurisdiction of the program.⁶²⁶ SDMCs are now available to a wider range of individuals served by the New York Office for People with Developmental Disabilities. For example, individuals who receive home or community based care, or who are only provided with case management or service coordination services, are now eligible for SDMC services.⁶²⁷ Similarly, individuals who have been discharged from mental hygiene facilities into nursing homes or the community are now eligible to have SDMC decisions made on their behalf.⁶²⁸ Lastly, the SDMCs are now authorized, subject to very specific safeguards, to make decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment.⁶²⁹

2. Texas Mental Retardation Committees

Like New York, Texas has also implemented a surrogate decision-making committee program to make decisions on behalf of its unbefriended citizens who suffer from mental retardation and related conditions.⁶³⁰ The committees are appointed by the Texas Department of Aging and Disability Services and consist of three to

623. Pataki, *supra* note 619, at 14.

624. *Id.*

625. *Surrogate Decision Making Committee (SDMC)*, EAC NETWORK, <http://eac-network.org/surrogate-decision-making-committee/> (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).

626. XXXI N.Y. Reg. 13 (Mar. 11, 2009), available at <https://docs.dos.ny.gov/info/register/2009/mar11/pdfs/rules.pdf>. See also NEW YORK TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, SPECIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMENDING THE FAMILY HEALTH CARE DECISIONS ACT TO INCLUDE HEALTH CARE DECISIONS FOR PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES AND PATIENTS IN OR TRANSFERRED FROM MENTAL HEALTH FACILITIES (June 21, 2016).

627. XXXI N.Y. Reg. 13 (Mar. 11, 2009), available at <https://docs.dos.ny.gov/info/register/2009/mar11/pdfs/rules.pdf>.

628. *Id.*

629. *Id.*

630. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 597.042 (West 1999); 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 9.281–9.295 (2016).

five volunteers.⁶³¹ Volunteers must attend a four-hour training.⁶³² When a committee is convened, it reviews written documentation as well as oral testimony from the patient, the provider, and any other interested person.⁶³³ It then decides if the proposed treatment is in the best interest of the individual.⁶³⁴

In 1999, proposed Texas legislation would have authorized similar “surrogate decision making committees” for patients in hospitals and nursing homes.⁶³⁵ The bill called for the Texas Board of Human Services to adopt rules regarding the appointment of such committees to, among other things, “ensure the independence of each committee member” and “govern the minimum number” of members.⁶³⁶ Unfortunately, the bill died in committee.⁶³⁷

3. Iowa Office of the Substitute Decision Maker

Iowa also has external surrogate committees.⁶³⁸ But in contrast to the external committees in New York and Texas, external committees in Iowa are not limited to any specific population of unbefriended patient.⁶³⁹ Iowa law provides that individual counties may establish “local substitute medical decision-making boards.”⁶⁴⁰

These boards “may act as a substitute decision maker for patients incapable of making their own medical care decisions if no other substitute decision maker is available to act.”⁶⁴¹ But they may not consent to stopping life-sustaining treatment.⁶⁴² Agency regulations

631. 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 9.290 (2016).

632. *SDM Program: Becoming a Member of a Surrogate Consent Committee*, TEX. HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., <https://hhs.texas.gov/laws-regulations/legal-information/surrogate-decision-making-program/sdm-program-become-a-member-a-surrogate-consent-committee> (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).

633. *Id.*

634. *Id.*

635. H.B. 1270, 1999 Leg., 76th Sess. (Tex. 1999).

636. *Id.*

637. See H.B. 1270, 76th Regular Session, LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE LIBRARY OF TEX., <http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/legis/billsearch/actions.cfm?legSession=76-0&billtypeDetail=HB&billNumberDetail=1270&billSuffixDetail=&startRow=1&IDlist=&unClicklist=&number=100> (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).

638. IOWA CODE § 135.29(1) (2010).

639. *Id.* § 135.29(2).

640. *Id.* § 135.29(1).

641. *Id.* § 135.29(2).

642. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 641-85.2(5) (2012).

require that local substitute medical decision-making boards include one or more members from three categories: (1) physicians, nurses, or psychologists; (2) attorneys or social workers; and (3) other individuals with “recognized expertise or interest in” the unbefriended.⁶⁴³

In March 2012, the Iowa Department of Public Health adopted amendments to the requirements and procedures for local substitute medical decision-making boards.⁶⁴⁴ The changes remove references to a “statewide” substitute medical decision-making board that was repealed by the legislature in 2010.⁶⁴⁵ Unfortunately, the local committees have not fared much better. Since 1989, only seven of 99 Iowa counties ever developed committees.⁶⁴⁶ While state regulations still authorize any Iowa county to establish a committee, there has not been a local committee for more than ten years.⁶⁴⁷ Consequently, 2017 legislation eliminates the authorizing statute because the program is “unfunded or outdated.”⁶⁴⁸

Most recently, Iowa revived its state Office of the Substitute Decision Maker.⁶⁴⁹ First established in 2005, the OSDM is an analog of public guardianship programs in other states.⁶⁵⁰ The OSDM is available to be appointed by the court as a substitute decision maker of last resort.

4. Florida Independent Social Workers

While professional decision making for the unbefriended is usually vested primarily with physicians, it is sometimes vested with other

643. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 641-85.3(1) (2012).

644. IOWA STATE BD. OF HEALTH, AGENDA (2012), <http://www.idph.state.ia.us/IDPHChannelsService/file.ashx?file=21EFBB4A-221C-46E0-8F3B-98414FF2C08E> (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).

645. *Id.* at 1.

646. Correspondence from Diana Nicholls-Blomme, Iowa Department of Public Health (May 4, 2012).

647. *Id.*

648. H.F. 393 § 24, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2017) (enacted, effective July 1, 2017).

649. IOWAN DEPT. ON AGING, OFFICE OF SUBSTITUTE DECISION MAKER 1–2, <https://dhs.iowa.gov/sites/default/files/Office-of-Substitute-Decision-Maker-Handout.pdf>

650. IOWA CODE § 231E.4(1) (2016).

clinicians, individuals, and entities.⁶⁵¹ In Florida, for example, the ultimate surrogate in the default priority list is “a clinical social worker . . . selected by the provider’s bioethics committee and . . . [not] employed by the provider.”⁶⁵² While these social workers have the authority to consent to major medical treatment, “decisions to withhold or withdraw life-prolonging procedures will be reviewed by the facility’s bioethics committee.”⁶⁵³ Some Florida social workers have formed companies to serve these surrogate functions.⁶⁵⁴

In 2015, South Carolina considered similar legislation.⁶⁵⁵ Following Florida’s lead, South Carolina also proposed adding “clinical social worker” to the very end of its priority list, for those individuals without even close friends.⁶⁵⁶ As in Florida, such a surrogate must be selected by the healthcare facility’s bioethics committee and must not be employed by the facility.⁶⁵⁷ And social workers cannot make decisions to withhold or withdraw life-prolonging procedures without review by the healthcare facility’s bioethics committee.⁶⁵⁸

Relatedly, in Texas, if no other surrogate is reasonably available and willing to consent to treatment on behalf of a patient, treatment decisions may be made by “a member of the clergy.”⁶⁵⁹ In 2011, Texas extended this surrogate decision-making process not only to

651. *See, e.g.*, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.401(1)(h) (West 2016).

652. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.401(1)(h).

653. *Id.*

654. *See* Karp & Wood, *supra* note 107, at 150 (noting that a “burgeoning number of not-for-profit and for-profit agencies . . . has developed to serve the at-risk, ‘unbefriended’ population”). It is increasingly important to carefully examine the qualification and incentives of these and other professional guardians. Parekh & Adorno, *supra* note 153. I thank Carol S. Huffman, owner of a Florida-based surrogate service, Social Work Advantage, for a telephone interview (Jan. 12, 2012). They thank Ken Goodman for a telephone interview (Feb. 3, 2012).

655. *See generally* H.B. 3999, 121st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2015).

656. *Id.*

657. *Id.*

658. *Id.*

659. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 313.004(a)(5) (West 2015). The original Consent to Medical Treatment Act was limited to patients in a nursing facility or hospital. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 313.002(8) (West 2007) (amended 2011). In 2007, the legislature added “home and community support services agency.” H.B. 3473, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007). The scope of consent does not include life-sustaining treatment. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 313.003(b) (West 2015).

patients in hospitals, nursing homes, and home care, but also to inmates in county or municipal jails.⁶⁶⁰ Several other states authorize clergy as “surrogates of last resort,” but these states require that the clergy know the patient.⁶⁶¹ A recent report recommended using certified chaplains.⁶⁶²

D. Discharge and Transfer Decisions

One particular challenge with unbefriended patients is authorizing discharge from an acute care hospital to some other more appropriate care setting.⁶⁶³ This challenge often goes unmet. Many of the mechanisms described above—for example, intramural ethics committees—help only when the unbefriended individual remains a patient at that same facility. But some states have addressed the discharge and transfer problem.⁶⁶⁴ For example, both New Jersey and Tennessee recently considered special mechanisms for this type of decision.⁶⁶⁵

New Jersey proposed the creation of “transition authorization panels.”⁶⁶⁶ These panels would be comprised of three persons to “authorize the transition of an eligible patient from a participating hospital to a specific post-acute care provider, and to make transition-related financial arrangements.”⁶⁶⁷ The panel members would be drawn from three classes of persons: (1) those designated by the hospital, (2) those designated by the director of the county social

660. H.B. 1128, 82nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011).

661. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2210(a)(5a) (West 2017); IND. CODE § 16-36-1-5(a)(3) (2016); IND. CODE § 16-36-4-13(g)(7) (2016); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 313.004(a)(5) (West 2015).

662. Harvard Community Ethics Committee, *Medical Decision-Making for Unknown and Unrepresented Patients* (Mar. 2016) (report submitted to the Harvard Ethics Leadership Group. The Board of Chaplaincy Certification Inc. certifies professional chaplains according to established national qualifications. BCCI Certification, BOARD OF CHAPLAINCY CERTIFICATION INC., <http://www.professionalchaplains.org/> (last visited June 16, 2017).

663. See, e.g., Walter F. Roche, Jr., *Last Minute Change in Law Lets Hospitals Drop Patients*, TENNESSEAN (Apr. 21, 2014, 7:27 PM), <http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/2014/04/21/last-minute-change-law-hospitals-drop-patients/7987061/>.

664. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. §§ 31-36A-1 to 31-36A-7 (Temporary Health Care Placement Decision Maker for an Adult).

665. TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1-133 (2016); S.B. 1233, 216th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2014).

666. S.B. 1233, 216th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2014).

667. *Id.*

services agency of the county in which the hospital is located, and (3) those designated by the State of New Jersey Office of the Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly.⁶⁶⁸

While the New Jersey legislation failed, the Tennessee legislation succeeded. Tennessee amended its conservatorship statute to permit hospitals to petition the court to appoint an “expedited limited healthcare fiduciary” to make decisions about discharging an unbefriended patient who no longer needs hospital care.⁶⁶⁹ The authority of this “limited healthcare fiduciary” lasts for only 60 days and is for the “limited purpose of consenting to discharge, transfer, and admission and consenting to any financial arrangements or medical care necessary to affect such discharge, transfer or admission to another healthcare facility.”⁶⁷⁰

New York, unlike New Jersey and Tennessee, has, since 2010, had an elaborate mechanism by which decisions can be made for unbefriended patients.⁶⁷¹ But there were still some gaps. One of those is the ability of the decision maker for unbefriended patients to authorize discharge to hospice.⁶⁷² The problem was that these decisions did not comfortably fall within the three then-existing statutory categories: (1) routine medical treatment, (2) major medical treatment, and (3) the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.⁶⁷³ Consequently, potential hospice patients could not get the type and level of care that best served their interests. They were deprived of the comfort and benefit of hospice care.⁶⁷⁴

To fill this gap, New York legislators introduced bills in both 2014 and 2015 that would expressly create a means to elect hospice on

668. *Id.*

669. TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1-133 (2016); Roche, Jr., *supra* note 663.

670. TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1-133 (2016).

671. ADEM EFFIONG & STEPHANIE HARMAN, *Patients Who Lack Capacity and Lack Surrogates: Can They Enroll in Hospice?*, 48(4) J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 745, 748 (2014). The program is now housed in the New York Justice Center for the Protection of People with Special Needs. *Surrogate Decision-Making Committee*, JUST. CTR. FOR PROTECTION PEOPLE WITH SPECIAL NEEDS, <http://www.justicecenter.ny.gov/services-supports/sdmc> (last visited Mar. 3, 2017).

672. Effiong & Harman, *supra* note 671, at 747; Kirk & Dubler, *supra* note 218.

673. See Karp & Wood, *Incapacitated and Alone*, *supra* note 4, at 20.

674. Kirk & Dubler, *supra* note 218.

behalf of hospice-eligible unbefriended patients.⁶⁷⁵ Basically, the attending physician must make the recommendation in accordance with standard surrogate decision-making standards.⁶⁷⁶ The attending physician must then obtain both a concurring opinion by another physician and approval by the facility's ethics committee.⁶⁷⁷ The bill passed the assembly and is now codified.⁶⁷⁸ Many other states continue to struggle with discharges and transfers, because intramural mechanisms are insufficient.

CONCLUSION

Most authors addressing the strengths and weaknesses of existing healthcare decision-making mechanisms for the unbefriended invoke the language of balance and equilibrium.⁶⁷⁹ Muriel Gillick, for example, writes that “a balance must be struck between the need to protect [the unbefriended] from caregiver bias and institutional self-interest, on the one hand, and a stranger's excessive distance on the other.”⁶⁸⁰ Diane Meier writes that the decision maker must be responsive yet independent.⁶⁸¹

This is an appropriate way to frame the question. On the one hand, we want a decision-making process that is accessible, quick, convenient, and cost-effective. On the other hand, we want a process that provides the important safeguards of expertise, neutrality, and careful deliberation.⁶⁸² The attending physician may be too close and the court appointed guardian may be too far. In striking the balance, we can take guidance from the sliding-scale approach taken in New York and in the VHA that provides oversight proportionate to consequences of the decision.

675. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-g (2016).

676. *See id.*

677. *Id.*

678. *Id.*

679. *See, e.g.,* Gillick, *supra* note 140, at 91; Meier, *supra* note 566, at 376.

680. *See* Gillick, *supra* note 140, at 91.

681. Meier, *supra* note 566, at 376.

682. *See* Karp & Wood, *Incapacitated and Alone*, *supra* note 4, at 47–48; Hyun et al., *supra* note 567, at 5.

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We must gather and review data to assess how these and other currently implemented processes are working. The status quo is unacceptable. The majority of states must legally authorize workable decision-making mechanisms. Failing that, facilities should follow the model of facilities in Santa Clara and Cleveland, and seriously consider adopting policies and processes on their own.